


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CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL



*George C. Beardsall* 49

Julius Caesar
from the marble bust in the British Museum.

CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL

AN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE

(BEING PART I. OF THE LARGER WORK ON
THE SAME SUBJECT)

BY

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PREFACE

IN November, 1899, Messrs. Macmillan published for me a large volume, called *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*, the first part of which contained an historical narrative of the conquest, while the second consisted of articles, systematically grouped in seven sections, on all questions of Gallic and Gallo-Roman history relating to the narrative. Professor Tyrrell, Mr. George Macmillan, and various critics, notably Mr. Haverfield in the *English Historical Review* and Mr. Peskett in the *Classical Review*, have suggested that the first part, reissued as a separate volume, would interest many readers who had not leisure or inclination to study the second. I have been guided by their advice; and although I doubt whether many people in this country would expect to find any narrative of the conquest of Gaul entertaining, I hope that every one who endures to the end of the first chapter of this little book will find it worth while to read on. I have made a few slight alterations and added a few sentences and footnotes; and, in revising the narrative, I have taken note of the observations of eminent scholars in this country, in France and Germany, and in the United States of America, for whose informing criticisms I am not less grateful than for the favourable opinions which they have so generously expressed. Two preliminary notes contained in the first part of the larger edition have been omitted. On the other hand, most of the references

to the second part which were made in footnotes to the original narrative have been retained in this edition for the benefit of any readers who may care to learn more of the subject; and I hope that some few may not rest content with reading the narrative, but may feel moved to consult Part II. of the original edition, which is still in print.

September 6, 1903.

PREFACE

TO THE LARGER EDITION

As this book has far outgrown my original conception, I will explain how it came to assume its existing form. Eleven years ago it occurred to me that an English narrative of Caesar's conquest of Gaul might help to relieve the weariness of the schoolboys whose lot it is to flounder, in ceaseless conflict with the Ablative Absolute, through the pages of the *Commentaries*; might help them to realise that those pages were not written for the purpose of inflicting mental torture, but were the story of events which did really happen, and many of which rival in interest the exploits of Cortes or of Clive. I hoped too that a few "general readers" might, if they could overcome their aversion to the title of the book, find something to interest them in its contents. In my ignorance I promised myself a comparatively easy task. Certain chapters of history, which I had written before, had cost me prolonged research and anxious toil. For the history of the Gallic war, on the other hand, I imagined that virtually the sole original authority was the Memoirs of the conqueror. Virtually the sole original authority, but so great a one that it would be impossible, I thought, for a man who honestly worked upon it to produce a really bad book. So I said to myself, Let me once master the *Commentaries*, and it will go hard with me if I cannot, with the aid of Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, and sundry other books which I must of course consult, evolve from such material a readable narrative. I shall be spared the labour of searching through Blue Books, forgotten memoirs and dusty bundles of MSS. It is

needless to say that I soon found out my mistake. The list of the "sundry other books" was continually lengthening. Though for the narrative as a whole, Caesar is virtually the sole original authority—for Plutarch and Suetonius, Dion Cassius, Florus and Orosius do not count for much—yet, in order to understand his military system and to supplement the information which he gives on certain points, we are obliged to have recourse to many other writers, ancient and mediæval, historians, geographers, chroniclers, compilers of itineraries. He has left many questions obscure,—questions of geography, of ethnology, of sociology, of religion, of politics, and of military science. To throw light upon these questions, and to explain the difficulties in his language, has engaged the labour of a host of scholars,—geographers, antiquaries, anthropologists, ethnologists, archaeologists, military specialists, philologists, learned editors; and the works which they have produced, the greater part of which are scattered in the learned periodicals of foreign countries, would fill a large library. If the bulk of these works are mainly controversial or exegetical, if they are largely devoted to the discussion and elucidation of ancient texts, yet on this point or on that many of them are virtually original authorities. They contain scraps of genuine information, which enable one to fill up gaps in the memoirs of the conqueror. Excavators have discovered disputed sites. Coins, inscriptions, rusty weapons, and even skulls have added items to our store of knowledge. Soldier-scholars, trained to observe the geographical features of a country, have travelled, *Commentaries* in hand, through the length and breadth of France and Belgium and Alsace and Switzerland; and, if prejudiced zeal or local patriotism have often misled them, their united labours have not been in vain.

Nor was this all. It was not enough for my purpose merely to write a narrative of the conquest. I was obliged of course also to write an introduction, in order to render my narrative of the conquest intelligible; and gradually it became evident

that, if I wished to avoid defrauding and insulting the purchasers whom I hoped to attract, even this brief chapter could not be written without recourse to the most recondite materials. Since the publication of the standard histories of Thierry, Mommsen, Merivale and others, new light had been thrown upon the ethnological and other questions which I had set myself to handle. Some opinion I must hazard regarding the degree of political development which the Gauls had reached; and, if it were to be worth printing, I must form it at first hand. I had no intention of writing a history of the Gauls: my subject was only their conquest by Julius Caesar; but I was bound to take as much pains to understand their history as if I had been ambitious of writing it. As I plunged deeper and deeper into the slough, I saw that many of the problems were insoluble; but this did not absolve me from the duty of grappling with them. Even if a historical or geographical problem cannot be solved with mathematical certainty, probability may be attainable; and if one solution is as good or as bad as another, the reader has a right to ask the reason why. It is something even to fix precisely the extent of one's ignorance. Either I must leave the subject alone, or I must master it. If the study of Caesar is arduous, it is fascinating. Year after year I read on and on, quite as much for the delight of learning as with the ambition of instructing. And I determined to do my best to produce something which should not only be useful to teachers and interesting to general readers, but should also be worthy of the notice of scholars and of students of the art of war.

To praise the *Commentaries* of Caesar, *laudatos toties a laudatis*, would be almost impertinent. But I may be allowed to say why I hope that a better fate may yet be in store for them than to serve as a mere whetstone for gerund-grinders. At present, I believe that the book is rarely used in education, at least in this country, except by young boys, and never read through by them. But, even if only one or two of the seven

Commentaries can be read, they can at all events be read not merely as a lesson in construing but also as history. Something, I gladly acknowledge, has already been done to promote this object. Much, however, still remains to be done. Unfortunately, the editions of the *Commentaries* which have been published in this country are defective, especially in the department of geography. Most of the editors are far too prone to submit to the authority of Napoleon. Those of them who have worked in the most intelligent spirit, sometimes, for want of drudgery, lead their readers farthest astray. I know of one who, inspired by the hope of firing the imagination of youthful scholars, embellished his edition with pictures with which only one fault could be found,—that the greater number represented places where Caesar had never been. If a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, a little research is labour thrown away. The fact is that, if a man professes to explain the geography of the Gallic war, he must do one of two things. Either he must go into the subject as an independent inquirer, pursuing his researches whithersoever they may lead him—and to do this requires an amount of labour so enormous that it would not pay the editor of a school-book to undertake it—or he must take Napoleon, or some such writer, as his guide; in which case he will assuredly be led into a great many mistakes.¹

Nor is there any reason, apart from the consideration of what subjects are most remunerative, why Caesar should only be used as an elementary text-book. The reform which I hope to see one day accomplished is that he should be read by more advanced students as well. Boys in the highest class of a public school could easily read the whole work through, side by side with other authors, in the course of a couple of years. By doing so, their knowledge of Latin would gain at least as much as their knowledge of history.

¹ I may be allowed to refer to an article which I contributed to the *Westminster Review* of August 1892, pp. 176-7. The really valuable part of the Emperor's book is that which is based upon the results of Colonel Stoffel's excavations.

I do not know whether educationists will consider this ideal desirable. But is it even attainable? Not certainly at present. It does not "pay" to teach Caesar to the more advanced scholars of public schools. If there is ever to be a reform, it must begin with the universities. And there is another class of students for whom the *Commentaries* would be peculiarly appropriate,—the candidates for the Royal Military Academy and for the Royal Military College.

But this book is not addressed only, not even primarily, to teachers; and for pupils, in its present form, it is of course too costly and too large. The narrative is addressed both to scholars and to those general readers, civil and military, who are interested in history. The second part is addressed in the first instance to scholars; and if it wins their approval, I hope that the labour spent upon it will not repel other readers who are willing to be interested in the subject. Of all that has been done in France, Germany, Italy and Belgium to solve the problems of Gallic history nothing is known in this country, except to a few students. And yet to those who care for history the study would be full of entertainment. The story of the conquest of Gaul, if that of any war of antiquity, is still worth reading; for not only were the operations intrinsically interesting, but their results are of permanent importance. Mr. Freeman was right when he called the conquest "one of the most important events in the history of the world."¹ The war with Hannibal, and it alone, rivals the Gallic war in interest. And the Gallic war has this great advantage over the war with Hannibal, that we know far more about it. Viewed simply as military history, intelligible without being technical, the *Commentaries* are by far the most valuable work of antiquity: they are among the most valuable of any age.² Let any soldier who possesses a fair knowledge

¹ *General Sketch of European History*, 1874, p. 77.

² I am not sure that the *Civil War* is not even more interesting than the *Gallic War*; for in his later work Caesar describes the campaigns which he con-

of Latin read Livy's description of the battle of Cannae: let him then read Caesar's description of the battle with the Nervii, and he will have made up his mind. He will appreciate the difference between military history as written by a mere literary artist and military history as written by a literary artist who was also a general.

I said that I would not take upon myself to praise the *Commentaries*: but when one has derived great and wholesome pleasure from a book, it is hard to refrain from expressing one's gratitude and admiration. Not to repeat encomiums that are familiar to all who take any interest in the classics, I will only speak my own thoughts; for I would fain persuade all who have not wholly forgotten their Latin—all who love good literature; all who can appreciate an informing story well and truly told—to get a copy of Caesar, and read him through from end to end. I sometimes wish that the book had never been used, in the way it has been used, as a school-book at all. For the reminiscences of the Fourth Form are at once so vivid and so dreary, that even classical scholars, many of them, pass through life without reading this great classic. In boyhood they plodded through the pages, chapter by chapter, forgetting one chapter before they began the next, reading one book and missing the others, and of the whole story or even of single episodes forming no idea. Some critics say that the narrative is dull, cold and colourless. I do not believe that any one would maintain these charges if he read the book rapidly through; and otherwise no story can be fairly judged. Macaulay himself might be dull, if he were read by a foreigner at the rate of a single paragraph a day. Caesar certainly did not pour out his spirit with the fervid passion of a Napier. But if a man's heart beats faster when he reads how Badajoz was stormed and how "six thousand unconquerable British soldiers" fought their way up "the

ducted against civilised enemies, one of whom was, as a strategist and tactician, perhaps his equal. (See H. A. Bruce's *Life of General Sir William Napier*, ii. 341.

fatal hill" of Albuera, he will not be unmoved by Caesar's account of the battle with the Nervii or of the last struggle of Vercingetorix. If his eyes become dim when they light on Napier's epitaph on Colonel Ridge—"And no man died that night with more glory; yet many died, and there was much glory"—he will hardly keep down a tear when he reads how Sextius Baculus arose and saved the camp at Aduatuca, "facing fearful odds," till he was borne back fainting to his sick-bed. No, Caesar is not dull, except to minds enervated by sensational reading. There is no tinsel in his narrative: but it is not void of colour. His style is severe: but it is not frigid. Like Thucydides and the historian of the Acts of the Apostles, he has no sentimentality, but no lack of sentiment. His passion never breaks from his control: but it communicates itself to us. Intent simply on telling his tale, he rises without an effort, whenever the subject inspires, to genuine eloquence. It is true that that swift narrative often baffles curiosity, even when curiosity is legitimate: but it is idle to wish a good book other than it is. Enough that this book is worthy of its theme and of its author. We know on the highest authority that even in our age the soldier who means to study his profession cannot afford to neglect the *Commentaries*.¹ And if a time should ever come when for purely professional purposes they shall have lost their value, they will still be worth reading for themselves.² They were written, with a purpose no doubt

¹ "The statement," says General Maurice (*War*, 1891, p. 12), "of the most brilliant and successful general of the British army of to-day appears to be indisputable that a perusal of the words of even Caesar himself will suggest to any thoughtful soldier who knows something also of modern war, reflections that he may afterwards recall with advantage as applicable to modern campaigns." (See Lord Wolseley's *The Soldier's Pocket-Book*, 5th ed., p. 286.) The great Napoleon, himself a diligent student of the *Commentaries*, recommended all aspiring officers to read them. (*Mémoires, notes et mélanges*, ii. 155.)

² "La partie divine de l'art," writes Colonel Stoffel (*Hist. de Jules César, Guerre civile*, i. v.), "est restée la même et elle ne changera jamais . . . l'étude des campagnes de César est fertile en renseignements. On y trouvera l'application presque constante des vrais principes: tenir ses forces réunies, n'être vulnérable nulle part, marcher avec rapidité sur les points importants, s'en rapporter aux moyens moraux, à la réputation de ses armes, à la crainte qu'on

but still in the main honestly, by the greatest man of the world who has ever lived; and men of the world who are also lovers of literature will best appreciate and most enjoy them. Whoever cares for a great book in a small compass, and will give it the attention that it demands; whoever can appreciate literary qualities that have fallen out of fashion but will have their turn again—masculine strength, simplicity, directness, reserve, relevancy: and, above all, the natural dignity that belongs to “the foremost man of all this world” writing the history that he had himself made—whoever cares for these things should read Caesar’s *Commentaries*, and he will have his reward.¹

Let me try to explain the scope of my own book. It does not narrate the events of the conquest in precisely the same detail, from first to last, in which Caesar narrated them; for such a narrative, even if it were skilfully composed, would inevitably weary a modern reader; and where it wearied, it would also fail to instruct. Caesar doubtless knew, though it was not his way to say so, that his book would be a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί*: but he wrote, first of all, for his own generation; and, regarded as material for history, some of his matter, if only a little, has lost its interest. Nothing, for instance, would be gained by narrating in full detail the campaign of Crassus in Aquitania. The general reader would be bored by what he could not but regard as an anticlimax to the more dramatic struggle of Caesar with the Veneti; and the student of Roman warfare would learn nothing that he might not learn as well or better from a study of the operations which Caesar con-

inspire et aussi aux moyens politiques pour maintenir dans la fidélité ses alliés, dans l’obéissance les peuples conquis; se donner toutes les chances possibles pour s’assurer la victoire sur le champ de bataille; pour cela faire, y réunir toutes ses troupes. On y remarquera la promptitude dans l’exécution, l’habileté à profiter de la victoire. Enfin on reconnaîtra chez César . . . un chef . . . en qui ni la bonne ni la mauvaise fortune . . . ne troublent l’équilibre.”

¹ But he will not appreciate the forbearance of Caesar’s character unless he goes on to read the *Commentaries on the Civil War*. See, for instance, i. 71-85, and Long’s *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 63-4, 66, 71-4.

ducted in person. On the other hand, of such events as the siege of Avaricum, the blockade of Alesia, the campaign of that great marshal, Labienus, against the Parisii, indeed of almost every operation of the war, I have tried to give a full and clear account, which might at once satisfy professional and interest general readers. Moreover, knowledge derived from personal exploration of the country, from the results of excavation, from Cicero's letters and other ancient authorities, from the researches of anthropologists, and from various monuments, has made it possible, as the reader of the Second Part will discover, to fill up certain gaps in Caesar's narrative. The two expeditions to Britain I have, of course, not described at all, but only made such a passing allusion to them as was necessary to a right understanding of my subject,—the conquest of Gaul. I do not profess to have followed the whole of Caesar's track, because the thing is impossible: only sections of the track can be traced with certainty, and we often have to be content with the knowledge of the general direction of his march. But I have travelled long distances in order to explore the known sites at which important events occurred. I hold that discussions on questions of evidence ought to be rigidly excluded from narrative; and my narrative therefore takes for granted the conclusions at which I have arrived in the Second Part of the book. Let me take the opportunity of expressing my gratitude to Colonel Stoffel, the principal collaborator of the late Emperor Napoleon, who has sent me a most interesting account, which will be found on pp. xxviii.-xxx., of the method by which he discovered Caesar's camps and entrenchments near Mont Auxois (Alesia) and at other places; and also to Major-General J. F. Maurice and Major-General Sir Coleridge Grove, who allowed me to consult them on certain military questions, which are discussed in Part II., and whose opinions, I was glad to find, generally confirmed my own conclusions.

One word regarding the Second Part of this volume. I

dare say the impatient reader, who measures its length against that of the narrative, will be inclined to reverse Prince Hal's dictum, and cry, "Oh, monstrous! but one half-pennyworth of sack to this intolerable deal of bread." But the remedy is in his own hands. It is not for me to warrant the quality of my sack: but whoever has no appetite for the bread can leave it untouched. It happened once at a dinner party that the lady whom I had taken in asked me whether I had read an account of a certain battle by a famous historian. I replied that I had not, but that, if the critics were to be believed, it was most likely full of mistakes. "What does that matter," rejoined my neighbour, "so long as he makes a good battle of it?" It was a delicious little speech; and I verily believe that, if it had been addressed to the late Mr. Freeman, he would not have had the heart to scold the lady. For my part, I have always been grateful to her for her frank avowal. She made it so clear to me that the majority of readers who take up a history care nothing whether it is accurate or not, provided it is interesting. Still, while I should like to think I had succeeded in "making a good battle of it," I do like to make sure that this or that statement is true before committing it to paper; and so, for my own satisfaction and for the satisfaction of scholars and the few general readers who are not satisfied with results, but want to know the evidence on which they are based, I have written my Appendix. Those who are at all familiar with the difficulties of the subject will not think that it has run to an undue length.¹ For a writer who deals with ancient history is at one great disadvantage as compared with a writer whose period falls within more recent times. He is obliged to spend years of labour in finding out the truth on matters of geography, military science and the like, which his fellow-labourer finds ready to his hand.

My object in writing the Second Part has been to determine

¹ Long indeed remarks (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iv. 4) that an adequate commentary on Caesar's memoirs "would fill several volumes"; but this was the estimate of a man who had not attempted the task.

what can and what cannot be proved in regard to those points which are still in dispute, and to furnish readers with the materials for forming their own opinion. My method has been not only to state my own reasons for the opinions which I have formed, but also to present, in the briefest possible compass, the reasons for the views from which I dissent. It is true that a point can hardly be called disputed when a decision, all but unanimously accepted, is cavilled at by a few crotcheteers. Astronomers do not waste their time in defending the conclusions of Copernicus and Kepler against the assaults of "Parallax"; and I once thought that it would not be worth while to answer the objections of the antiquaries who, even after the appearance of the famous article by the Duc d'Aumale in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, of the *Dictionnaire archéologique de la Gaule*, of M. A. de Barthélemy's admirable article in the *Revue des Questions Historiques*, and of Ernest Desjardins's candid recantation, persisted in identifying Alesia with Alaise. But, for reasons which I have given in the Appendix, I decided that it would be expedient to treat M. Quicherat and his school, and even M. Maissiat, with more respect than "Parallax."

So far as I am aware, this is the only English narrative which deals specially with Caesar's conquest of Gaul. Narratives more or less detailed are to be found in Mr. Froude's *Caesar*, in Mr. Warde Fowler's *Julius Caesar*, in Colonel Dodge's *Caesar*, in Dean Merivale's *History of the Romans under the Empire*, in Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, and in the English translations of Mommsen's *Römische Geschichte*, the late Emperor Napoleon's *Histoire de Jules César*, and Duruy's *Histoire des Romains*. None of these writers, however, makes any systematic and comprehensive attempt to discuss doubtful points; and even the von Gölers, father and son, in *Cæsars Gallischer Krieg*, which has not been translated, have not regarded this task as falling within their scope. Indeed there has not hitherto appeared in any language a book which attempts to collect, to co-ordinate and to estimate the results

of the innumerable researches which have aimed at throwing light upon the problems of Gallic history, and most of which are practically inaccessible. Mommsen, strictly subordinating his narrative to his great historical scheme, goes into details hardly at all. Mr. Froude writes, not as a military historian but as the biographer of Caesar; and his brilliant sketch, which has been as enthusiastically, if not as widely, admired as his larger works, necessarily omits much that would interest not only military but even general readers. On geographical questions he almost invariably follows Napoleon; and his book would certainly have been not less trustworthy than it is if he had never looked at any other commentary. The scheme of his work and the rules of art compel him to dismiss battles, such as that with the Helvetii or Ariovistus, in a single sentence; even when he is describing such important operations as the siege of Avaricum or the attack on Gergovia, he leaves very much to the imagination of his readers; and throughout his narrative he draws freely upon his own.¹ Indeed, as he apparently wrote the entire work in less than a year,² it is safe to say that he did not waste much time in investigation. Colonel Dodge's account, which, like Mr. Fowler's brief sketch, did not appear until the rough draft of my own narrative had been completed, is sufficiently full: but he too, like Mr. Froude, is a faithful follower of Napoleon; and Napoleon, as I shall show, makes many serious mistakes. The colonel claims credit for having studied the works of "the best recognised modern critics," and for having visited "the theatre of Caesar's campaign and his many battle-fields." But if a man wants to find out what can and what cannot be known about the Gallic war, he must not shrink from the labour of checking the

¹ See my article in the *Westminster Review* of August 1892, pp. 174-89.

² In a letter, dated May 3, 1878, to Mr. John Skelton, Froude says, "I am reading up Caesar and his times, with a view to writing a book about him." In a letter dated February 6, 1879, he says, "'Caesar' is in the press." The book was published some time before July of the same year. (*Blackwood's Magazine*, December 1894, pp. 772, 774.)

opinions of "the best recognised modern critics" by the works of unrecognised scholars who have wrought diligently in the same field; and, if I may be pardoned the Hibernicism, it is of no use to visit battle-fields, unless it is certain that battles were fought upon them. Merivale wrote before the modern era of continental research had begun: he worked upon a scale which forbade him to describe military operations in detail; and I am obliged to say that whoever compares his pages with the *Commentaries* will find that some of his most impressive passages are purely fictitious.¹ Long's narrative, which forms the bulk of his fourth volume, is very full,—too full perhaps in parts: but Long had a hearty contempt for the general reader. Moreover, his knowledge of Gallic geography, although thoroughly sound, was very far from complete. Every student of Caesar is, indeed, under the deepest obligations to him; for no man ever brought a stronger judgement to the study of the problems which Caesar left us to solve. He knew his ancient texts by heart: he was perfectly familiar with the works of such modern authorities as d'Anville, Walckenaer, Rüstow and von Göler: but of the enormous mass of articles which are scattered among the transactions of the numerous French archaeological societies and other periodical publications, as well as of the numberless monographs and pamphlets which have been published independently, and of the mediæval chronicles which bear upon the subject, he knew very little. No doubt ninety-nine hundredths of the printed matter contained in these works are valueless: but amid the dross of verbiage and declamation with which too many of them abound there lie embedded grains of solid information. Moreover, since Long wrote, light has been thrown upon various matters, which, in his time, were obscure.

It is to be wished rather than hoped that the appalling mass of printed matter which, for four centuries, has been accumulating round the *Commentaries*, may not be swelled in

¹ See pp. 128, n. 1, 133, n. 3, *infra*.

the future by mere verbiage. If only the editors of German periodicals would restrain the ardour of the emendators who inundate them with futile conjectures, they would be setting a good example. The *Tabula Coniecturarum* which Meusel prints at the end of his great *Lexicon Caesarianum* fills thirty-six pages super royal octavo, closely printed in double columns; and of all these conjectures those which really deserve the name of emendations would not fill a single page; while those which have been unanimously adopted might be counted upon the fingers of one hand. In the Greek state of Locri there was a rule that whoever proposed a new law should do so with a rope round his neck, and, if his proposal were rejected, should be strangled on the spot. It would be a good thing if editors would combine to deal with emendators in a like spirit. Death would perhaps be an excessive penalty even for a bad conjecture: but whoever proposed an emendation which failed within a certain period to win general acceptance might be forbidden ever to contribute to a learned periodical again.¹ We have not yet got, nor will conjectural emendation give us, a final critical edition of the *Commentaries*: but for the purposes of history, in the most comprehensive sense of the word, the text is good enough. Very few of the passages in which it is uncertain offer a stumbling-block to the historian; and those mainly in points of minute detail. Many of the geographical and other problems are now solved; and I hope that I have succeeded in contributing something to the result. Others, as I have tried to show, are at present insoluble, and must remain so unless and until fresh discoveries throw light upon them. But excavation, carried out regardless of cost and intelligently directed, has already been so active in France that I doubt whether, for the period of Caesar's campaigns, it has many surprises in store for us. It is perhaps conceivable

¹ If these remarks had not been misunderstood, I should have thought it unnecessary to say that they were directed not against the use but against the abuse of conjecture. [26.8.03.]

that the future may reveal some lost memoirs which may supplement Caesar's own narrative. But even if our positive knowledge is not destined to be increased, we know enough already for essential purposes; and the most that further research or happy chance can bring to light is very little in comparison with what has been already discovered. And when the catalogue of "programmes" and dissertations is complete, when modern research and modern literary skill shall have combined to produce the final history of the Gallic war, the unpretending little book which Caesar wrote two thousand years ago in the scanty leisure of a busy life will outlive them all.

11 DOURO PLACE, KENSINGTON, W.

July 23, 1899.

THE BUSTS OF JULIUS CAESAR

WHOEVER wishes to know all that can be known about the busts of Caesar should read Bernoulli's learned and beautifully illustrated *Römische Ikonographie*. That work will tell him what busts are generally regarded as authentic: but what we really want to know is which of the authentic busts offers the most faithful likeness; and this is what neither Bernoulli nor any one else can certainly tell. It comes to this, that every one must study for himself Caesar's history, form his own idea of his character, and then use his own judgement: and if a man distrusts his own judgement and finds a learned treatise tiresome, perhaps he might do worse than take Mr. Baring Gould for his guide. It is true that the author of *The Tragedy of the Caesars* sometimes lets his imagination run away with him. He has, I think, idealised the character of Caesar, and read his ideal in, or rather into his favourite busts. But it is impossible for him to take pen in hand without being interesting; and, accurate or not, a man of his calibre cannot fail to throw light upon any subject with which he deals.

A portrait which has done duty in many works on Caesar is taken from the colossal bust of Naples. This seems to me, not indeed, as Mr. Baring Gould¹ thinks, characterless, but, at any rate, no true presentment of the character of Caesar. The face is powerful, but heavy if not brutal.²

Mr. Warde Fowler,³ suggests that the real Caesar may be represented by the green basalt bust of Berlin. The breadth of skull which characterises the marble bust in the British Museum, and, in varying degrees, all the others, is absent from this: but Mr. Baring Gould⁴ suggests that the block of basalt which the sculptor used may have been too narrow. Surely this is pushing conjecture too far. M. Salomon Reinach,⁵ on the other hand, points out that the type of the basalt bust is not to be found on any of the coins of Caesar,⁶ and that it is similar to the type represented in the bust of an Alexandrine Greek in the Imperial Museum of Vienna. Mr. J. C. Ropes,⁷ indeed,

¹ *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 3, 116.

² The illustrations of this bust in Mongez's *Iconographie romaine* (tome ii.) are idealised. Compare them with Taf. xiii. in Bernoulli's book.

³ *Classical Review*, vii., 1893, p. 103.

⁴ *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 106.

⁵ *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, 3^e pér., t. vii., 1892, pp. 474-6.

⁶ See the beautiful illustrations of the coins in H. Cohen's *Description générale des monnaies de la république romaine*, 1857.

⁷ *Scribner's Mag.*, i., 1887, pp. 132, 135.

speaks of "a mark by which one can generally recognise the authentic busts of Caesar, namely a scar or furrow on the left side of the face"; and he adds that this mark is to be found on the bust in the British Museum, and also on the basalt bust. There is certainly a furrow on the left side of the bust in the British Museum: but there is a corresponding, though shorter, furrow on the right side; and I used to think that both of them simply represented lines such as are to be seen on the faces of many men who have passed middle life. I have, however, since noticed that some of the coins¹ show a furrow on the right cheek with great distinctness. But, whatever may be the worth of the furrows as evidence, Bernoulli, as well as M. Reinach, questions the authenticity of the basalt bust; and only an enthusiast could detect any similarity between it and any of the other busts the authenticity of which is admitted.

M. Geoffroy,² the director of the *École française de Rome*, remarks that Signor Barracco possesses a bust of Caesar, the genuineness of which is proved by its bearing on the crown of the head the star mentioned by Suetonius. Undoubtedly this bust was intended to represent Caesar: but what proof is there that the artist ever saw Caesar, or even worked with an authentic portrait before him? If any one thinks this question vexatious, I beg him to suspend his judgement until he has finished reading this note. Suetonius³ says that, on the occasion of the first games which Augustus held in honour of Julius, a comet appeared; that the comet was regarded as a sign that Caesar's soul had been received into heaven; and that, in consequence, the image of a star was placed upon the head of his bust. Now M. Geoffroy cannot prove that the bust in Signor Barracco's possession is the very bust of which Suetonius speaks, or even a replica of it; for it is probable that a posthumous bust or busts were produced with a star upon the head; and if Signor Barracco's bust was posthumous, as he himself believes that it was,⁴ it must either have been a copy of an original or simply a work of memory or of imagination. It was found in the delta of the Nile; and two photographs of it are reproduced in a volume entitled *La collection Barracco*, by G. Barracco and W. Helbig. The face is covered with a beard of about a fortnight's growth.⁵ The shape of the head is strikingly different from that of the bust in the British Museum, and its relative breadth is much less; though in both the forehead, as distinguished from the head itself, is remarkably narrow. In expression the two busts have hardly any resemblance.

Mr. Baring Gould has a very high opinion of the bust in the

¹ See Bernoulli, Nos. 53 and 62, and Mommsen, *Hist. de la monnaie rom.*, t. iv. Pl. xxxii. No. 5.

² *Rev. arch.*, 3^e sér., t. xx., 1892, p. 256.

³ *Divus Iulius*, c. 88. Cf. *Archæologische Zeitung*, xix., 1867, pp. 110-13.

⁴ "Nous pouvons conclure que la statue dont provient notre tête fut exécutée après la consécration de César." *La collection Barracco*, by G. Barracco and W. Helbig, 1893-4, p. 51.

⁵ The authors of *La collection Barracco* conjecture that Caesar had let his beard grow as a sign of mourning for Pompey, just as, according to Suetonius (*Divus Iulius*, c. 67), he did while he was avenging the massacre at Aduatuca.

British Museum: so has Bernoulli;¹ and, given the authenticity of the bust, which is generally admitted,² I do not think that any one could doubt that it was the work of a sculptor who, as Mr. Baring Gould says, "knew Caesar and loved him," or at least understood and admired him. But Mr. Baring Gould tells us that Mr. Conrad Dressler, the sculptor, who shares his admiration for the bust, has pronounced that Caesar could not have sat to the artist, because the extraordinary breadth of the skull above the ears is anatomically impossible.³ When I read this it struck me as most unlikely that a sculptor who is assumed to have known Caesar well would have cared to model his bust from memory, or that his memory would have been so defective; and it seemed quite incredible that a sculptor who was capable of producing such a work of art should have lacked an elementary knowledge of anatomy. I asked Mr. Hope Pinker, whose bust of Sir Henry Acland is a speaking likeness, for his opinion. It confirmed my own. Have Mr. Baring Gould and Mr. Dressler forgotten the bust of the youthful Augustus which stands in the British Museum, within a few feet of the bust of Caesar? Let them look at it again, and I think they will admit that its breadth above the ears is just as remarkable as that of its neighbour.⁴

Mr. Baring Gould considers a bust in the Louvre, of which he gives an illustration, as good in its way as the bust in our national collection: but it seems to him to represent the militant rather than the reflective side of Caesar's character.⁵ To my mind the bust in the British Museum represents, as a bust should do, not one side of the man's character, but the whole. The bust in the Louvre has features of the Caesarian type; but the expression is quite different. Mr. Dressler has remarked that, in default of direct evidence, there is no better test of the fidelity of a portrait than the impression which it leaves upon the mind of an intelligent observer.⁶ The test is obviously imperfect: but it is worth pages of discussion. Nor would I hesitate to apply that test, according to the measure of my intelligence, if only it were certain that the bust in the British Museum is really an authentic bust of Julius Caesar. But even this certainty is wanting. There is not in existence a single bust of which it can be said, with absolute certainty, both that the sculptor intended it to be a portrait of Caesar, and also that either Caesar sat for the likeness or the sculptor had personal knowledge or

¹ "Among those busts," says Bernoulli (p. 171), "which recommend themselves by their resemblance to the coins this is the one which most suggests Caesar."

² Mr. Cecil Smith, of the British Museum, tells me that Herr Furtwängler, the well-known writer on classical sculpture, regards the bust as a forgery. I have not been able to discover any reference to it in those works of Herr Furtwängler, which are catalogued in the Museum. If the sculptor was a forger, he was also a genius; but no forger would have thought of portraying that narrow forehead in combination with a broad head. [M. Salomon Reinach, in a review of the larger edition of this book, asserts that the bust is "modern."]

³ *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 114-15.

⁴ Only the other day I saw a child, whose head, extraordinarily broad, projected above the ears as much as that depicted by the bust in the Museum. [16.11.97.] The bust is not more brachycephalic than the heads of many living Auvergnats and inhabitants of the department of Jura.

⁵ *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 115.

⁶ *Ib.*, pp. 9-10.

an authentic likeness to guide him. Some years ago I asked an eminent authority on Greek and Roman sculptures whether there was any doubt of the authenticity of the marble bust. "Oh! no," he answered; "no doubt whatever." But he could not give me any proof. The bust was once believed to represent Cicero. If physiognomy is any index to character, it is certain that that calm face bore no resemblance to his: but the conjecture, absurd as it was, would never have been made if there had been direct evidence that the bust was intended for Caesar. Evidence, however, there is none for the authenticity of this or of any one of the so-called busts of Caesar, except such evidence as is to be got from the study of the texts and of the coins. The evidence of the texts is very scanty; and most of the coins differ widely among themselves.¹ The contemporary coins which bore Caesar's effigy were the work of five different agents,—L. Aemilius Buca, L. Flaminius Chilo, M. Mettius, P. Sepullius Macer, and C. Cossutius Maridianus. None of them were struck before 44 B.C., the year of Caesar's death. Others, known as the Voconian group, were executed a few years later.² In the *Description of the collection of Ancient Marbles in the British Museum*³ it is affirmed that there is an agreement among the Aemilian and Voconian coins "which is perfectly satisfactory," and that with all of them the bust in the Museum "exhibits a striking similarity." Well, the reader should look through Cohen's *Description générale des monnaies de la république romaine*, and judge for himself. The Aemilian coins are numbered 15, 16, 17, and 18 on Plate ii.; the Voconian 1 and 2 on Plate xlii. No. 2 certainly resembles 15, but differs widely from 1; 17 and 18 are about as much like the others as Gladstone was like Beaconsfield; and, in expression, none of the six resembles any of the busts. All that can be said is that, in profile, there is a general resemblance between No. 15, No. 2, Nos. 2 and 3 on Plate xvi., 3 on Plate xviii., and 4 on Plate xxxvii.; that the type of face depicted on these six coins is not unlike that of the bust in the British Museum; and that the lean muscular neck shown in the former resembles that of the latter. When one looks at different portraits of any well-known modern face, one can always tell at a glance whom they were intended to represent. Similarly, the portraits of Queen Elizabeth, for instance, are all unmistakable. And, to go back to ancient times, it does not need an expert to tell that the busts of Augustus were all intended to portray the same face. But the busts of Caesar differ from each other so much in expression, and some of them even in feature, that, although there is a certain vague "Caesarian" type common to all, an untrained eye, if the inscriptions were removed, would probably take them for portraits of different men. The conclusion appears to be either that most of the sculptors were unable

¹ The face on a coin in the British Museum, an illustration of which is given in Mr. Warde Fowler's *Caesar*, is that of an imbecile buffoon.

² E. Babelon, *Descr. hist. et chron. des monnaies de la république rom.*, 1886, t. i., p. 497, t. ii., p. 560; Mommsen, *Hist. de la monnaie rom.*, t. ii., 1870, p. 545, n. 1.

³ Part xi., 1861, pp. 39-40.

to catch a likeness, or that most of them worked from memory or imagination, or, finally, that some of the busts were not meant to represent Caesar at all. But this much is certain:—if the original of the bust in the British Museum was not Caesar, he was a very great man, perhaps the noblest Roman of them all; and who? The experts cannot help us to arrive at a definite conclusion; and for my part I am content to accept as the likeness of Caesar the noble bust which has approved itself to Mr. Froude, to Bernoulli, to Mr. Baring Gould, and to other well-qualified judges.¹

This bust represents, I venture to say, the strongest personality that has ever lived, the strongest which poet or historian, painter or sculptor has ever portrayed. In the profile it is impossible to detect a flaw: if there is one in the full face, it is the narrowness of the forehead as compared with the breadth of the skull. The face appears that of a man in late middle age. He has lived every day of his life, and he is beginning to weary of the strain: but every faculty retains its fullest vigour. The harmony of the nature is as impressive as its strength. No one characteristic dominates the rest. Not less remarkable than the power of the countenance are its delicacy and fastidious refinement. The man looks perfectly unscrupulous; or, if the phrase be apt to mislead, he looks as if no scruple could make him falter in pursuit of his aim: but his conduct is governed by principle. Passion, without which, it has been truly said, there can be no genius, inspires his resolve and stimulates its execution: but passion, in the narrow sense, is never suffered to warp his action. He is kindly and tolerant: but, to avoid greater ills, he would shed blood without remorse. "The mild but inexorable yoke of Caesar,"—so Mr. Strachan-Davidson² describes the ascendancy to which Cicero reluctantly submitted; and mild inexorability is apparent in the expression of this man. He can be a charming companion to men; and, though he is no longer young, he knows how to win the love of women. He sees facts as they are, accepts and makes the best of them. Knowledge of men has made him cynical: but the cynicism is dashed by humour. Look at the profile from the left, and you will note an expression of restrained amusement, as of one who is good-naturedly observant of the weaknesses of his fellows. If his outlook passes beyond mundane things and strains

¹ In the *Description of the collection of Ancient Marbles in the British Museum* (Part xi., pp. 39-40) it is asserted that "the general character of the features of Caesar are as well known and as clearly marked as those of any personage of Roman times," and that "the features of the marble bust agree with them." If this statement requires some qualification, it may, I think, be affirmed that the marble bust agrees as well as any other with the coins, and that, as Bernoulli says, it is the one which "most suggests Caesar." It is interesting to compare it with Visconti's illustrations (in Mongez's *Iconographie romaine*, t. ii.) of the Neapolitan, Capitoline and St-Cloud busts. These three, though they differ in expression, represent, I feel sure, the same man. The lines of the forehead in them and in the British Museum bust are alike; and there is a certain resemblance in the profile and the shape of the head, though the jaw in the St-Cloud bust is squarer, and the chin more prominent than in the other three. The ear of the former is very like that of the British Museum bust, and, like it, lies very close to the head.

² *Cicero*, 1894, p. 268.

after the unknown, he does not let us into the secret of his thoughts. But if the ordinary observer is unable to discern that look of faith, that "far-off look" which Mr. Baring Gould¹ loves to fancy that he can read in the expression, he cannot fail to recognise the stamp not only of will and of intellect, but also of nobility. The bust represents a man of the world, in the fullest meaning of the term. It alone represents a man such as Caesar has revealed himself in his writings, and as his contemporaries have revealed him in theirs; and that is why I have chosen it to illustrate this book.

[Mr. Frank J. Scott, of Toledo, U.S.A., has recently published a book, called *The Portraiture of Julius Caesar*, which contains illustrations of all or nearly all the busts, coins, and gems that have been regarded as meant to portray Caesar's features. That many of them were so meant is certain; but which of them was the best likeness, and whether any one of them was executed from life, are problems that remain unsolved.]

¹ *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, i. 114-15.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	v
PREFACE TO THE LARGER EDITION	vii
THE BUSTS OF JULIUS CAESAR	xxii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	xxxvi

CHAPTER I

Gaulic invasion of Italy : battle of the Allia and its results	1
Gaulic tribes assist the enemies of Rome	1
The Romans fight their way to the Po	2
And conquer Cisalpine Gaul	2
Formation of the Roman Province in Transalpine Gaul	3
Gaul and its inhabitants	4
Ethnology of Gaul	5
Civilisation of the Gauls	10
Their political and social organisation	12
The Druids	16
Invasions of the Cimbri and Teutoni	18
Invasion of Ariovistus	19
Revolt of the Allobroges	20
Threatened invasion of the Helvetii	20
Consulship of Caesar	21
How he attempted to provide against the Helvetian danger	22
He is appointed Governor of Gaul	22
His army	23
His intentions	25

CHAPTER II

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE HELVETH AND ARIOVISTUS

Caesar hears that the Helvetii are about to march through the Province	26
He hastens to Geneva and destroys the bridge	26
Helvetian envoys ask his leave to use the road through the Province	26

	PAGE
He promises to reply in a fortnight, and meanwhile fortifies the left bank of the Rhône	27
He prevents the Helvetii from crossing	27
The Sequani allow them to march through the Pas de l'Écluse	28
Caesar goes back to Cisalpine Gaul, returns with reinforcements, and encamps above the confluence of the Rhône and the Saône	28
The Aedui solicit his aid against the Helvetii	29
He defeats and disperses the rearguard of the Helvetii	29
His passage of the Saône	29
The Helvetii attempt to negotiate, but reject Caesar's terms	29
They march northward, followed by Caesar	30
Caesar pressed for supplies, owing to the intrigues of Dumnorix	31
His abortive attempt to surprise the Helvetii	32
He marches for Bibracte (Mont Benvray) to get supplies	33
Defeat of the Helvetii near Bibracte	35
Caesar's treatment of the fugitives	35
Settlement of the Boii	36
Envoys from Celtic Gaul congratulate Caesar, and solicit his aid against Ariovistus	36
Failure of his attempts to negotiate with Ariovistus	37
He marches against Ariovistus and seizes Vesontio (Besançon)	39
Panic in the Roman army	39
How Caesar restored confidence	40
He resumes his march against Ariovistus	41
His conference with Ariovistus	41
Mission of Troucillus and Mettius	43
Ariovistus cuts Caesar's line of communication	43
How Caesar regained command of it	43
The Germans from superstition delay to fight a pitched battle	44
Caesar attacks them	44
They are defeated and expelled from Gaul	45
Caesar quarters his legions at Vesontio	46
Significance of this step	46

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELGAE

Results of the first campaign	47
The Belgae conspire against Caesar	47
Caesar returns to Gaul and marches against them	48
The Remi submit and help Caesar	48
He sends Divitiacus to ravage the lands of the Bellovaci	49
Marches to encounter the advancing host, crosses the Aisne, and encamps near Berry-au-Bac	49
The Belgae attack Bibrax (Vieux-Laon)	49
Caesar sends his auxiliaries to the rescue	49
The Belgae encamp opposite Caesar	50
Caesar makes his position impregnable	50
The Belgae attempt to cut his communications, but are defeated	51

CONTENTS

XXXI

	PAGE
They disperse	51
Caesar's cavalry pursue them	51
He marches westward and receives the submission of the Suessiones, Bellovaci and Ambiani	52
The Nervii resolve to resist	53
Caesar marches against them	53
He learns that they and their allies are encamped on the right bank of the Sambre	53
His pioneers mark out a camp on the heights of Neuf-Mesnil	53
Battle of Neuf-Mesnil	54
Caesar treats the survivors with clemency	57
He besieges the stronghold of the Aduatuci	57
They surrender	58
But afterwards make a treacherous attack	58
Their punishment	59
Galba's campaign in the Valais	59
Submission of the tribes of Brittany and Normandy	61
Rejoicings at Rome	61

CHAPTER IV

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE MARITIME TRIBES AND THE AQUITANI

Delusive prospects of peace	62
Rebellion of the Veneti, Curiosolites and Esviii	63
Caesar prepares for a naval war	63
The conference at Luca	63
Caesar returns to Gaul	64
Preparations of the Veneti	64
The Roman fleet weather-bound in the Loire	65
Caesar's fruitless campaign against the Veneti	65
Sea-fight between the Veneti and Brutus	65
Punishment of the Veneti	66
Campaign of Sabinus against the northern allies of the Veneti	66
Brilliant campaign of Crassus in Aquitania	67
Fruitless expedition of Caesar against the Morini	68

CHAPTER V

THE MASSACRE OF THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI

The Usipetes and Tencteri invade Gaul	70
Caesar fears that some of the Gallic tribes may join them	71
He returns to Gaul and summons a Gallic council	71
He marches against the Usipetes and Tencteri	71
And negotiates with their envoys	71
Their cavalry, in violation of a truce, attack his	73
He resolves to attack them at once	73
Arrests their chiefs, who had come ostensibly to apologise	73
And virtually annihilates the host	73

	PAGE
His conduct condemned in the Senate	74
He bridges the Rhine, punishes the Sugambri, and returns to Gaul	74

CHAPTER VI

THE DISASTER AT ADUATUCA AND ITS RESULTS

Caesar's invasions of Britain	76
Intrigues of Dumnorix	76
His fate	77
The Gallic nobles in a dangerous mood	77
Distribution of the legions for the winter of 54-53 B.C.	78
<i>Divide et impera</i>	79
Assassination of King Tasgetius, Caesar's nominee, by the Carnutes	79
Intrigues of Indutiomarus against Caesar	80
The Eburones, under Ambiorix, make a futile attack on the camp of Sabinus and Cotta	81
Ambiorix advises Sabinus to withdraw his force to one of the nearer camps	81
The advice discussed in a council of war	81
In spite of the protests of Cotta, Sabinus decides to abandon the camp	83
The Romans march out	83
They are surrounded by the Eburones	83
And virtually annihilated	85
Ambiorix persuades the Aduatuci and Nervii to join him in attacking Q. Cicero	85
Siege of Cicero's camp	86
A messenger from Cicero carries a despatch to Caesar	88
Caesar marches to relieve Cicero	88
The Gauls abandon the siege, and march to encounter him	89
Defeat of the Gauls	90
Caesar joins Cicero	90
Immediate effects of his victory	91
Many of the nobles continue to intrigue	91
Schemes of Indutiomarus	92
He is outwitted by Labienus, defeated and slain	92
Caesar raises two new legions, and borrows a third from Pompey	93
Continued troubles in north-eastern Gaul	93
Caesar punishes the Nervii	93
Forces the Senones and Carnutes to submit	93
And prepares to punish Ambiorix	94
As a preliminary step, he crushes the Menapii	94
Labienus disperses the Treveri	94
Caesar again crosses the Rhine, and threatens the allies of Ambiorix	94
Returning unsuccessful to Gaul, he marches against Ambiorix	95
The Eburones keep up a guerilla warfare	96
Caesar invites the neighbouring tribes to harry them	97
The Sugambri surprise Cicero	97
Caesar ravages the country of the Eburones	99
Ambiorix eludes pursuit	99
The legions distributed for the winter	99
Execution of Aeco	100

CHAPTER VII

THE REBELLION OF VERCINGETORIX

	PAGE
News of the murder of Clodius reaches Gaul	101
Gallie chiefs encouraged to conspire against Caesar	101
The Carnutes massacre Roman citizens at Cenabum (Orléans)	102
The news reaches the Arverni	102
Gergovia	102
Vercingetorix, notwithstanding the opposition of the Arvernian govern- ment, rouses popular enthusiasm for rebellion	103
Most of the tribes between the Seine and the Garonne join him, and elect him Commander-in-Chief	103
How he raised an army	103
The dissentient tribes	104
The Bituriges join Vercingetorix	104
Caesar returns with recruits to the Province	104
How shall he rejoin his legions?	104
He rescues the Province from a threatened invasion	105
Crosses the Cevennes, invades Auvergne, and forces Vercingetorix to come to its relief	105
Then seizes the opportunity to rejoin his legions	106
Vercingetorix besieges Gorgobina	106
Caesar marches from Agedineum (Sens) to relieve Gorgobina	106
Captures Vellaunodunum (Montargis ?)	107
Captures and punishes Cenabum	107
Crosses the Loire and captures Noviodunum	108
And marches to besiege Avaricum (Bourges)	108
Vercingetorix persuades the Bituriges and other tribes to burn their towns and granaries	108
The Bituriges, contrary to his advice, resolve to defend Avaricum	109
Siege of Avaricum	109
Storming of Avaricum	114
Indiscriminate massacre	115
Vercingetorix consoles his troops	115
He raises fresh levies	116
Caesar, at the request of the Aedui, decides between rival claimants for the office of Vergobret	116
He sends Labienus to suppress rebellion in the basin of the Seine, and marches himself to attack Gergovia	117
He establishes a magazine at Noviodunum (Nevers)	117
Crosses the Allier by a stratagem	118
And encamps before Gergovia	119
First operations at Gergovia	119
Defection of the Aeduan Vergobret	120
An Aeduan contingent, marching to join Caesar, persuaded by its leader to declare for Vercingetorix	120
Caesar makes a forced march, overawes the contingent, and returns just in time to rescue his camp	121
Outrages of the Aedui against Roman citizens	122

	PAGE
Anxiety of Caesar	123
He attempts to take Gergovia by a <i>coup-de-main</i>	123
The attack repulsed with heavy loss	126
Caesar marches to rejoin Labienus	126
His critical position	127
Eporedorix and Viridomarus seize Noviodunum, and try to prevent Caesar from crossing the Loire	127
He saves himself by a series of extraordinary marches	128
Labienus's campaign against the Parisii	129
He extricates himself from a perilous position by victory	131
And marches to rejoin Caesar	131
The rebellion stimulated by the adhesion of the Aedui	132
They claim the direction of the war	132
Vercingetorix re-elected Commander-in-Chief by a general council	132
His plan of campaign	132
He hounds on the neighbours of the Provincial tribes to attack them	133
Caesar enlists German cavalry	134
He marches to succour the Province	134
Vercingetorix attacks Caesar's cavalry	135
And retreats beaten to Alesia (Mont Auxois)	136
Caesar invests Alesia	137
The Gallie cavalry make a sortie, but are beaten	137
Vercingetorix sends them out to fetch succour	137
Caesar constructs lines of contravallation and circumvallation	138
Organisation of an army of relief	140
Famine in Alesia	141
Critognatus proposes cannibalism	141
The fate of the Mandubii	141
Arrival of the army of relief	142
The final struggle	142
The self-sacrifice of Vercingetorix	146
Surrender of the garrison	146
Vercingetorix and his place in history	146
Caesar distributes his legions for the winter	148

CHAPTER VIII

THE END OF THE STRUGGLE

Effects of Caesar's victory at Alesia	150
Various tribes prepare to renew the struggle	150
Caesar disperses the Bituriges and Carnutes	150
Campaign against the Bellovaci	151
Caninius and Fabius compel Dumnacus to raise the siege of Lemonum (Poitiers)	154
Drappes and Lueterius take refuge in Uxellodunum (Puy d'Issolu)	154
Blockade of Uxellodunum	154
Execution of Gutuatus	156
Caesar marches for Uxellodunum	156
He cuts off the garrison from their supply of water	156

CONTENTS

XXXV

	PAGE
Surrender of the garrison	157
Their punishment	157
Caesar follows up coercion by conciliation	158

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION	160
APPENDIX	165
INDEX	173

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Caesar (from the bust in the British Museum)	<i>Frontispiece</i>
Gaul in the time of Caesar	<i>to face page 1</i>
Defeat of the Helvetii	,, 33
Operations on the Aisne	,, 49
Battle of Neuf-Mesnil	,, 53
Gergovia	,, 117
Labienus's campaign against Camulogenus	,, 129
Alesia	,, 133
Uxellodunum	,, 153

[An article on "The Map of Gaul" will be found by any reader who may care to consult it on pages 329-332 of the larger edition of this book.


When pages following 172 are referred to in the footnotes without the mention of any book—for example, "See p. 606" or "See note on GORGOBINA, pp. 426-32"—the reference is to the larger edition.]

NO. 1111
1700

BRITANNIA

GAUL IN THE TIME OF CAESAR

Scale of Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Scale of Roman Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Scale of English Statute Miles
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10



CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THREE centuries before the birth of Caesar, while patrician was still struggling with plebeian, while both were still contending with rival peoples for supremacy, the Gauls first encountered their destined conquerors. For a generation or more,¹ the Celtic wanderers, whose kinsmen had already overflowed Gaul, crossed the Pyrenees and passed into Britain and into Ireland, had been pouring, in a resistless stream, down the passes of the Alps. They spread over Lombardy. They drove the Etruscans from their strongholds in the north. They crossed the Po, and pushed further and further southward into Etruria itself. At length they overthrew a Roman army in the battle of the Allia, and marched unopposed through the Colline Gate. The story of the sack and burning of the city was noised throughout the civilised world; yet the disaster itself hardly affected the history of Rome. It probably tended to rivet the bonds of union between her and the other cities of Latium, and to strengthen her claim to supremacy in Italy. From time to time during the next century the Gauls returned to plunder: but their incursions were repelled; and the champion of Italian civilisation was Rome.


Galic
invasion
of Italy:
battle of
the Allia
and its
results.

388 B.C.

But the Roman dread of the Gauls long remained; and more than once Rome's enemies enlisted their services against her. In the last Samnite war, one of the most crucial events

Galic
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¹ Regarding the date of the Gallic invasion of Italy, and the place from which the invaders came, see pp. 548-50 of the larger edition of this book.



CAESAR'S CONQUEST OF GAUL

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295 B.C. of Roman history, Samnites, Etruscans and Gauls made a desperate effort to crush the rising power; and after this attempt had been frustrated, the Etruscans once again rose in revolt, and their Gallic mercenaries destroyed a Roman army under the walls of Arretium. It was not until the
 283 B.C. Senones had in their turn been defeated and expelled from Italy, and the Boii, who hastened to avenge them, had been
 282 B.C. crushed near the Lake of Vadimo, that the republic was finally released from the fear of Gallic invasion.

The Romans fight their way to the Po; Years passed away. Rome became mistress of the peninsula and determined to vindicate her natural right to the rich plain on her own side of the Alpine barrier. The Gauls offered a strenuous resistance, and even assumed the offensive. Reinforced by a swarm of free-lances from the valley of the upper Rhône, they boldly crossed the Apennines and plundered Etruria. The Romans were taken by surprise: but in the
 225 B.C. great battle of Telamon they checked the invasion; and within two years they fought their way to the right bank of the Po. The Insubres on the northern side still held out: but before the outbreak of the second Punic war Mediolanum, or Milan, their chief stronghold, was captured; and the
 222 B.C. fortresses of Placentia and Cremona were founded.

and conquer Cis-alpine Gaul But the work of conquest was only half completed when
 218 B.C. Hannibal descended into the plain, and the exasperated Gauls rallied round him. When Rome emerged, victorious, from her great struggle, they knew what was in store for them, and made a last desperate effort to win back their liberty.
 200 B.C. Placentia was sacked, and Cremona was invested. The Roman army which marched to its relief gained a victory,
 199 B.C. but was in its turn almost annihilated by the Insubres. The Gauls, however, could never long act together: their countrymen beyond the Alps gave them no help: the league of the northern tribes was rent by discord and treachery; and the
 196 B.C. Insubres and Cenomani were compelled to accept a peace, which allowed them indeed to retain their constitution, but forbade them to acquire the Roman citizenship. South of the Po the Boii strove frantically to hold their own: but in a series of battles their fighting men were well nigh exterminated: the Romans insisted upon the cession of half
 191 B.C.

their territory; and on both sides of the river the survivors were gradually lost among Italian settlers.

Eastward and southward and westward the empire of the Romans spread. They conquered Greece. They conquered Carthage. They conquered Spain. But between the central and the western peninsula they had no means of communication by land save what was afforded by the Greek colony of Massilia. It was an entreaty from the Massiliots for protection that gave occasion to the wars which resulted in the formation of the Province of Transalpine Gaul; and the natural willingness of the Senate to support their most faithful allies was doubtless stimulated by the desire to secure possession of the indispensable strip of coast between the Alps and the Pyrenees, partly also perhaps by the idea of creating a Greater Italy for the growing Italian population. In 155 B.C. the Romans stepped forward as the champions of Massilia against the Ligurian tribes between the Maritime Alps and the Rhône. The highlanders who inhabited the forest-clad mountains above the Riviera were crushed in a single campaign; after an interval of thirty years their western neighbours, the Salyes, were forced to submit; and their seaboard, like that of the other tribes, was given to the Massiliots. But the Romans had come to stay. The Aedui, who dwelt in the Nivernais and western Burgundy, calculated that the support of the Republic would help them to secure ascendancy over their rivals; and by a treaty, fraught with unforeseen issues, they were recognised as Friends and Allies of the Roman people. The Allobroges, on the other hand, whose home was between the Lake of Geneva, the Rhône and the Isère, refused to surrender the king of the Salyes, who had claimed their protection; and the king of the Arverni, with all the hosts of his dependent tribes, marched to support them. Just twenty years before the birth of Caesar a great battle was fought at the confluence of the Rhône and the Isère. The Gauls were beaten; and the bridges over the Rhône broke down beneath the multitude of the fugitives.

This victory was, in the strictest sense, decisive. The Romans were now masters of the lower Rhône; and if they were ever to penetrate into Further Gaul, their base could

Formation
of the
Roman
Province in
Transal-
pine Gaul.

[Mar-
seilles.]

125 B.C.

123 B.C.

121 B.C.

be advanced some hundreds of miles. The Arverni, whose hegemony had extended to the Rhine and the Mediterranean, had received a blow from which they never recovered.

The Province which was now formed stretched from the Maritime Alps to the Rhône. Succeeding consuls rapidly extended the frontier until it ran along the Cevennes and the river Tarn down into the centre of the Pyrenees. The tribes were obliged to pay tribute; and their subjection was assured by the construction of roads and fortresses. The heavy exactions of the conquerors provoked frequent insurrections; but year by year the Provincials became steadily Romanised. Roman nobles acquired estates in the Province, and sent their stewards to manage them. Roman merchants built warehouses and counting-houses in the towns; and the language and civilisation of Rome began to take root.¹ Narbo with its spacious harbour was not only a powerful military station, but in commerce the rival of Massilia. Meanwhile events were paving the way for the conquest of the great country that stretched beyond the Rhône and the Cevennes to the Rhine and the Atlantic Ocean.

[Nar-
bonne.]

Gaul and
its inhabi-
tants.

The aspect of this region was, of course, very different from that of the beautiful France with which we are familiar. The land of gay cities, of picturesque old towns dominated by awful cathedrals, of corn-fields and vineyards and sunny hamlets and smiling chateaux, was then covered in many places by dreary swamps and darkened by huge forests. Gaul extended far beyond the limits of modern France, including a large part of Switzerland, Alsace and Lorraine, Belgium and southern Holland. The people were divided into three groups, differing in race, language, manners and institutions. Between the Garonne and the Pyrenees were the Aquitani, of whom certain tribes were akin to the Iberians of Spain. North-east of the Seine and the Marne, in the plains of Picardy, Artois and Champagne, on the mist-laden flats of the Scheldt and the lower Rhine and in the vast forest of the Ardennes, dwelt the Belgae, who may have partially mixed and were continually at war with their German neighbours. The lowlands of Switzerland, Alsace

¹ Cicero, *Pro. Fonteio*, 11.

and Franche Comté, the great plains and the uplands of central France, and the Atlantic seaboard, were occupied by the Celts.

Modern science, however, has established a more detailed classification. Neither in Aquitania nor in Celtica nor in the land of the Belgae were the people homogeneous. To what era is to be assigned the first appearance of man in Gaul, is still a disputed question. Some ethnologists affirm that even in the tertiary epoch, more than a million years ago, the country round Aurillac was inhabited by men, if men they can be called, who wrought for themselves flint implements which remain as their sole memorial.¹ Even after the close of that period our own country was still part of the continent, and the great ice-age had not yet begun. Thenceforward uncertainty disappears. In the quaternary epoch came the palæolithic races, whose existence is attested not only by their weapons but by their own remains. These men maintained themselves in Gaul during the second interglacial epoch, and sheltered in caves throughout the countless centuries in which the glaciers were spreading and receding and spreading again over the uplands of central Europe.² Earliest of all were the Neanderthal, or, as they are sometimes called, the Canstadt race, with their low brutish foreheads and huge beetling brows, whose skeletons have been found in the basin of the Meuse and between the valley of the Rhine and Auvergne. Towards the close of this epoch appeared the dawn of pictorial art. From the caves of La Madelaine and Les Eyzies in the basin of the Dordogne have been recovered tusks of mammoths and horns of reindeer, engraved with likenesses of horses, of fish and of men.³ The palæolithic races were all dolichocephalic: their heads, that is to say, were long in proportion to their breadth; and the

Ethnology
of Gaul.

¹ See A. Bertrand, *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, 2nd ed., 1891, pp. 31-52; A. H. Keane, *Ethnology*, 2nd ed., 1896, pp. 91-2; and, for a full discussion of the whole subject of this and the next three paragraphs, my essay on "The Ethnology of Gaul" (pp. 245-322).

² See J. Geikie, *The Great Ice Age*, 3rd ed., 1894, pp. 577-84, 608, 612, 684-5, 687, 689-90. But see also p. 823 of the larger edition of this book.

³ See the illustrations in Bertrand's *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, pp. 84-87-91, 93-5, 102.

same characteristic is found in the skulls of the tall Cro-Magnon race, and of the slender stunted people of l'Homme Mort, who, though they may have been descended from the older inhabitants, belonged to the neolithic age. Both of these peoples, who are called after the caverns in which the first specimens were found, appear to have been diffused over the length and breadth of Gaul. But as the new epoch advanced, new races began to appear; and the invaders who came from the east, and gradually subdued the feebler aborigines, were characterised by brachycephaly, or great breadth of skull. Among the neolithic tribes were some whose chiefs erected dolmens, or vast structures of stone, to cover the sepulchres of their dead. It is believed by some ethnologists that the dolmen-builders belonged to the so-called Mediterranean race, which originated in Africa, of which the peoples of Cro-Magnon and l'Homme Mort were branches, and which penetrated into the British Isles¹; while others hold that the great majority of them came from the north and east, and were identical with the Ligurians, who, in historical times were apparently confined within the limits of the modern Provence. The dolmens are not all of one pattern: some of them contained implements of bronze as well as of flint; and the skeletons which have been found in them belong to more than one race. The era in which they were constructed was marked by considerable commercial activity; for some of them have yielded ornaments of jade and turquoise, which must have been imported into Gaul. The huge stone monuments which Caesar doubtless saw when his legions entered Brittany were only one of many groups which extended along the coast from the Pyrenees to the Channel, and were scattered over central Gaul: but not a single dolmen has been found on Gallic soil east of the great barrier formed by the Jura and the Vosges.² The neolithic races were of manifold types: but it has been suggested that the

¹ The Tamahu, with whom the dolmen-builders have also been identified, and whose features were portrayed in Egyptian wall-paintings more than 3000 years ago, were themselves, it should seem, a branch of the "Mediterranean race."

² Bertrand has published a map showing the distribution of the Gallic dolmens. See *La Gaule avant les Gaulois*, 1891, p. 128.

latest were the sturdy, dark, round-headed people whose descendants still form the mass of the population not only of France, but also of southern Germany. Probably this type, which some ethnologists call the "Auvergnat" and others the "Ligurian," summed up the characteristics of divers intermingled groups.

The earliest inhabitants of Gaul about whom history has anything to tell were the Iberians, who dwelt between the Rhône and the Pyrenees. The "Iberian question" is one of the problems which amuse and baffle ethnologists; for there can be little doubt that in the land which belonged to the Iberians of history, in Spain as well as in southern Gaul, there prevailed two forms of speech,—Basque and the uncouth, undeciphered language in which were engraven the so-called Iberian inscriptions. But the researches of anthropologists would seem to show that, if the Iberians were not one race, the bulk of them were small and dark, and were akin to the neolithic people of l'Homme Mort. On their east dwelt the Ligurians, small and dark like them, and, as some believe, an offshoot from the same Mediterranean stock, though others insist that they were the purest representatives of the round-headed "Auvergnat" type. According to the ancient geographers, the land which belonged to them in Gaul was the mountainous tract between the Rhône, the Durance and the Cottian and Maritime Alps; but Ligurians were mingled with Iberians on the west of the Rhône; and it is certain that in Caesar's time Liguria, as well as the land of the Iberians, was also peopled by the descendants of Celtic invaders. It was perhaps in the eighth century before the Christian era that the tall fair Celts began to cross the Rhine¹: but it is unlikely that even these invaders were homogeneous; and those to whom belonged the characteristics which the ancient writers associated with the Gallic or Celtic type may have been accompanied by the descendants of aliens who had joined them during their long sojourn in Germany. Successive swarms spread over the land, partly subduing and mingling with the descendants of the paleolithic peoples and of their neolithic conquerors, partly

¹ See p. 823.

perhaps driving them into the mountainous tracts. Physically, they resembled the tall fair Germans whom Caesar and Tacitus describe: but they differed from them in character and customs as well as in speech. And although the *tumuli*, in which remains of their dead have been discovered, contain implements of iron,¹ there are writers who maintain that the earliest hordes had begun to arrive in neolithic times. The Belgic Celts were the latest comers; and among the Belgae of Caesar's time the aboriginal elements were comparatively small. If Caesar was rightly informed, the languages of the Belgae and the Celtae were distinct. Both, it is needless to say, were Celtic, and the difference may not have been great; for if a Goidelic dialect was spoken anywhere in Gaul, the vestiges of Gallic that remain belong to the Brythonic branch of the Celtic tongue.² In Aquitania the natives remained comparatively pure, and formed a separate group, which, in Caesar's time, stood politically apart from the Celtae as well as from the Belgae. They are generally spoken of as an Iberian people: but the name is misleading. The conquering Celts, as the evidence of nomenclature shows, had advanced, though probably in small numbers, beyond the Garonne; and evidence supplied by recent measurements of the heads of living inhabitants appears to show that in certain parts of Aquitania the "Auvergnat" element was considerable. But it is certain that the Celtic language was not generally spoken in Aquitania; and the Iberian type was sufficiently conspicuous to give some colour to the popular theory.

Thus when Caesar entered Gaul, the groups whom he called Belgae, Celtae and Aquitani were each a medley of different races. The Belgae were the purest and the least civilised of the three; and both in Belgic and in Celtican Gaul the Celtic conquerors had imposed their language upon the conquered peoples. Even in a political sense, the Belgae and the Celtae were not separated by a hard and fast

¹ A map showing the distribution of the *tumuli* both in Belgic and in Celtican Gaul will be found in M. Bertrand's *Archéologie celtique et gauloise*, 2nd ed., 1889, p. 264. See my essay on "The Ethnology of Gaul," pp. 284-5.

² See App. A.

line; for the Celtican tribe of the Carnutes was among the clients of the Belgic Remi, while on the other hand the Celtican Aedui claimed supremacy over the Belgic Bellovaci. But if not scientifically complete, the grouping adopted by Caesar was sufficient for the purpose of his narrative. Just as a modern conqueror, without troubling himself about recondite questions of ethnology, might say that the people of Great Britain were composed of Englishmen, Scotchmen and Welsh, so Caesar, knowing and caring nothing about ethnical subdivisions, divided the people of Gaul into Belgae, Celtae and Aquitani.

But who would be content with the mere knowledge of the physical characteristics of the races, more or less intermingled, of which a people was composed? Measurements of skulls, tables of stature, diagrams illustrating tints of hair or of complexion,—these things have their uses; but they leave our curiosity unsatisfied. Even the arrows and the harpoons that have been found in the caves of Perigord and the Dordogne, the pottery, the tools and the ornaments that have been taken from the dolmens to enrich the museums of France, have only enabled the most diligent of antiquaries to piece together an outline of the culture of palaeolithic and neolithic men. They hunted and fished; they domesticated animals; they learned to sow and reap and grind their corn; they tried to propitiate the spirits with which their imagination peopled the lakes and springs.¹ All this we know: but when the races have amalgamated into the three groups of Belgae, Celtae and Aquitani, and the epoch of Roman conquest is approaching, we desire to know more. What manner of men were the inhabitants of Gaul? If this question can be answered, the answer can only come from a mind subtle and powerful no less than well-informed. Every man has his own character. Yet, with all the idiosyncrasies which distinguish them one from another, Yorkshiremen have a common type of character which differentiates them from the men of Kent: Englishmen have a common type which differentiates them from Scotsmen; and finally

¹ See A. Bertrand, *La religion des Gaulois*, 1897, pp. 191-3, 268-9, and J. Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, 1888, pp. 105-6.

Englishmen and Scotsmen have something in common, which, in the eyes of foreign observers, differentiates the people of Great Britain, morally and intellectually, from the other nations of the earth. For in our own, as in other lands, long association, intermarriage, the prolonged influence of common conditions of life have given to originally distinct groups, without destroying the individuality of any, a common recognisable, if indefinable, mental, and even physical, type. To some, though for obvious reasons a less degree, the same causes must have operated in Gaul. Setting aside the Aquitani, of whom Caesar had little to tell, and perhaps also the Belgae, the medley of peoples whom he called "Galli" had probably so far coalesced that they had acquired certain common traits of character. Perhaps when he described the features of the Gallic temperament which had most impressed him in the course of the war, he took little note of the lowest class, the cultivators and the shepherds, who had little to do with political life: but we can hardly suppose that his remarks applied only to the ruling class or to the purer Celts.¹ To attempt the portrayal of national character is often as misleading as it is tempting: but guided by Caesar's observations, we cannot go far astray even if we do not go very far. The Gauls were an interesting people, enthusiastic, impulsive, quick-witted, versatile, vainglorious and ostentatious, childishly inquisitive, rash, sanguine and inconstant, arrogant in victory and despondent in defeat, submissive as women to their priests, impatient of law and discipline, yet capable of loyalty to a strong and sympathetic ruler.

Civilisation
of the
Gauls.

The Gallic peoples had all risen far above the condition of savages; and the Celticans of the interior, many of whom had already fallen under Roman influence, had attained a certain degree of civilisation and even of luxury. Their trousers, from which the Province took its name of Gallia Braccata, and their many-coloured tartan shirts and cloaks excited the astonishment of their conquerors. The chiefs wore rings and bracelets and necklaces of gold; and when

¹ See especially *B. G.*, ii. 1, § 3; iii. 19, § 6; iv. 5, §§ 2-3, 13, § 3; vii. 20-21; and compare Strabo, *Geogr.*, iv. 4, §§ 2-6. I am not sure whether Caesar's remarks apply to the Belgae.

those tall fair-haired warriors rode forth to battle with their helmets wrought in the shape of some fierce beast's head and surmounted by nodding plumes, their chain armour, their long bucklers and their clanking swords, they made a splendid show. Walled towns or large villages, the strongholds of the various tribes, were conspicuous on numerous hills. The plains were dotted by scores of open hamlets. The houses, built of timber and wicker-work, were large and well-thatched.¹ The fields in summer were yellow with corn. Roads ran from town to town. Rude bridges spanned the rivers; and barges, laden with merchandise, floated along them. Ships, clumsy indeed but larger than any that were seen on the Mediterranean, braved the storms of the Bay of Biscay and carried cargoes between the ports of Brittany and the coast of Britain. Tolls were exacted on the goods which were transported on the great water-ways; and it was from the farming of these dues that the nobles derived a large part of their wealth. Every tribe had its coinage; and the knowledge of writing, in Greek and in Roman characters, was not confined to the priests. The Aeduans were familiar with the plating of copper and of tin. The miners of Aquitaine, of Auvergne and of the Berri were celebrated for their skill. Indeed in all that belonged to outward prosperity the peoples of Gaul had made great strides since their kinsmen first came in contact with Rome.²

But the growth of material prosperity had not been matched by true national progress. The Aquitani, indeed, the maritime tribes and the Belgae were untouched by foreign influences: but the Celticans of the interior had been

¹ Recent excavations, however, have shown that the houses in the great manufacturing town of Bibracte, on Mont Beuvray, the capital of the Aedui, were rectangular, built of stone compacted with clay, and partially subterranean. See an interesting article by M. Joseph Déchelette in *Congrès international d'anthr. et d'arch. préhist.*, 1900, pp. 418-27.

² Livy, vii. 10, xxxviii. 17; Virgil, *Aen.*, viii. 660, 662; Propertius, iv. 10 43; Tacitus, *Hist.*, ii. 20; Strabo, *Geogr.* iv. 4, § 3; Diodorus Siculus, v. 28 30; Caesar, *B. G.*, i. 18, §§ 3-4, ii. 5, § 6, vii. 34, § 3, etc.; *Dict. arch. de la Gaule*, i. 450 and illustrations *passim*; J. G. Bulliot and H. de Fontenay, *L'art de l'émaillerie chez les Éduens*, 1875; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, ii. 566-70; *Journal des Savants*, 1880, pp. 45, 52-3, 76-8; *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1881, p. 733; *Rev. arch.*, nouv. sér., t. xvi., 1867, pp. 69-72.

enfeebled by contact with Roman civilisation. Much nonsense has been written about the enervating effect of luxury. Its effect, however, when it is suddenly introduced among a half-civilised people, is quite different from its effect when it is a natural growth. The Gauls had lost the strength of barbarism, and had not gained the strength of civilisation. They had once, as Caesar remarked, been more than a match for the Germans: but enervated by imported luxury, and cowed by a succession of defeats, they no longer pretended to be able to cope with them.

Their political and social organisation.

Their constitution was based upon the tribe, if that word may be applied to the political unit which Caesar called a *civitas*. The tribe was generally an aggregate, more or less compact, of communities to which he gave the name of *pagi*, the members of which had originally been related by blood or by near neighbourhood; but it would seem that some of the smaller tribes consisted each of one *pagus* only. Each *pagus* appears to have enjoyed a certain measure of independence, and to have contributed its separate contingent to the tribal host.¹ Each tribe had its council of elders, and had once had its king: but in certain tribes the king was now superseded by an annually elected magistrate; while in others perhaps the council kept the government to itself. A rule which prevailed among the Aedui illustrates the jealousy which was felt of monarchical power. In that state the chief magistrate, who was known as the Vergobret, was forbidden to stir beyond the frontiers of the country, from which it may be inferred that it was not lawful for him to command the host. The executive was generally weak. Some of the smaller communities of which a tribe was composed occasionally acted on their own account, in opposition to the rest or to the policy of the tribal authorities.² Like the Anglo-Saxon thanes and the Norman barons, the

¹ Sir Henry Maine (*Early Hist. of Institutions*, 1875, p. 30) speaks of "Caesar's failure to note the natural divisions of the Celtic tribesmen, the families and septs or sub-tribes." See, however, F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, 1891, pp. 8-9, and pp. 519-21 of the larger edition of this book. As M. Camille Jullian has shown in a most interesting and suggestive article (*Revue des études anciennes*, iii., 1901, pp. 77-97), the *pagi* were themselves "natural divisions."

² *B. G.*, iv. 22, § 1, 5.

nobles surrounded themselves with retainers,—loyal followers or enslaved debtors;¹ and none but those who became their dependents could be sure of protection. On the other hand, none but those who were strong enough to protect could be sure of obedience. The oligarchies were no more secure than the monarchs whom they had supplanted. These men or their descendants sullenly plotted for the restoration of their dynasties, and, reckless of the common weal, they were in the mood to grasp the hand even of a foreign conqueror, and reign as his nominees. Here and there some wealthy noble, like Pisistratus in Athens, armed his retainers, hired a band of mercenaries, won the support of the populace by eloquence and largess, and, overthrowing the feeble oligarchy, usurped supreme power. The populace were perhaps beginning to have some glimmering of their own latent strength: but there is no evidence that anywhere they had any definite political rights. The Druids and the nobles or, as Caesar called them, the knights, enjoyed a monopoly of power and consideration:² the bulk of the poorer freemen, ground down by taxation and strangled with debt, had no choice but to become serfs.

And if in individual tribes there was anarchy, want of unity was the bane of them all. It was not only that Belgian and Aquitanian and Celtican were naturally distinct. This distinction might have been as readily overcome as that between English and Scotch and Welsh. But the evil was more deeply seated. It is of course true that disunion is the normal condition of half-civilised peoples. The Old English tribes showed no genius for combination: it was the strong hand of an Egbert, an Edgar, an Athelstan, that laid the foundations of the English kingdom. Nor was the kingdom

¹ *B. G.*, i. 18, §§ 4-5; ii. 1, § 4; vi. 11, § 4, 13, §§ 1-2, 15; vii. 40, § 7. Cf. F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 37-8.

² Sir Henry Maine (*Early Hist. of Institutions*, p. 29) holds that the Equites, or Chiefs, though to some extent they were a class apart, did not stand in such close relation to one another as they stood to the various septs or groups over which they presided. He bases his criticism of Caesar's account of the Gallic institutions, which, he thinks, "is accurate as far as it goes," but "errs in omission of detail," upon "the evidence concerning a Celtic community which the Brehon tracts supply."

united, except in the loosest sense, even on the eve of the Norman Conquest. If Harold was formally king over all England, his subjects felt themselves Yorkshiremen or men of Kent rather than Englishmen. Moreover, the circumstances of the Gauls were peculiarly unfortunate. Their patriotism, if it was latent, was real: they were proud of what their fathers had achieved in war; and the sense of nationality was stirring in their hearts. If they had been unmolested or had been exposed to attack only from a single enemy, it seems probable that a Vercingetorix would have welded them into an united nation. But menaced as they were by the Germans on the one hand and by the Romans on the other, their tendency to disunion was increased. This much we may safely conclude,—that the Gauls were not well fitted for developing from their own resources a coherent polity. If the Englishman was provincial and unpatriotic, the Gaul was factious and impracticable. Much glib generalisation has been hazarded regarding the hypothetical defects of the Celtic character: but only a very rash or a very discerning historian would undertake to say how far the evil was due to circumstances, how far to an inherited strain. Organism and environment are for ever acting and reacting upon one another. While, however, it is foolish to pass sweeping judgements upon a people, of whom, except during the few years that preceded the loss of their independence, we have only the scantiest knowledge, it would be a great mistake to leap to the conclusion that, in political capacity, one race is as good as another. What aptitude for self-government or for stable government of any kind the descendants of the Gauls¹ have exhibited during the past century, is known to all the world. No one would deny that the Greeks were endowed with a genius for art and literature which their environment doubtless helped to develop; and it may be that the Celts were but poorly endowed with political talent, and that circumstances had helped

¹ To avoid possible misconception, I ought perhaps to say that I use the word "Gauls" in the wider sense in which Caesar used it,—meaning the inhabitants of Gaul, without distinction of race, who formed the great majority of the ancestors of the French people.

to stunt its growth. The important fact is, explain it as we may, that the tribal rulers of Gaul had not achieved even that initial step towards unity which the kings of Wessex, Mercia and Northumberland achieved when they swallowed up the petty kingdoms of the heptarchic period. Or perhaps it would be more true to say that, when the Romans first established themselves on the west of the Alps, the Arvernian king had achieved that step; but that first his defeat on the banks of the Rhône, and afterwards the revolution which subverted the royal power, had broken his supremacy and dealt a fatal blow to the political development of Gaul. There, as in Latium, the downfall of the monarch inevitably weakened the power of the tribe; and the oligarchies, if they had the power, were not granted the time to work out their own salvation. Individual tribes, such as the Aedui and the Sequani, did indeed achieve some sort of supremacy over their weaker neighbours. There were leagues of the Belgae, the Aquitani and the maritime tribes. But supremacy had not hardened into sovereignty;¹ and the leagues were loose, occasional and uncertain. If some powerful baron, stimulated by ambition or impressed by the evils of disunion, succeeded in clutching the power of a Bretwalda, he was forthwith suspected by his brother nobles of a design to revive the detested monarchy, and was lucky if he escaped the stake. The country swarmed with outlawed criminals, who had fled from justice, and exiled adventurers, who had failed to execute *coups d'état*. Nobles and their clients lived sword in hand; and hardly a year passed without some petty war. Every tribe, every hamlet, nay every household was riven by faction. One was for the Romans and another for the Germans: one for the Aedui and another for the Sequani: one for a Divitiacus and another for a Dumnorix; one for the constitutional oligarchy and another for the lawless adventurer. All, in short, were for a party; and none was for the state.²

¹ Certain "client" tribes appear to have paid tribute and rendered military service. But hegemony was not firmly grasped, and client tribes transferred their allegiance from one overlord to another. See pp. 528-9.

² See various Notes in Part II., Section IV.

“Ἀπωλόμεθ’ ἄν,” said Themistocles, “εἰ μὴ ἀπωλόμεθα”:¹ like the English, whom the Normans chastened, the Gauls needed the discipline of foreign conquest.

The
Druids.

Yet in Gaul, as in England before the Norman Conquest, there was one influence which tended to make every man feel that he and his fellows belonged to one nation,—community of religion. Local superstitions doubtless flourished side by side with the official cult; but Druidism, which recognised and regulated them all, was the religious force which affected the destiny of the people. The question of the origin and affinities of Druidism has given rise to superabundant speculation, which has led to no certain result. Caesar was informed that the system was believed to have been imported from Britain. At all events, there is no evidence that it was known to the Celts of Cisalpine Gaul; nor is it certain that in Transalpine Gaul it existed outside the limits of the region which was inhabited by the “Celtae.” Scholars,² whose opinion carries weight, accept Caesar’s statement, and hold that the Druids had entered Gaul at a comparatively recent date, and had established their priestly supremacy without extirpating the superstitions of the older races. From the study of the remains of certain typical Gallic fortresses they have inferred that the Druids created a school of architecture, and from the laconic statement of a Greek writer³ that they were the great civilisers of Gaul. Other scholars of equal eminence⁴ maintain that the Celtic conquerors, holding a creed which had much in common with that of the Romans, found Druidism existing in Gaul, and that Druidism was strong enough to secure terms, and finally to make itself supreme. But all that we know for certain about the Gallic branch of this strange hierarchy we learn from the brief notices of Caesar and other ancient writers; and Caesar has told us all that was essential for the subject of his narrative. The Druids formed a corpora-

¹ “We should have been undone if we had not been undone.” Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 29.

² *E.g.* M. Alexandre Bertrand.

³ Timagenes, quoted by Ammianus Marcellinus, xv. 9, §§ 4, 8.

⁴ *E.g.* Professor Rhys, *Celtic Britain*, 2nd ed., 1884, pp. 67-9; *Celtic Heathendom*, 1888, pp. 105-6, etc.

tion, admission to which was eagerly sought: they jealously guarded the secrecy of their lore; and full membership was only obtainable after a long novitiate. They were ruled by a pope, who held office for life; and sometimes the succession to this dignity was disputed by force of arms. They were exempt from taxation and from service in war. They had, as the priests of a rude society always have, a monopoly of learning. The ignorance and superstition of the populace, their own organisation and submission to one head gave them a tremendous power. The education of the aristocracy was in their hands. The doctrine which they most strenuously inculcated was that of the transmigration of souls. "This doctrine," said Caesar, "they regard as the most potent incentive to valour, because it inspires a contempt for death."¹ They claimed the right of deciding questions of peace and war. Among the Aedui, if not among other peoples, at all events in certain circumstances, they exercised the right of appointing the chief magistrate. They laid hands on criminals, and, in their default, even on the innocent, imprisoned them in monstrous idols of wicker-work, and burned them alive as a sacrifice to the gods. They practically monopolised both the civil and the criminal jurisdiction; and if this jurisdiction was irregular, if they had no legal power of enforcing their judgements, they were none the less obeyed. Every year they met to dispense justice in the great plain above which now soar the spires of Chartres cathedral. Those who disobeyed their decrees were excommunicated; and excommunication meant exclusion from the civil community as well as from communion in religious rites.² One religious custom, of which Caesar himself witnessed examples, suggests an interesting question.

¹ *B. G.*, vi. 14. § 5.

² See pp. 532-6. The latest theories about Druidism are to be found in *La religion des Gaulois* (1897), by M. Alexandre Bertrand, who devoted his life to the study of the prehistoric antiquities and the early history of his own country. The conjectures in which his book abounds are supported by arguments drawn from a wide knowledge of coins, megalithic and other monuments, as well as from a study of classical and Irish texts: they are sometimes convincing, and always interesting and ingenious. The book was ably reviewed by M. Salomon Reinach in the *Revue archéologique*, xxxii., 1898, pp. 451-2.

When the warriors of a Gallic tribe had made a successful raid, they used to sacrifice to Toutates, whom Caesar recognised as the counterpart of Mars,¹ a portion of the cattle which they had captured; the rest of their booty they erected in piles on consecrated ground. It rarely happened that any one dared to keep back part of the spoil; and the wretch who defrauded the god was punished, like Achan,² by a terrible death. Along with Druidism there prevailed, at least among the Celtic conquerors, the worship of divinities which appeared to Caesar to resemble those of Greece and Rome; and it seems probable that the Druids had sanctioned, in order to control the polytheism which was not part of their original creed.³

Invasions
of the
Cimbri and
Teutoni.

But though religion might perhaps foster the idea, it could not supply the instant need of political union. Over the vast wooded plains of Germany fierce hordes were roaming, looking with hungry eyes towards the rich prize that lay beyond the Rhine. Moreover, the danger of Gaul was the danger of Italy. The invader who had been attracted by "the pleasant land of France" would soon look southward over the corn-fields, the vineyards and the olive-gardens of Lombardy. When Caesar was entering public life, men who were not yet old could remember the terror which had been inspired by the Cimbri and Teutoni,—those fair-haired giants who had come down, like an avalanche, from the unknown lands that bordered on the northern sea. They descended into the valley of the Danube. They overthrew a Roman consul in Carinthia; crossed the Rhine and threaded the passes of the Jura; and overran the whole of Celtic Gaul. Four years after their first victory, they defeated

113 B.C.

109 B.C.

¹ See *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, vol. vii. No. 84.

² Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, pp. 49-50.

³ *B. G.*, vi. 13, § 4, 16, § 3, 17, §§ 3-5. M. Bertrand insists (*La religion des Gaulois*, p. 340) that the worship of the three chief Gallic deities, Toutates, Taranis and Esus (see Lucan, *Pharsalia*, i. 444-6), "ne pénétra pas dans les contrées où les druides dominaient," that is to say, the land of the Celtæ: but on page 354 he modifies this assertion; and his own work furnishes proof that monuments of the worship in question have been discovered in numerous districts of the land of the Celtæ, namely in the departments of Allier, Charente-Inférieure, Côte-d'Or, Doubs, Indre, Maine-et-Loire, Puy-de-Dôme, Saône-et-Loire, Seine and Vosges.

another consul in the Province. Then they vanished: but four years later they reappeared; and two more armies were destroyed on the banks of the Rhône. The panic-stricken 105 B.C. Italians dreaded another Allia: but, while Italy lay at their mercy, the Cimbri turned aside; and when, after three years' wandering in Spain and Gaul, they rejoined the Teutoni, and the two swarms headed for the south, Marius was waiting for them on the Rhône, and his brother consul in Cisalpine Gaul. Once more the host divided; and while the Teutoni encountered Marius in the neighbourhood of Aix, the Cimbri threaded the Brenner Pass, and descended the valley of the Adige. The ghastly appellation of the Putrid Plain commemorated the 102 B.C. slaughter of the Teutoni: the Cimbri were annihilated at Vercellae, near the confluence of the Sesia and the Po.¹ 101 B.C.

But if this danger had been averted, the movements of the other German peoples might well cause anxiety. Pressing resolutely onward, they fought their way through the outlying Celtic territory, up to the right bank of the Upper Rhine. Some years before the conspiracy of 71 B.C. Catiline² an opportunity was afforded them of making good their footing in the heart of Gaul. A bitter enmity had for many years existed between the rival tribes of the Aedui and the Sequani. The Aedui were the stronger; and they enjoyed the countenance of Rome. The Sequani hired the aid of a German chieftain, Ariovistus, who crossed the Rhine with fifteen thousand men. They were enchanted with the country, its abundance and its comparative civilisation; and fresh swarms were attracted by the good news. After a long struggle the Aedui were decisively beaten, and had to pay tribute and give hostages to their rivals. Their chief magistrate, the famous Druid, Divitiacus, went to Rome and implored the Senate for help. He was treated with marked distinction, made the acquaintance of Caesar, and discussed religion and philosophy with Cicero:³ but the Senate did not see their way to interfere on his behalf. All that 61 B.C. they did was to pass a vague decree that whoever might at any time be Governor of Gaul should, as far as might be consistent with his duty to the republic, make it his

¹ See pp. 551-6.

² See pp. 557-8.

³ Cicero, *De Div.*, i. 41, § 90.

business to protect the Aedui and the other allies of the Roman people. Meanwhile the Sequani had found that their ally was their master. He was not going to return to the wilds of Germany when he could get a fertile territory for the asking. He compelled the Sequani to cede to him the northern portion of Alsace. At length they and their Gallic allies, including, as it should seem, even the Aedui, mustered all their forces and made a desperate effort to throw off the yoke: but they sustained a crushing defeat; and their conqueror was evidently determined to found a German kingdom in Gaul.

60 B.C.

Revolt of
the Allo-
broges.

61 B.C.

60 B.C.

Threatened
invasion
of the
Helvetii.

107 B.C.

Meanwhile the Allobroges, who had never yet fairly accepted their dependent condition, had risen in revolt. They were still embittered by defeat when the Roman agents in the Province were alarmed by the appearance of bands of marauders on the right bank of the Rhône. They had been sent by the Helvetii, a warlike Celtic people, who dwelt in that part of Switzerland which lies between the Rhine, the Jura, the lake of Geneva and the Upper Rhône. The Romans had already felt the weight of their arms. A generation before, the Tigurini, one of the four Helvetian tribes, had thrown in their lot with the Cimbri. They had spread desolation along the valley of the Rhône, defeated a consular army, and compelled the survivors to pass under the yoke. Now, in their turn, they were hard pressed by the Germans; and they had formed the resolution of abandoning their country and seeking a new home in the fertile land of their kinsmen.

The author of the movement was Orgetorix, the head of the Helvetian baronage. His story throws a vivid light upon the condition of the Gallic tribes. He persuaded his brother nobles that they would be able to win the mastery over Gaul. He undertook a diplomatic mission to the leading Transalpine states. Two chiefs were ready to listen to him, Casticus, whose father had been the last King of the Sequani, and Dumnorix, brother of Divitiacus, who was at that time the most powerful chieftain of the Aedui. If Divitiacus saw the salvation of his country in dependence upon Rome, his brother regarded the connexion with

abhorrence. He was able, ambitious and rich; and the common people adored him. Orgetorix urged him and Casticus to seize the royal power in their respective states, as he intended to do in his, and promised them armed support. The three entered into a formal compact for the conquest and partition of Gaul. But the Helvetii had still to be reckoned with. They heard that their envoy had broken his trust, and immediately recalled him to answer for his conduct. He knew that, if he were found guilty, he would be burned alive; and accordingly, when he appeared before his judges, he was followed by his retainers and slaves, numbering over ten thousand men. The magistrates, determined to bring him to justice, called the militia to arms: but in the meantime the adventurer died, perhaps by his own hand.

But the idea which he had conceived did not die. The Helvetii had no intention of abandoning their enterprise; nor Dumnorix of abandoning his. He had married a daughter of Orgetorix; and he was quite ready to help them, if they would make it worth his while. They resolved to spend two years in preparing for their emigration; bought up waggons and draught cattle; and laid in large supplies of corn. Their purpose threatened Rome with a twofold danger. Once they had gone, the lands which they left vacant would be overrun by the Germans, who would then be in dangerous proximity to Italy; and there was no telling what mischief they might do in Gaul. Above the din of party strife at Rome the note of warning was heard. Men talked anxiously of the prospects of war; and the Senate sent commissioners to dissuade the Gallic peoples from joining the invaders.¹ Diplomacy, however, was powerless to shake the purpose of a brave and desperate nation. Perhaps the Senate failed to realise the gravity of the crisis. Perhaps they shrank from putting the sword into the hands of the man who might ultimately turn it against themselves.

But the hesitation of an effete Senate was soon to give way to the energy of a leader of men. One of the consuls for the year 59 was Julius Caesar. About the time of the

Consulship
of Caesar.

¹ Cicero, *Ep. ad Att.*, i. 19, § 2.

How he attempted to provide against the Helvetian danger.

He is appointed Governor of Gaul.

election Ariovistus made overtures for an alliance with Rome ; and doubtless with the object of securing his neutrality in view of the threatened Helvetian invasion, the Senate conferred upon him the title of Friend of the Roman People. They had already half promised to protect their Gallic allies. They now practically guaranteed to the conqueror of those allies the security of his conquest. And in this latter policy Caesar, if we may believe his own word, fully concurred. He must have seen the impending troubles. But he was not yet free to encounter them ; and he doubtless approved of any expedient for keeping the barbarian chief inactive until he could go forth in person to encounter him. That time was at hand. ¶ In the year of his consulship Caesar was made Governor of Illyricum, or Dalmatia, and of Gaul, that is to say of Gallia Cisalpina, or Piedmont and the Plain of Lombardy, and of Gallia Braccata, or, as it was usually called, the Province. If Suetonius¹ was rightly informed, his commission gave him the right to include Gallia Comata—"the land of the long-haired Gauls"—that is to say the whole of independent Gaul north of the Province, within his sphere of action.² ¶ He had already gained distinction in Spain both as a general and as an administrator : but hitherto he had had no chance of showing the full measure of his powers. He was at this time forty-three years old.³ In person he was tall and slight, but well-knit ; and, if he was as licentious as the mass of his contemporaries, his constitution, fortified by abstemious habits, was capable of sustaining prodigious efforts. His broad dome-like skull ; his calm and penetrating eyes ; his aquiline nose ; his massive yet finely moulded jaw, expressed, like no other human countenance, a rich and harmonious nature,—intellect, passion, will moving in accord. And, if his vices were common, his generosity, his forbearance, his equanimity, his magnanimity were his own. He believed, with an unwavering faith, that above himself there was a power, without whose aid the strongest judgement, the most diligent calculation might fail. That power was Fortune ; and Caesar was assured that Fortune

¹ *Divus Iulius*, 22.

² See pp. 195, 823.

³ See pp. 560-61.

was ever on his side.¹ But it would be impertinent to this narrative to attempt to analyse the character—to which our greatest poet has done less than justice—of the greatest man of action who has ever lived. Whatever quality was lacking, the want in no wise affected his fitness for the task which he had now to perform.

His appointment carried with it the command of an army ^{His army.} consisting of four legions, perhaps about twenty thousand men.² One of them was quartered in Transalpine Gaul: the other three were at Aquileia, near the site of the modern Trieste. He could also command the services of slingers from the Balearic isles, of archers from Numidia and Crete, and of cavalry from Spain.³ Various military reforms had been introduced by Marius; and the legions of Caesar were, in many respects, different from those which had fought against Hannibal. They were no longer a militia, but an army of professional soldiers: Each legion consisted of ten cohorts; and the cohort, formed of three maniples or six centuries, had replaced the maniple as the tactical unit of the legion. From the earliest times the legion had been commanded by an officer called a military tribune. Six were assigned to each legion; and each one of the number held command in turn. But they now often owed their appointments to interest rather than to merit; and no tribune in Caesar's army was ever placed at the head of a legion. They still had administrative duties to perform, and exercised subordinate commands. But the principal officers were the *legati*, who might loosely be called generals of division. Their powers were not strictly defined, but varied according to circumstances and to the confidence which they deserved. A *legatus* might be entrusted with the command of a legion or of an army corps; he might even, in the absence of his chief, be entrusted with the command of the entire army. But he was not yet, as such, the permanent commander of a legion. The officers upon whom the efficiency of the troops mainly

¹ Cicero, *Ep. ad Att.*, x. 8E; Caesar, *B. G.*, v. 58, § 6; vi. 30, § 4, 35, § 2, 42, §§ 1-2; vii. 89, § 2; *B. C.*, iii. 10, § 6, 68, § 1, 95, § 1 etc. See App. B.

² See pp. 561, 563-7.

³ The succeeding narrative will show that Caesar raised the bulk of his cavalry during the Gallic war year by year in Gaul itself.

depended were the centurions. They were chosen from the ranks; and their position has been roughly compared with that of our own non-commissioned officers. But their duties were, in some respects, at least as responsible as those of a captain: the centurions of the first cohort were regularly summoned to councils of war; and the chief centurion of a legion was actually in a position to offer respectful suggestions to the legate himself.¹ Every legion included in its ranks a number of skilled artisans, called *fabri*, who have been likened to the engineers in a modern army: but they were not permanently enrolled in a separate corps.² They fought in the ranks like other soldiers; but when their special services were required, they were directed by staff-officers called *præfecti fabrum*. It was their duty to execute repairs of every kind, to superintend the construction of permanent camps, and to plan fortifications and bridges; and it should seem that they also had charge of the artillery,³—the *ballistæ* and catapults, which hurled heavy stones and shot arrows against the defences and the defenders of a besieged town.

The legionary wore a sleeveless woollen shirt, a leathern tunic protected across breast and back by bands of metal, strips of cloth wound round the thighs and legs, hob-nailed shoes, and, in cold or wet weather, a kind of blanket or military cloak. His defensive armour consisted of helmet, shield and greaves: his weapons were a short, two-edged, cut-and-thrust sword and a javelin, the blade of which, behind the hardened point, was made of soft iron, so that, when it struck home, it might bend and not be available for return. These, however, formed only a part of the load which he carried on the march. Over his left shoulder he bore a pole, to which was fastened in a bundle his ration of grain,⁴ his cooking vessel, saw, basket, hatchet and spade. For it was necessary that he should be a woodman and navvy as well as a soldier. No Roman army ever halted for the night without constructing a camp fortified with trench, rampart and palisade.

¹ See *B. G.*, iii. 5, § 2.

² See p. 583.

³ See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, ii. 19.

⁴ Sometimes a sixteen days' ration was served out; but the amount certainly varied according to circumstances. See pp. 587-8.

The column was of course accompanied by a host of non-combatants. Each legion required at least five or six hundred horses and mules to carry its baggage;¹ and the drivers, with the slaves who waited on the officers, formed a numerous body. Among the camp-followers were also dealers who supplied the wants of the army, and were ready to buy booty of every kind.²

What line of policy Caesar intended to follow, he has not told us. While he was going forth to govern a distant land, the government of his own was lapsing into anarchy.³ He must have seen that the Germans would soon overrun Gaul unless the Romans prevented them; and that the presence of the Germans would revive the peril from which Marius had delivered Rome.⁴ We may feel sure that he had determined to teach them, by a rough lesson if necessary, that they must advance no further into Gaul, nor venture to cross the boundaries of the Province or of Italy.⁵ It can hardly be doubted that he dreamed of adding a new province to the empire, which should round off its frontier and add to its wealth. But whether he had definitely resolved to attempt a conquest of such magnitude, or merely intended to follow, as they appeared, the indications of Fortune, it would be idle to conjecture. Ambitious though he was, he only courted, he never tempted her. The greatest statesman is, in a sense, an opportunist. When Caesar should find himself in Gaul, he would know best how to shape his ends. His intentions.

¹ Caesar nowhere mentions that he used waggons or carts during the Gallic war, though it seems certain that he must have used some, to carry artillery and material for mantlets and the like. See *Bell. Afr.*, 9; *B. C.*, iii. 42, § 3; and Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des antiquités grecques et rom.*, i. 929.

² W. Smith, *Dict. of Gk. and Roman Ant.*, i. 346, 811-12, 851; ii. 588-9, 614; Polybius, vi. 23; F. Fröhlich, *Das Kriegswesen Cäsars*, 1891, pp. 56-7, 62-4, 66-7, 75; Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, 1887, ii. 339, n. 2; Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. des ant. grecques et rom.*, ii. 957, 1447, 1605-6; W. Rüstow, *Heerwesen und Kriegführung Cäsars*, 1857, pp. 16-19; Frontinus, *Strat.* iv. 1, § 7; Josephus, *De bello Iudaico*, iii. 5, § 5; Ammianus Marcellinus, xvii. 9, § 2; Caesar, *B. C.*, i. 78, § 1; Cicero, *Tusc.* ii. 16, § 37. See also various notes in Section VI. of the larger edition of this book. There is no evidence that there was any medical staff in Caesar's army or under the Republic at all, though it may perhaps be inferred from a passage in Suetonius (*Divus Augustus*, 11) that wealthy officers were attended by their private surgeons.

CHAPTER II

THE CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE HELVETII AND ARIOVISTUS

58 B.C.

Caesar hears that the Helvetii are about to march through the Province.

ABOUT the middle of March a startling announcement reached Caesar. The Helvetii had actually begun to move; and their hordes would soon be streaming over the Roman Province. Three neighbouring tribes, the Raurici, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, and also the Boii, who had long ago migrated into Germany, had been induced to join them; they had laid in sufficient flour to last for three months; and, to stimulate their resolution and enterprise, they had deliberately cut themselves off from all prospect of return by burning their homes. On the 24th¹ of that very month the whole vast multitude, numbering, according to their own muster-rolls, three hundred and sixty-eight thousand,² was to assemble opposite Geneva, ready to cross the Rhône.

He hastens to Geneva and destroys the bridge.

Helvetian envoys ask his leave to use the road through the Province.

Caesar instantly left Rome, and, hurrying northward ninety miles a day,³ crossed the Alps, took command of the Provincial legion, ordered a fresh levy, and reached Geneva at the end of a week. He immediately destroyed the bridge by which the Helvetii intended to cross the river. They sent ambassadors to say that they only wanted to use the road through the Province, and would promise to do no mischief. Would Caesar give them permission? Caesar had of course no intention of granting their request: but, as he wanted to gain time for his levies to assemble, he told the

¹ March 28 of the unreformed calendar.

² See pp. 222-5.

³ Plutarch, *Caesar*, 17. See also *B. G.*, i. 7, § 1; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 57, and the map of Gaul.

ambassadors that he would think over what they had said, 58 B.C. and give them an answer on the 9th of the following month.¹ He made good use of the interval. The legion was with him; and the Provincial levies arrived in time to join in executing the design which he had formed. The road by which the Helvetii desired to march led through Savoy; and the river was at certain points fordable. It should seem that they had not yet had time to assemble in force. Along the southern bank of the Rhône, between the lake and the Pas de l'Écluse—a distance of about seventeen miles—Caesar threw up lines of earthworks in the few places where the banks were not so steep as to form a natural fortification.² The soldiers were posted in redoubts behind the works. When the ambassadors returned, Caesar plainly told them that he would not allow the Helvetii to pass through the Province. Undeterred by this rebuff, the emigrants made several attempts to force the passage of the river. Some of them waded; others made bridges of boats, and tried to storm the ramparts: but the soldiers pelted them with missiles and sent them staggering back.

He promises to reply in a fortnight, and meanwhile fortifies the left bank of the Rhône.

He prevents the Helvetii from crossing.

Only one route now remained,—the road that winded along the right bank of the Rhône, beneath the rocky steeps

¹ F. Eyssenhardt (*Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Pædagogik*, lxxxv., 1862, p. 760) accepts Dion Cassius's statement (*Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii. 31) that Caesar held out to the Helvetian envoys the hope that he would allow them to pass through the Province. Otherwise, he insists, it is impossible to explain why the Helvetii waited for the day which Caesar had appointed. Caesar neither says nor implies that he did not hold out such a hope to the envoys. On his own showing, indeed, he intended to deceive them. I suspect, however, that this is one of Dion's embellishments, because I believe that Caesar would have kept the fact to himself instead of blurting it out to any of the "excellent authorities" whom Dion is assumed to have followed (see pp. 178-81). But Dion may have hit upon the truth. Caesar would certainly have held out such a hope to the Helvetii, if it had been worth his while to do so. "As a nation," writes Lord Wolseley, "we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by falsehood. . . we will keep hammering along with the conviction that 'honesty is the best policy' and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well for a child's copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better sheathe his sword for ever." *Soldier's Pocket-book*, 5th ed., 1886, p. 169. Again, the general "can, by spreading false news among the gentlemen of the press, use them as a medium by which to deceive an enemy." *Ib.*, 4th ed., p. 337.

² See pp. 184-5, 608.

58 B.C.
The
Sequani
allow them
to march
through
the Pas de
l'Écluse.

of the Jura, through the Pas de l'Écluse. The emigrants might, it would seem, have made their way into Gaul by the route that leads to Pontarlier or one of the other passes in the Jura: but either because they shrank from encountering Ariovistus or for some other reason, of which Caesar took no account, these routes were out of the question.¹ The road that led through the Pas de l'Écluse was so narrow that there was barely room for a single waggon to move along it at a time: beyond the pass, it led into the territory of the Sequani; and if they offered the slightest opposition, it would be hopeless to attempt to get through. They refused at first to grant a safe-conduct: but Dumnorix, at the request of the Helvetii, willingly acted as mediator. He had established his influence with the Sequani by wholesale bribery; and, after a little negotiation, he succeeded in procuring for his friends the favour which they sought. The Helvetian leaders undertook to restrain their people from plundering; and hostages were exchanged for the fulfilment of the compact. The ultimate object of the emigrants was to settle in western Gaul, in the fertile basin of the Charente. Thence they would be able to make raids upon the open corn-growing districts of the Province; and their mere presence would be a standing menace to Roman interests in Gaul. But first they would have to make their way along the valley of the Rhône, across the plain of Ambérieu, and over the plateau of Dombes to the Saône. Caesar calculated that while their

Caesar goes
back to
Cisalpine
Gaul, re-
turns with
reinforce-
ments and
encamps
above the
confluence
of the
Rhône and
Saône.

huge unwieldy column was crawling along the muddy tracks, he would have time to raise a new army, strong enough to cope with them. Leaving his ablest lieutenant, Labienus, to guard the lines on the Rhône, he hastened back to Cisalpine Gaul; raised two new legions on his own responsibility; withdrew the other three from their winter-quarters; and marched back by the road leading along the valley of the Dora Riparia and over Mont Genève. The mountain tribes, who doubtless hoped to plunder his baggage-train, attempted to stop his advance: but again and again he dashed them aside until, descending into the valley of the Durance, he pushed on through the highlands of Dauphiné, past Briançon, Embrun

[The Grai-
celi, Ceu-
trones, and
Caturiges.]

¹ See p. 607.

and Gap,¹ crossed the Isère and the Rhône, and encamped on the heights of Sathonay, near the point where the rushing current is swelled by the tranquil stream of the Saône. 58 B.C.
About
June 7 ?²

He was only just in time. The bulk of the Helvetii had crossed the Saône, and descended, like a swarm of locusts, upon the cornfields and homesteads of the Aedui. Envoys came to beg Caesar to remember the loyalty of their countrymen, and help them to get rid of the invaders. Labienus with his legion had already joined him. The rearguard of the Helvetii, numbering about a fourth of the entire host, were gathered on the eastern side of the river, in the valley of the Formans, eleven miles to the north.³ Caesar left his camp soon after midnight, marched quietly up the valley of the Saône over ground which masked his approach, and launched his legions upon the unsuspecting multitude, as they were crowding into their boats. Those who escaped the slaughter vanished in the surrounding forests. They and their slain kinsfolk belonged to the tribe called the Tigurini,⁴ by which, fifty years before, a Roman army, under the consul Lucius Cassius, had been defeated and compelled to pass under the yoke. The Aedui
solicit
his aid
against the
Helvetii.

Within twenty-four hours Caesar had thrown a bridge of boats⁵ over the river, and transported his entire army to the right bank. The Helvetii, who had taken three weeks over the passage, were greatly alarmed, and sent an embassy to meet him. The principal envoy was an aged chief named Divico, who, in his youth, had commanded the army which defeated Cassius. He said that his countrymen were willing to settle wherever Caesar pleased, if he would only leave them unmolested. But if he was bent upon war, they were ready; and he would do well to remember that they had already defeated a Roman army. Caesar replied that he remembered the treacherous exploit of which they boasted, and remembered He defeats
and dis-
perses the
rearguard
of the
Helvetii.

¹ Between Briançon (Brigantio) and the Rhône the itinerary is not absolutely certain; but Caesar must have gone either by the route indicated in the text or by the valley of the Romanche and Grenoble. See *Carte de France* (1:200,000), Sheet 60, and p. 609.

² See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 57, n. 2.

³ See pp. 610-13.

⁴ See p. 20, *supra*.

⁵ See p. 606.

His passage
of the
Saône.

The
Helvetii
attempt to
negotiate,
but reject
Caesar's
terms.

58 B.C.

it with indignation. Besides, even if he were inclined to let bygones be bygones, he could not overlook the outrages of which they had just been guilty. Still he was ready to make peace with them, upon certain conditions. They must compensate the Aedui for the damage which they had done, and give hostages for their future good behaviour. Divico haughtily replied that the Helvetii, as the Romans had the best of reasons to know, were accustomed to receive hostages, not to give them.

They
march
northward,
followed
by Caesar.

Next day the emigrants broke up their encampment. To reach the valley of the Charente, it was necessary to cross the Loire. The direct line intersected that river near Roanne. But the rugged country between the basins of the Saône and the Loire was, in this direction, impassable; and beyond Roanne the mountains of Le Forez barred the way. The only course was to move up the valley between the Saône and the hills of Beaujolais until a practicable route could be found. Caesar sent on his cavalry to watch the enemy's movements. They were composed of levies from the Province and from the Aedui; and the Aeduan contingent was commanded by Dumnorix. They ventured too near the Helvetian rearguard, and lost a few men in a skirmish. For a fortnight the two armies continued to advance, northward and then north-westward, never more than five miles apart. The Helvetii probably turned off from the Saône near Mâcon, and moved up the valley of the Petit Grosne.¹ Their vast column must have extended at least fifteen miles in length.² The advanced guard, composed of the Boii and Tulingi,³ was followed by the train of waggons, drawn by horses or oxen; and last of all came the Helvetian fighting men.⁴ Elated by their recent success, the Helvetii occasionally faced about and challenged their pursuers: but Caesar would not allow his men to be drawn into a combat. He was looking for a favourable opportunity to fight a decisive battle: but for the time he had enough to do in trying to prevent the enemy

¹ See pp. 613-14.

² See Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii. 451, and my essay on "The Credibility of Caesar's Narrative" (pp. 222-4).

³ See pp. 621-2.

⁴ Probably some of the fighting men marched parallel with the waggons. See p. 622 and n. 1.

from plundering his allies. Nor was this his only anxiety. ^{58 B.C.} He depended upon the Aedui for his supplies: but day followed day, and no supplies came. On the Saône indeed he had a flotilla of barges laden with corn: but the necessity of following the Helvetii had led him far away from that river. ^{Caesar pressed for supplies, owing to the intrigues of Dumnorix.} The Aeduan chiefs in his camp promised, protested and poured forth excuses, till he lost all patience and accused them of deliberate breach of faith. This challenge elicited a full disclosure. Liscus, the Vergobret or chief magistrate of the Aedui, spoke on behalf of his brother chiefs. It appeared that there were certain individuals whose power was actually greater than that of the Government. They had exerted their influence over the people to prevent them from sending supplies, telling them that if the Romans succeeded in defeating the Helvetii, they would use their victory to enslave the Aedui as well as the other tribes. Liscus concluded by telling Caesar that he had revealed the truth at the risk of his life, and had only spoken under compulsion. Caesar had no doubt that by "certain individuals" he meant Dumnorix. But he had no intention of discussing matters of state in the presence of men whose discretion could not be trusted. He therefore told all the chiefs, except Liscus, that they might go. Liscus then spoke out frankly. He admitted that Dumnorix and no other was the man. He had amassed great wealth, and had spent it lavishly in buying popular support. He had acquired great influence with the Bituriges and other tribes by arranging marriages between the women of his family and powerful chieftains. Not only was he politically connected with the Helvetii, but he privately detested Caesar, because Caesar had set him aside and restored his brother Divitiacus to power. In his own country he was the leader of the anti-Roman faction. The interests of the Helvetii were his interests. If they succeeded, they would help him to mount the throne: if they failed, he would be worse off than before. He had kept them regularly supplied with information; and in the cavalry skirmish, a few days before, he had set the example of flight.


Caesar hardly knew how to act. Dumnorix was evidently one of the most powerful and implacable enemies

58 B.C.

whom he had to fear. He could not afford to overlook such flagrant hostility; but he was afraid of offending Divitiacus, whom he particularly desired to conciliate. He summoned him to his tent, and, addressing him through the medium of Gaius Valerius Troucillus, a distinguished Provincial, his principal interpreter and trusted friend, earnestly pressed him to consent to his punishing Dumnorix. Divitiacus, with a burst of tears, begged him not to be too hard upon his brother; or it would be said that it was he who had advised the infliction of the punishment, and public opinion would brand him as a monster. Caesar pressed his hand kindly, and bade him dismiss his fears. His regard for him, he said, was so great that he was willing to condone the insult which had been offered to his Government and the provocation which he had himself received. The truth was that he had no choice. He had not yet won the prestige that would only come from victory; and with powerful enemies before him, and doubtful allies around him, upon whose goodwill he depended for the means of subsistence, it would be folly to raise a hornet's nest about his ears. He contented himself therefore with sending for Dumnorix, and giving him a severe rebuke and a stern warning. This once, he said, for his brother's sake, his conduct should be overlooked. At the same time he gave secret orders that Dumnorix should be watched, and his movements reported.

His
abortive
attempt to
surprise the
Helvetii.

Next morning Caesar made an attempt to surprise the enemy, which only failed through the stupidity of an officer. They had encamped, his scouts reported, at the foot of a hill eight miles distant. He at once sent a party to reconnoitre the hill, and ascertain whether it would be possible to ascend it from the rear. They reported that such an ascent was easily practicable. In the middle of the night Caesar sent Labienus with two legions, under the guidance of the exploring party, to climb the hill and swoop down upon the enemy's rear, while he should himself attack them in front. About two hours after the departure of Labienus, he sent forward his cavalry, and followed along the track by which the enemy had advanced. Publius Considius, an officer of experience and reputation, was sent on ahead with scouts to




REFERENCE

S	Summit of hill of Armeecy
C	Entrenchment for protection of baggage
RR	Legions in line of battle
HH	Helvetii
HH'	Helvetii forced to retreat to a hill
TT	Boii & Tulingi
rr	Roman 3rd line facing Boii & Tulingi
hh	Helvetii renewing attack
---	Roman line of march
---	Helvetian " " "

The contours denote intervals in altitude of 10 metres

Scale 1:50,000

Kilometres



reconnoitre. Shortly before sunrise Caesar was within a mile and a half of the enemy, who suspected nothing. Suddenly Considius rode back at a gallop and told him that all had gone wrong: not Labienus, but the enemy occupied the height; he had recognised them by their arms and standards, and was sure that he had made no mistake. Caesar at once led his troops on to another hill close by, and formed them in line of battle. Labienus meanwhile was wondering why he did not come; and when it was too late, Caesar learned that Considius had been the dupe of his own fears.

The legions moved on in the afternoon, and encamped about three miles in the rear of the Helvetii, near the site of Toulon-sur-Arroux.¹ The day after, as no corn-carts had appeared and only two days' rations were left, Caesar struck off to the right, and marched for Bibracte, the capital of the Aedui, a thriving town situated on Mont Beuvray, about sixteen miles to the north, where he knew that he would find granaries stored with corn. The route ran along the watershed between the Arroux and one of its affluents, a rivulet called the Auzon. The Helvetii were far on their way, the head of the column having passed Luzy and turned westward down the valley of the Alène, when some deserters from Caesar's cavalry brought them the news. Fancying that he was afraid of them, or hoping to prevent him from reaching Bibracte, they turned likewise, marched back rapidly, and attacked his rearguard near Armecy, about three miles north of Toulon. Caesar sent his cavalry to retard their advance, while he ordered the infantry to retrace their steps and ascend the slopes of Armecy. The whole movement must have occupied about two hours. Half-way up the hill, the four veteran legions were ranged in three lines of cohorts, each line being eight men deep.² The soldiers' packs were collected on the top, under the protection of the auxiliaries and the two newly-raised legions, who were ordered to entrench the position. The baggage-train may either have been parked on the ridge along which it was moving, or have continued its march towards Bibracte.

About
June 28?


He
marches for
Bibracte
to get
supplies.

¹ See pp. 618-19.

² See p. 590.

DEFEAT OF THE HELVETII

(After Col. Stoffel)



REFERENCE

- S . . . Summit of hill of Armeey
- C . . . Entrenchment for protection
- RR . . . 4 legions in line of battle
- HH . . . Helvetii
- HH . . . Helvetii forced to retreat
- TT . . . Boii & Tulingi
- rr . . . Roman 5th line facing Boii
- hh . . . Helvetii renewing attack
- . . . Roman line of march
- . . . Helvetian " " "

The contours denote intervals in altitude

Scale 1:56,000

Kilometres



London Macmillan & Co Ltd

reconnoitre. Shortly before sunrise Caesar was within a 58 B.C. mile and a half of the enemy, who suspected nothing. Suddenly Considius rode back at a gallop and told him that all had gone wrong: not Labienus, but the enemy occupied the height; he had recognised them by their arms and standards, and was sure that he had made no mistake. Caesar at once led his troops on to another hill close by, and formed them in line of battle. Labienus meanwhile was wondering why he did not come; and when it was too late, Caesar learned that Considius had been the dupe of his own fears.

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¹ See pp. 618-19.

² See p. 590.

58 B.C.

It was exposed to no danger from the Helvetii; and, as the Aedui were, for the most part, friendly, a slender escort would have sufficed to protect it.¹ The opportunity for which Caesar had been waiting had at last come. Although the enemy were now between him and Bibracte, the hill of Armecy was the best position which he could have chosen. If he won, the road would of course be open. If he lost,—but he did not intend to lose. It was his first pitched battle; and he knew that for him and his army defeat would be destruction. The Helvetii would fight desperately: his legions, except perhaps the 10th, had not yet come to know him; and he could not fully trust all his officers. He therefore dismounted and made his staff do the same, so that the men might see that their officers shared their dangers. The waggons of the Helvetii were parked, as they came up, on rising ground to the left of the road; and about one o'clock in the afternoon the whole mighty host, congregated in compact masses, flung back Caesar's horsemen and with shields closely locked pressed up the hill against the Roman line. The men in the front rank held their shields before their bodies, while those behind bore theirs horizontally above their heads.² The legionaries in the front ranks stood with their javelins in their hands, ready to throw. On the plateau above, recruits and auxiliaries were hard at work with their entrenching tools. When the enemy were within a few yards, the centurions gave the word. Down flew a shower of javelins; and the mass began to break. The blades of the javelins, composed of soft iron, had bent as the points penetrated the shields.³ Sword in hand, the cohorts of the first line charged: many of the Helvetii, finding their shields nailed together by the javelins, which, pull and wrench as they might, were not to be torn out, flung them away, and parried the thrusts as best they could: but they were soon overborne, and fell back to a hill about a mile north of Armecy. The Romans were following when

¹ See p. 620.

² See W. Smith, *Dict. of Greek and Roman Ant.*, ii. 808; and Stoffel, *Guerre de César et d'Arrioviste*, 1890, p. 69.

³ See p. 24, *supra*.

the Boii and Tulingi, who had just arrived upon the field, 58 B.C. rushed upon their flank and rear. The Helvetii took heart again and returned to the attack; and, while the first two lines of the Romans closed with them, the third faced about, and confronted their fresh assailants.

Long and fiercely the battle was fought out. In due time the cohorts of the second line relieved those of the first, advancing between the files as the latter withdrew; and again the first line relieved, in its turn, the second.¹ Gradually the Helvetii were forced further up the hill; while the Boii and Tulingi retreated to their baggage. Standing behind the wall of waggons, they hurled down stones and darts upon the advancing Romans, and thrust at them with long pikes when they attempted to storm the laager. The struggle was prolonged far into the night. At length the legionaries burst through the barrier. Women and children who could not escape were slaughtered; and the flying remnant of the invading host disappeared in the darkness of night.²

Defeat of
the Hel-
vetii near
Bibracte.

Before the sun went down, evil tidings must have reached the non-combatants who were still wending their way towards the field. It is certain that many of the waggons never came into the laager.³ What despair fell upon the baffled emigrants; how the jaded cattle were headed round again towards the north, and goaded through that night; how those who escaped the slaughter tramped after, and told the tale of the calamity; the din, the confusion, the long weariness of the retreat,—these things it is easy to imagine, but those only who have shared the rout and ruin of a beaten army can adequately realise.

Caesar was unable to pursue. His cavalry were weak and untrustworthy; and he had to give the wounded time to recover, and to bury the teeming corpses that might have

Caesar's
treatment
of the
fugitives.

¹ See Stoffel, *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 120-21, and pp. 593-4 of the larger edition of this book.

² If Caesar's estimate (see p. 26, *supra*) of the number of the emigrants was correct, and unless a considerable proportion had dispersed on the march, over 100,000, as Colonel Stoffel calculates, must have perished in the battle. See pp. 222-5. All questions relating to the battle are discussed on pp. 610-25.

³ See pp. 223-4.

58 B.C.

engendered a pestilence among his allies: but he sent mounted messengers to warn the Lingones, through whose country the fugitives would have to pass, to give them no help. The Lingones occupied the country round Tonnerre and Bar-sur-Aube as well as the plateau of Langres. At the end of three days Caesar started in pursuit. On the way he was met by envoys, whom the Helvetii, now reduced to utter destitution, had sent to arrange terms of surrender. He bade them tell their countrymen to halt, and await his arrival. When he overtook them, he ordered them to give hostages, and to surrender their arms and a number of slaves, who had escaped to them. Six thousand Helvetians slipped away in the night, and took the road towards the Rhine: but Caesar sent peremptory orders to the inhabitants to hunt them down and bring them back; and on their return, they were all put to death. The Boii were allowed, at the request of the Aedui, who appreciated their martial qualities, to settle in Aeduan territory. It would seem that the tract assigned to them was in the neighbourhood of St-Parize-le-Châtel, between the Allier and the Loire. The Helvetii and the other tribes, who would be most useful as a barrier between the Germans and the Province, were sent back to their own land; and the Allobroges were directed to supply them with grain.

Settlement
of the Boii.

Envoys
from Cel-
tican Gaul
congratu-
late Caesar,
and solicit
his aid
against
Ariovistus.

The news of this brilliant victory produced its natural effect. The success of the Helvetii would have been a calamity to all, except Dumnorix and his following; and this calamity Caesar had averted. He appeared as the conqueror, not of Gaul but of the invaders of Gaul. At the worst, his rule would be preferable to the tyranny of Ariovistus; and he would doubtless be glad to aid in expelling his rival. The patriots in the tribal councils, if they offered any opposition, were outvoted. Chieftains came from all parts of central Gaul to congratulate the conqueror. They told him that they had certain important proposals to lay before him; and, with his express sanction, they then and there convoked a council to arrange details. The meeting took place some days later. After the council had broken up, Caesar consented, at the pressing request of the

chiefs, to give them a private interview. They earnestly 58 B.C. begged him to keep what they were going to say a close secret; for if it were to get abroad, they would be made to suffer cruelly. Divitiacus, who spoke for them, related how Ariovistus had established his footing in the land of the Sequani, defeated the Aedui and their dependents, and finally overthrown the combined forces of the Aedui, the Sequani, and their respective allies.¹ At that moment there were a hundred and twenty thousand Germans in their midst; and the Gauls would soon be expelled from their own country. The Sequani had already been forced to cede a third part of their territory; and they would soon be forced to give up another third; for a fresh horde, the Harudes, numbering four and twenty thousand, had recently crossed the Rhine. Ariovistus was a cruel bloodthirsty tyrant; and, if Caesar would not help them, they must all go forth, like the Helvetii, and seek some new home.²

Caesar assured the chiefs that they might rely upon his support. Their interests indeed coincided with his. He saw that it was absolutely necessary to stop the flow of German invasion. Like the Cimbri and Teutoni, these fierce hordes might, if they were not checked, soon overrun the whole of Gaul, and thence pour into Italy. Moreover, the interest as well as the honour of Rome required that she should protect her allies; and the Aedui were allies of long standing, whose fidelity had been rewarded by the title of "Brethren." And there was another reason why Caesar should interfere. Like Clive, when he found himself confronted by Dupleix, he could not stand still. He must either advance or retreat. If he shrunk from espousing the cause of the Gauls, he would lose the credit which his victory had won, and perhaps force them to make common cause with Ariovistus against him. Peaceful methods, however, might be tried first. The Roman army was comparatively weak. Ariovistus was master of a formidable host; and it would be foolhardy to attack him without absolute need. He had been treated with distinction by the Senate; and there was just a chance that he might listen to reason.

Failure
of his
attempts
to nego-
tiate with
Ariovistus.

¹ See pp. 558-9.

² See pp. 187-9.

58 B.C.

He was then probably in the neighbourhood of Strasbourg. Caesar sent ambassadors to ask him to name some intermediate spot for a conference. Ariovistus told them to say that if their master wanted anything from him, he must take the trouble to come to him in person. He could not risk his safety by moving outside his own territory without his army; and to move and feed his army would involve an amount of exertion which he did not care to undergo. Meanwhile he should like to know what business Caesar had in a country which the Germans had won by their own swords.

Caesar now assumed a more peremptory tone. Ariovistus had rejected his invitation. Very good! Then these were his terms. Not another man must set foot across the Rhine: the hostages of the Aedui must be restored; and Ariovistus must positively cease to molest that people or their allies. If he obeyed, Caesar would be his friend. If not, he should know how to avenge the wrongs of the Aedui. The Senate had decreed, three years before, that the Governor of Gaul for the time being should protect the Aedui and the other allies of the Republic; and he intended to obey his instructions.

Ariovistus haughtily replied that he was a conqueror; and, as a conqueror, he had a right to treat his subjects as he pleased. He did not interfere with the Romans: what right, then, had the Romans to interfere with him? He would not molest the Aedui so long as they paid their tribute: but most certainly he would not give up the hostages; and if the Aedui did not pay, much good would their alliance with the Romans do them! For Caesar's threats he cared nothing. No man had ever withstood Ariovistus and escaped destruction. Let Caesar choose his own time for fighting. He would soon find out what mettle there was in the unbeaten warriors of Germany.

With this message came the alarming news that a host of Suevi had appeared on the eastern bank of the Rhine, and that the Harudes were actually harrying the lands of the Aedui. Caesar, the most reticent of writers, has told us that he was seriously alarmed.¹ The Gauls were waiting to see

¹ *E. G.*, i. 37, § 4.

whether he or Ariovistus was to be master. If he suffered any reverse, they would probably rise in his rear; and between them and the Germans his army might perish. Not a moment was to be lost if the formidable Suevi were to be prevented from reinforcing the army of Ariovistus. With all possible speed Caesar made arrangements with the Aedui and the Lingones for the forwarding of supplies, and immediately put his army in motion. Three days later he heard that Ariovistus was marching to seize Vesontio, now Hemarches against Ariovistus and seizes Vesontio. Besançon, the chief town of the Sequani, a strong place well stored with all munitions of war. Marching night and day at his utmost speed to anticipate him, he reached the town before the enemy had emerged from Alsace.

Vesontio, which now became Caesar's base, was an ideal Gallic stronghold. The town stood on a sloping peninsula, round which the Doubs swept in a curve that nearly formed a circle; while the isthmus, little more than five hundred yards wide, rose from either bank into a steep and lofty hill, girt by a wall, which gave it the strength of a citadel, and connected it with the town. During the short time that Caesar stayed there to collect supplies, his soldiers had plenty of opportunities for gossiping. The people of the place, and especially the traders, whose business had brought them into contact with the Germans, told marvellous stories of their great strength and desperate bravery:—one could not bear even to look them in the face, so terrible was the glare of their piercing eyes. The Roman soldiers were brave: but they were liable to fits of panic; and they were very credulous. The idle chatter of their new acquaintances completely demoralised them. The mischief began with the tribunes, the officers of the auxiliary corps, and others who formed the personal following of the General. Many of them were soldiers only in name. Like every other Roman governor, Caesar had been obliged, for political reasons, to find places in his army for fashionable idlers and disappointed professional men, who had had no experience of war, and simply wanted to mend their fortunes by looting.¹ Now Panic in the Roman army.

¹ *B. G.*, i. 39, § 2. See also Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.*, vii. 5-6, 8, 10, 18; *ad Quint. frat.*, ii. 13, § 3.

58 B. C.

that there was a prospect of real stern fighting, they began to tremble. Some invented excuses for asking leave of absence. Others felt bound, for very shame, to stay: but they could not command their countenances enough to look as if they were not afraid. Sometimes indeed, in spite of themselves, they gave way to tears. Gradually even centurions and seasoned veterans were infected by the general alarm. Some of them indeed made an effort to disguise their fears. They told each other that it was not the enemy, but only the forests between them and the enemy and the probable failure of supplies that they dreaded. All over the camp men were making their wills; and Caesar was actually told that, when he gave the order to march, the men would refuse to obey.

How
Caesar
restored
confidence.

He immediately sent for the tribunes and centurions, and gave them a severe lecture. What business had they to ask where he intended to march? It was most unlikely that Ariovistus would be mad enough to fight: but supposing he did, what was there to be afraid of? Had they lost all confidence in themselves, all faith in their General? What had these terrible Germans ever really done? The crushing defeats which Marius had inflicted upon the Cimbri and Teutoni, the defeats which had been inflicted upon the gladiators, trained though they were in Roman discipline, in the recent servile war, gave the real measure of their prowess. Even the Helvetii had often beaten them; and the Helvetii had gone down before the legions. To talk about the difficulty of the country or the difficulty of getting supplies was downright impertinence. It was as much as to assume that the General did not know his own business. Supplies were coming up to the front from the friendly tribes; and the croakers would soon see that their alarm about the forests was absurd. As for the story that the army was going to mutiny, he did not believe it. Armies did not mutiny unless generals were incapable or dishonest. His integrity had never been called in question; and the late campaign proved that he could command. Anyhow on the very next night he intended to march; and if nobody else would follow him, he would go on with the

10th legion alone; for it, at all events, was faithful to its 58 B.C. commander.

This vigorous little speech had a marvellous effect upon the troops. From despair their spirits bounded to the highest pitch of confidence; and they were only impatient to measure swords with the enemy. The men of the 10th, flattered by Caesar's trust in them, sent him a message of thanks through their officers; while the other legions asked theirs to tell him that they were sorry for what had occurred. At the hour which he had fixed Caesar struck his camp. He left a detachment to hold Vesontio. Before him all was unknown: but he had full faith in Divitiacus; and Divitiacus undertook to be his guide. To avoid the broken wooded country between Besançon and Montbéliard, he made a circuit northward and eastward, of about fifty miles, and then, threading the pass of Belfort, debouched into the plain of the Rhine, and pushed on rapidly past the eastern slopes of the Vosges till he reached a point within twenty-two miles of the German encampment. He has not told us where he formed his own camp: probably it was on the river Fecht, between Ostheim and Gemar.¹ Ariovistus, who was on the north, sent messengers to say that, as Caesar had come nearer, he had no objection to meeting him. Caesar accepted his proposal; and the conference was fixed for the fifth day following. Ariovistus, who knew that Caesar's cavalry were weak, pretended to be afraid of treachery from the legions, and insisted that they should each bring with them a cavalry escort only. Caesar was unwilling to raise difficulties: but, as all his cavalry were Gauls, and he did not care to trust his safety to them, he mounted the 10th on their horses. The place of meeting was a knoll, rising above the plain, nearly equidistant from the Roman and the German camp. Caesar stationed the bulk of his escort about three hundred yards off: Ariovistus did likewise; and each rode up with ten horsemen to the knoll. Ariovistus had stipulated that they should hold the conference without dismounting. Caesar began by reminding Ariovistus of the honours which the Senate had conferred upon him; and afterwards repeated the

He resumes
his march
against
Ariovistus.

His confer-
ence with
Ariovistus.

¹ See pp. 636-8, and App. C.

58 B.C.

demands, which he had already made through his envoys, on behalf of the Aedui. Ariovistus replied that he had only crossed the Rhine in response to Gallic appeals. The country which he occupied in Gaul had been formally ceded to him by Gauls: it was not he who had attacked them, but they who had attacked him. He had overthrown their entire host in battle; and, if they cared to repeat the experiment, he was ready to fight them again. As for the friendship of the Romans, it was only fair that he should get some solid advantage out of it; and if he could only retain it by giving up the tribute which he received from his subjects, he would fling it aside as readily as he had asked for it. He had entered Gaul before the Romans. Caesar was the first Roman Governor who had ever passed beyond the frontier of the Province. What did he mean by invading his dominions? His part of the country belonged to him just as much as the Province belonged to Rome. Caesar talked a great deal of the titles which the Senate had bestowed upon the Aedui; but he knew too much of the world to be imposed upon by such shams. The Aedui had not helped the Romans in the war with the Allobroges; and the Romans had not stirred a finger to help their "Brethren" against himself. He had good grounds for suspecting that the friendship which Caesar professed for him was another sham, — a mere blind under cover of which Caesar was plotting his ruin. He happened to know what was going on in Rome; and there were prominent men there who would be glad to hear of Caesar's death. If Caesar did not withdraw from his country, he would expel him by force of arms: but if he would only go away and leave him in peace, he would show his gratitude. Caesar quietly answered that it was impossible for him to go back from his word or to forsake the allies of his country; and, he added, if history were to be appealed to, the claim of the Romans to supremacy in Gaul was better founded than that of the Germans. He was still speaking when a soldier rode up and warned him that a number of Germans were edging up towards the knoll and stoning his escort. Riding back to his men, he withdrew them without attempting to retaliate; for, though

he was confident that his splendid legion could easily beat ^{53 B.C.} the Germans, he was determined not to give them any pretext for accusing him of foul play.

Exasperated by this outrage, the Romans became more than ever impatient for battle. Two days later Ariovistus requested Caesar to meet him again, or else send one of his generals. His motive doubtless was the hope of gaining time; for he had a superstitious reason for wishing to postpone the battle. Caesar saw no reason for further discussion, and did not care to expose his lieutenants to the tender mercies of a treacherous barbarian: but he sent his interpreter, Troucillus,¹ and a man called Mettius, whom, as he believed, Ariovistus could have no motive for injuring. They were instructed to hear what Ariovistus had to say, and bring back word. The moment he saw them, Ariovistus flew into a passion. "Why have you come here," he shouted: "to play the spy?" and when they attempted to explain, he cut them short and put them under arrest. Mission of Troucillus and Mettius.

On the same day he made a long march southward, and halted about six miles north of Caesar's camp, at the very foot of the Vosges. He had conceived a daring plan. Next morning his column ascended the lower slopes, marched securely along them past the Roman army, and took up a position two miles south of Caesar's camp. As he looked up at the huge column winding leisurely by, Caesar saw that he was being outmanœuvred: to send the legions up the hill-side would be to court destruction; and he could only wait, a passive spectator, while Ariovistus was cutting his communications and barring the road by which he expected his supplies.² Ariovistus cuts Caesar's line of communication.

Next day Caesar formed up his army immediately in front of the camp, under the protection of his artillery. Ariovistus might attack if he liked: but if he attacked, it would be at his peril; if he declined the challenge, the legionaries would be assured that the Germans were not How Caesar regained command of it.

¹ See App. D.

² See pp. 636-7. Napoleon (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 89, n. 2) infers from Caesar's narrative (*B. G.*, i. 48, § 2) that Ariovistus only succeeded in cutting Caesar's communication with the convoys that were coming up from the Aedui and the Sequani, not with those which he expected from the Leuci and the Lingones.

58 B.C.

invincible.¹ Ariovistus remained where he was. On each of the four following days Caesar offered battle: but the enemy would not be provoked into leaving their camp. Cavalry skirmishes indeed took place daily, but without any decisive result. The Germans had light-armed active footmen, who accompanied the cavalry into action: they were trained to run by the horses' sides, holding on to their manes; and if the troopers were forced to retreat, they supported them and protected the wounded. As the infantry remained obstinately in their camp, and it was necessary for Caesar to win back communication with his convoys, he resolved to take the initiative. Forming his legions in three parallel columns,—prepared, at a moment's notice, to face into line of battle, he marched back to a point about a thousand yards south of Ariovistus's position, and there marked out a site for a camp. One column fell to work with their spades, while the other two formed in two lines to protect them. Ariovistus sent a detachment to stop the work: but it was too late: the fighting legions kept their assailants at bay, and the camp was made. Two legions were left to hold it; and the other four returned to the larger camp. Next day Caesar led his men into the open, but not far from his camp, and again offered battle. Ariovistus again declined the challenge: but, as soon as the legions had returned to their entrenchments, he made a determined attempt to storm the smaller camp, and only drew off his forces at sunset. Caesar now learned from some prisoners that the enemy had been warned by their wise women, whose divinations they accepted with superstitious awe, that they could not gain the victory unless they postponed the battle until after the new moon.

The Germans from superstition delay to fight a pitched battle.

Sept. 18.

Caesar attacks them.

Caesar saw his opportunity. He waited till the following morning; and then, leaving detachments to guard his two camps, he formed his six legions, as usual, in three lines, and marched against the enemy. They had no choice but to defend themselves. Their waggons stood in a huge semicircle, closing their flanks and rear; and, as they tramped

¹ See Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii. 342-5; *Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, p. 64; and Caesar, *B. C.*, iii. 55, § 1, 84, § 2.

out, their women stretched out their hands and piteously 58 B.C. begged them not to suffer their wives to be made slaves. The host was formed in seven distinct groups, each composed of the warriors of a single tribe. As the Romans were numerically weaker than their opponents, the auxiliaries were drawn up in front of the smaller camp, to make a show of strength. Each of the *legati* was placed at the head of a legion, in order that every one might feel that his courage in action would not be overlooked. Caesar commanded the right wing in person, and, noticing that the enemy's left was comparatively weak, directed against it his principal attack, in the hope of overwhelming it speedily and thus disconcerting the rest of the force. But before the Romans in the front ranks could poise their javelins, the Germans were upon them; and they had barely a moment to draw their swords. Quickly stiffening into compact masses, the Germans locked their shields to receive the thrusts: but some of the Romans flung themselves right on to the phalanxes: they tore the shields from the grasp of their foes, and dug their swords down into them; and, after a close struggle, they broke the formation, and their weapons got freer play. The unwieldy masses, unable to manœuvre or to deploy, reeled backward, dissolved, and fled. But the Roman left, overpowered by numbers, was giving ground. Young Publius Crassus, son of the celebrated triumvir, who was stationed in command of the cavalry, outside the battle, saw the crisis, and promptly sent the third line to the rescue. The victory was won, and the whole beaten multitude fled towards the Rhine. But the Rhine was some fifteen miles away;¹ the Ill had first to be crossed; and in that weary flight many fell under the lances of the cavalry. Only a few, among whom was Ariovistus, were lucky enough to swim the river or find boats. Caesar, in the course of the pursuit, came upon his interpreter, who was being dragged along in chains by his captors, and had only escaped death by the accident that, on drawing lots, they had decided to postpone his execution. There is nothing in Caesar's memoirs more full of human interest than the passage in which, breaking his habitual reserve, he

They are
defeated
and
expelled
from Gaul.

¹ See pp. 638-40, and App. C.

58 B.C.

tells us of the joy he felt on seeing this man, for whom he had the greatest respect and regard, alive and unhurt. It gave him, he tells us, a pleasure as great as he had felt in gaining the victory.¹

The victory was decisive. The Suevi, who were on the point of crossing the Rhine, lost heart and set out homewards. And Caesar,—where was he to go? What use was he to make of his victory? It would be fatal to withdraw his legions into the Province. That would be to invite the German to attempt a new invasion; to confess weakness to the Gaul. Fortune beckoned him on. Gaul was disunited: her foremost state was on his side; and others felt the spell of his success. To bring those gifted peoples under the civilising sway of Rome, to open their broad lands to Italian enterprise,—that was a work to satisfy the most soaring ambition. For the present indeed he must return to Cisalpine Gaul, to conduct the civil duties of his government and watch the politics of Italy: but leaving his legions under the command of Labienus, he quartered them for the winter in the stronghold of Vesontio.² In that last act of his we may read the registration of a great resolve; and doubtless he reflected, as he travelled southward, upon the magnitude of the undertaking to which he had committed himself. For to all who had eyes to see and ears to hear he had made it evident that his purpose was nothing less than the conquest of Gaul.

Caesar
quarters
his legions
at Vesontio.

Signifi-
cance of
this step.

¹ Colonel Stoffel (*Guerre de César et d'Arioviste*, pp. 67-72) gives a detailed description of the battle, which is partly imaginary, but nevertheless well worth reading. The imagination is totally different from that of a rhetorical historian: it is the imagination of a soldier, who understands what he is writing about; and the description, which recommends itself as substantially true, helps one to realise what a battle was like in the circumstances of ancient warfare.

² So Napoleon conjectures with probability (*Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 97): we only know for certain that the winter-quarters were in the country of the Sequani (*B. G.*, i. 54, § 2). But Napoleon's conjecture is supported by the fact that Caesar had garrisoned Vesontio (*ib.*, 38, § 7).

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELGAE

THE results of the campaign which Caesar had just concluded ^{57 B.C.} may be summed up in a single sentence:—he had secured, ^{Results of the first campaign.} at least for a time, the virtual submission of central Gaul; and he had paved the way for the conquest by destroying or expelling the barbarian hordes who threatened to anticipate him.

But the Gauls were not yet ready to bow their necks ^{The Belgae} beneath the Roman yoke. Caesar's victories were doubtless ^{conspire against Caesar.} talked of in every village from the Rhine to the Atlantic; and it needed less than the Celtic quickness to perceive their significance. Before the close of winter he heard rumours that the warlike Belgae were conspiring; and these rumours were confirmed by a despatch from Labienus. The tribes were binding each other, by the interchange of hostages, to mutual fidelity. They were fearful that Caesar would first conquer the rest of Gaul, and then conquer them. Moreover, they were egged on to fight by certain influential chiefs from Celtican Gaul. The motives of these counsellors were various. Some simply desired to make their country free. It was all very well, they argued, to have got rid of the Germans: but these new intruders were not a whit more welcome. If Caesar had expelled Ariovistus, he was evidently determined to take his place. The legions had settled down in the country; and they intended to make the country support them. Others, merely because they were Gauls, longed, above all things, for revolution. Then there were princely adventurers, who were plotting to seize royal power, and who foresaw that, if Gaul became a Roman province, they would

57 B.C.

be obliged to submit to law, and would no longer be allowed to hire troops for the gratification of their ambition.

Caesar
returns to
Gaul, and
marches
against
them.

On his own responsibility and at his own cost, Caesar instantly raised two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul, and sent them in the early spring to join Labienus. As soon as the herbage was sufficiently forward to make it safe to take the field, he crossed the Alps and rejoined his army at Vesontio. The tribes nearest to the Belgae, whom he charged with the duty of collecting information, reported that they were busily raising and concentrating levies. Having arranged for supplies of corn, Caesar pushed on and, after another fortnight's marching, appeared on the northern bank of the Marne.


The Remi
submit,
and help
Caesar.

The Belgae were taken completely by surprise. Engrossed in their preparations against Caesar, they had never dreamed that Caesar might anticipate them. One tribe, the Remi, who occupied the country round Reims, Laon and Chalons, were shrewd enough to perceive that his patronage would strengthen their own position. They were subject to the overlordship of their neighbours, the Suessiones, and wanted to shake off the yoke.¹ Two of their leading men, Iccius and Andecumborius, presented themselves in Caesar's camp, and not only submitted on behalf of the tribe, but promised to render him every assistance. Nothing could have been more opportune. He saw that it would be easy to establish in the heart of Belgium a power as devoted to his interests as the Aedui in central Gaul. He gave the envoys a gracious welcome, only stipulating that the Roman senate should present themselves before him, and that the sons of the leading men should be delivered up as hostages. The envoys gave him full information. The Belgae, they said, were full of confidence. They boasted that the Cimbri and Teutoni, who had overrun the rest of Gaul, had never been able to get a footing in their land. The Remi had done their utmost to prevent the Suessiones from taking part

¹ The Roman envoys told Caesar (*B. G.*, ii. 3, § 5) that the Suessiones and the Remi formed one political community. Now Galba was the king of the Suessiones; and therefore, it should seem, had been overlord of the Remi. Mommsen then is doubtless right in affirming that the Remi "discerned in this invasion of the foreigners an opportunity to shake off the rule which their neighbours, the Suessiones, exercised over them." *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 247.

OPERATIONS ON THE AISNE.

The numbers denote the heights in metres above the level of the sea.



Kilometres Scale 1:60,000 Roman Miles
 1 1/2 0 1 1/2 0
 London, Macmillan & Co Ltd.

in the movement, but in vain: indeed their king, Galba, 57 B.C. had been unanimously elected commander-in-chief. Every other tribe had joined the league; and Galba was prepared to put over two hundred thousand men into the field.¹

Caesar himself could hardly muster a fourth of this number; and his enemies were the stoutest and the most stubborn of all the warriors of Gaul. His only chance of success was to force their huge host to divide. With this aim,

he asked Divitiacus to raise a levy of Aeduans, and ravage the lands of the Bellovaci, which lay beyond the Oise, in the region now dominated by the huge choir of Beauvais. The entire armament was now in full march against him. They were moving down a road which led from La Fère, on the Oise, past Laon to Reims.² Caesar determined to choose his own battle-field. Marching rapidly northward from Reims, he crossed the Aisne by a bridge at Berry-au-Bac, and encamped on rising ground between that river and its tributary, the Miette, a small stream flowing through a marshy ooze. The camp was, as usual, quadrilateral, as nearly square as the lie of the ground allowed. The rampart, eight feet high, was faced with sods and revetted with timber and fascines, to keep its slope of the requisite steepness: along the top of it was set a palisade of interlacing branches;³ and the ditch which surrounded it was eighteen feet wide and ten feet deep.⁴ Caesar's rear was protected by the Aisne; and his supplies could be brought up in safety by the Remi. At the northern end of the bridge he established a *tête-de-pont*; and, to guard its further extremity, he left a detachment about two thousand strong under one of his generals, Titurius Sabinus. Towards mid-

He sends Divitiacus to ravage the lands of the Bellovaci.

Marches to encounter the advancing host, crosses the Aisne, and encamps near Berry-au-Bac.

night a messenger came into camp with the news that the Belgae were making a furious attack upon Bibrax, or Vieux-Laon, a Roman stronghold about seven miles to the north-west, and that Iccius, who commanded the garrison, despaired of being able to hold out unless he were promptly reinforced. Caesar instantly despatched a force of slingers, bowmen and light-armed auxiliary infantry to the rescue. The Gauls

The Belgae attack Bibrax.

Caesar sends his auxiliaries to the rescue.

¹ See pp. 228-9.

² See pp. 644-5.


³ See pp. 588-9

⁴ Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 191, note.

OPERATIONS

To face page 49

The numbers denote the heights in



in the movement, but in vain : indeed their king, Galba, 57 B.C. had been unanimously elected commander-in-chief. Every other tribe had joined the league ; and Galba was prepared to put over two hundred thousand men into the field.¹ Caesar himself could hardly muster a fourth of this number ; and his enemies were the stoutest and the most stubborn of all the warriors of Gaul. His only chance of success was to force their huge host to divide. With this aim, he asked Divitiacus to raise a levy of Aeduans, and ravage the lands of the Bellovaci, which lay beyond the Oise, in the region now dominated by the huge choir of Beauvais. The entire armament was now in full march against him. They were moving down a road which led from La Fère, on the Oise, past Laon to Reims.² Caesar determined to choose his own battle-field. Marching rapidly northward from Reims, he crossed the Aisne by a bridge at Berry-au-Bac, and encamped on rising ground between that river and its tributary, the Miette, a small stream flowing through a marshy ooze. The camp was, as usual, quadrilateral, as nearly square as the lie of the ground allowed. The rampart, eight feet high, was faced with sods and revetted with timber and fascines, to keep its slope of the requisite steepness : along the top of it was set a palisade of interlacing branches ;³ and the ditch which surrounded it was eighteen feet wide and ten feet deep.⁴ Caesar's rear was protected by the Aisne ; and his supplies could be brought up in safety by the Remi. At the northern end of the bridge he established a *tête-de-pont* ; and, to guard its further extremity, he left a detachment about two thousand strong under one of his generals, Titurinus Sabinus. Towards midnight a messenger came into camp with the news that the Belgae were making a furious attack upon Bibrax, or Vieux-Laon, a Roman stronghold about seven miles to the north-west, and that Iccius, who commanded the garrison, despaired of being able to hold out unless he were promptly reinforced. Caesar instantly despatched a force of slingers, bowmen and light-armed auxiliary infantry to the rescue. The Gauls

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¹ See pp. 228-9.

² See pp. 644-5.

³ See pp. 588-9

⁴ Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 191, note.

57 B. C.

knew nothing of the scientific methods by which the Romans captured fortified towns. When their numbers were sufficiently great, they used to drive the defenders from the rampart by showers of missiles, and then to demolish a portion of the wall. But Bibrax was defended on the south by impregnable escarpments: it would seem that Galba had neglected to invest this side; and when Caesar's light troops appeared, the impatient and undisciplined host abandoned their attempt.¹ They only lingered long enough to ravage the lands and fire the hamlets within reach of the town.

The Belgae
encamp
opposite
Caesar.

On the following night the sudden blaze of a line of watch-fires, extending eight miles in length beyond the further side of the Miette, revealed to Caesar their encampment.

Caesar
makes his
position
impreg-
nable.

So formidable was the appearance of the huge host, so great was their reputation as fighting men, that Caesar did not care to risk a battle until he had seen enough to judge whether he would have a reasonable chance of success. A few cavalry skirmishes convinced him that he had nothing to fear. The rising ground on which the camp stood extended in a south-westerly direction nearly to the confluence of the Miette and the Aisne. The legions were protected in front by the Miette: but on their right the vast numbers of the enemy might outflank them. To prevent this, Caesar made his men dig two trenches, each about three furlongs in length, one southward to the Aisne from the south-eastern angle of the camp, the other northward to the Miette from the north-western; and at the extremity of either trench he caused forts to be constructed and armed with *ballistae* and catapults. Along the whole length of the hill, on the left of the camp, he drew up six of his legions in battle array; while the other two remained to guard the camp. The enemy's masses were ranged on the further side of the Miette. Each of the two armies obstinately waited for the other to cross. Meanwhile Caesar's cavalry were scattering the Belgic squadrons. At length, tired of waiting, he led his legions back into camp. There was a ford on the Aisne, about two miles below the *tête-de-pont*, which he had either failed to notice or had not thought it necessary to

¹ See p. 229, n. 1, and note on BIBRAX, p. 395.

guard. Presently an orderly came from Sabinus, who 57 B.C. reported that a body of the enemy were moving down to the bank on his left, evidently intending to cross over, attack his camp, and destroy the bridge. Even if they failed, the corn-fields of the Remi would be at their mercy: the convoys would be cut off; and then the legions would starve. Taking his cavalry, light-armed Numidians, archers and slingers, Caesar hurried down the hill, crossed the bridge, wheeled to the right, and pushed down the bank towards the ford. There were the enemy, splashing through the water. The archers and slingers attacked them, and did terrible execution. The survivors clambered over the fallen bodies, and staggered on under showers of stones and arrows: but those who succeeded in reaching the bank were surrounded by the cavalry and cut to pieces.¹

The Belgae attempt to cut his communications, but are defeated.

The Belgae were thoroughly disheartened. They had no organised commissariat; and their supplies were running out. Galba had not the genius to control a vast multitude made up of hordes without discipline, with conflicting interests, and distracted by mutual jealousies. Caesar's position was impregnable; and he evidently had no intention of quitting it. His allies would soon be swarming over the frontier of the Bellovaci; and the chiefs of that tribe insisted on returning to defend their families. It was decided, therefore, that each tribe should go back to its own country, and that, whatever district the Romans might invade, all should rally to its defence. But this resolution was merely to save their self-respect. In the night the whole multitude poured out of their encampment with great uproar and confusion, each man struggling to get in front of his fellows. Caesar at first suspected that this movement was merely a ruse: but at daybreak he received positive information that the enemy had really gone, and immediately sent his cavalry, supported by three legions, under Labienus, in pursuit.² The rear ranks, when they were overtaken, stood at bay, and resisted resolutely: but those in front, hearing the shouts of the

They disperse.

Caesar's cavalry pursue them.

¹ Regarding Caesar's operations on the Aisne, see pp. 645-52, and App. E.

² Caesar wisely entrusted the command of the cavalry to two of his *legati*, one of whom, Cotta, was a soldier of the highest class.

57 B.C. combatants, made haste to escape. The slaughter was instant; and the pursuers raced on. As long as daylight lasted, they hung on the rearguard, slaying, pursuing and slaying again; and at sunset they returned to camp. Caesar left the disorganised host no time to rally. Next morning he pushed on westward down the valley of the Aisne. In a single forced march of some seven and twenty miles he reached Noviodunum, near the modern Soissons, the chief stronghold of the Suessiones, and at once attempted an assault:¹ but though the garrison was weak, the moat was so wide and the wall so high that his troops were repulsed. In spite of their fatigue, they proceeded to fortify their camp and make preparations for a siege. Sappers' huts were constructed for protecting the workers: earth and fascines were shot into the moat; and wooden towers were erected to carry the artillery which was to play upon the defenders of the wall. During the night the contingent of the Suessiones, which had retreated from the camp on the Miette, thronged into the town and reinforced the garrison: but they were so confounded by the formidable appearance of the siege works that they surrendered without striking a blow. Marching on westward, Caesar crossed the Oise. Bratuspantium, the chief town of the Bellovaci, opened its gates on his approach; and when he drew near Samarobriua, where now rises the colossal pile of the cathedral of Amiens, the Ambiani likewise tendered their submission. Caesar treated the three tribes with equal clemency and firmness. He punished no one: but he disarmed the garrisons of Noviodunum and Bratuspantium, and required the surrender of hostages of noble birth. Divitiacus, who had rejoined him, interceded for the Bellovaci; and, as his policy was to strengthen the influence of the Aedui, he gave out that it was his regard for those loyal allies which led him to show mercy. But now he learned that his progress was about to be disputed. On the north-east, among the inhospitable forests of the Sambre and the marshes of the Scheldt, dwelt a tribe whose primitive virtues had not yet been enfeebled by contact with civilisation. No traders were suffered to cross their frontier, for

Hemarches
westward,
and re-
ceives the
submission
of the
Suessiones,
Bellovaci
and
Ambiani.


[Dreuil?]²

¹ See pp. 473-4, 652-4.

² See pp. 396-8.

THE BATTLE OF NEUF-MESNIL.

The numbers denote the heights in metres above the level of the sea.



Kilometres Scale 1:40,000 Roman Miles

1 1/2 0 1 2 1 3/4 1/2 1/4 0 1

London Macmillan & Co. Ltd.

Standard Map Estate

fear the luxuries of which the rude warriors were still ignorant might sap their manhood. Bitterly taunting their neighbour tribes for having so tamely surrendered, they vowed that for their part they would accept no terms of peace. This people, whom of all his enemies Caesar most respected, and of whom he wrote with one of those rare touches of enthusiasm that here and there relieve the severity of his narrative, were the Nervii.

A couple of marches brought the legions to the Nervian frontier. The road led through Hainaut, past the site of the modern Cambrai. Three days later Caesar gathered from some rustics, who had been taken prisoners, that the warriors of the tribe were encamped only nine miles off, on the further bank of the Sambre, with their allies, the Viromandui and the Atrebatæ; and that another tribe, the Aduatuci, were marching from the east to join them. He immediately sent on a party of centurions and pioneers to choose a camping ground. It happened that some of his prisoners had escaped to the enemy in the night. They told them that each of the Roman legions was separated, on the march, from the one that followed it by a long baggage-train; and that, when the foremost legion, encumbered with their heavy packs, reached the camping ground, it would be easy to overwhelm them and plunder the baggage before the others could come to the rescue. The centurions selected for the site of the camp the heights of Neuf-Mesnil, which slope evenly and gently down towards the left bank of the Sambre. The depth of the river was not more than three feet. From the opposite bank an open meadow, over which were scattered a few cavalry piquets, rose into a hill covered with woods. The space for the camp was measured and marked out. Meanwhile the Roman army was toiling up from behind, its march being delayed by thick hedges, which had to be cut through. The formation was different from that which had been described to the Nervii; for when close to an enemy, Caesar always changed his order of march. In front came six legions in column. Then followed the entire baggage-train, protected by the two newly raised legions, which closed the rear. The cavalry, who had gone on in front, rode across

57 B.C.

The Nervii resolve to resist.

Caesar marches against them.

He learns that they and their allies are encamped on the right bank of the Sambre.

His pioneers mark out a camp on the heights of Neuf-Mesnil.

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the shallow stream, and, supported by archers and slingers, engaged the enemy's piquets. The piquets fell back into the wood, whither the cavalry dared not follow them; and there leisurely re-forming, they charged again and again. As the infantry arrived upon the ground, some began to dig the trenches for the camp, while others scattered over the country to cut down wood. Caesar neglected to take the precaution of keeping a part of his force under arms.¹ At length the head of the baggage-train appeared. Ambushed among the trees, the Gauls caught sight of it. Suddenly they flashed forth from the wood and came pouring down the open; their rush swept away the terrified cavalry; now they were across the river and racing up the slope; and now they fell upon the half-formed line.

Battle of
Neuf-
Mesnil.

The confusion was overwhelming. From the moment when the onrushing host was seen there were hardly ten minutes for preparation. The Romans flung aside their tools. Caesar had to give all his orders in a breath. The red battle-ensign was quickly hoisted over his tent. The blast of the trumpet recalled the men who were working at the further side of the camp, while messengers ran to fetch those who had scattered far afield. They had not a moment even to cram on their helmets or pull the coverings off their shields. The generals were obliged to act without waiting for orders; and Caesar was glad that he had forbidden them to leave their respective legions while the camp was being made. He could not direct them; for the hedges which crossed the field obstructed his view. The nature of the ground prevented them from forming a regular line of battle: along the brow of the hill a number of isolated combats were beginning at

¹ As he had done when constructing his smaller camp in presence of the hostile force of Ariovistus (*B. G.*, i. 49). The great Napoleon blames him for having allowed himself to be surprised. "Il est vrai," he says, "que sa cavalerie et ses troupes légères avaient passé la Sambre; mais, du lieu où il était, il s'apercevait qu'elles étaient arrêtées à 150 toises de lui, à la lisière de la forêt; il devait donc ou tenir une partie de ses troupes sous les armes, ou attendre que ses coureurs eussent traversé la forêt et éclairé le pays. Il se justifia en disant que les bords de la Sambre étaient si escarpés qu'il se croyait en sûreté dans la position où il voulait camper." *Précis des guerres de César*, 1836, p. 45. It should be noted that "150 toises" is a mistake; the distance from the Roman camp to the edge of the wood was about 7 furlongs.

once; and all that could be done was to make each legion ^{57 B.C.} face its immediate assailants. Disciplined, and self-reliant from the experience which they had gained, the soldiers instinctively grasped the situation: they did not trouble themselves to join their respective companies, but one after another, as they hastened up, they fell into the ranks by the standards nearest them. Hurrying down at haphazard to cheer them on, Caesar found himself close to the left of the line. There was the 10th,—his favourite legion. “Keep cool, men,” he cried, “and remember the honour of the legion. Stand up against that rush!” He had no time to say more; for the enemy were within a javelin’s cast, and, as he hurried on, both sides were engaged.

Hurling their javelins, the 10th and, on their left, the 9th fell, sword in hand, upon the Atrebatas, who, panting from their headlong rush, soon gave way. Hunted down the slope, they plunged into the stream, but the Romans dashed after, sword in hand; and when the survivors clambered up the further bank and tried to rally, fell upon them again and chased them up the hill. At the same time the 11th and 8th drove the Viromandui from the front of the camp right down to the water’s edge. But the very success of these four legions was disastrous to their comrades—the 12th and 7th—on the right. The left and front of the camp were exposed; and the Nervii, compacted in one mighty column, swarmed up the heights, and while some outflanked the two legions on their right, the rest pressed on for the defenceless camp. The beaten cavalry came full upon them and again took to flight: the officers’ servants, who had gone out to plunder, looked back, and ran for their lives: the baggage-drivers, who were coming up, scattered in all directions, shrieking with terror; and a body of horse from the Treveri, who formed part of the auxiliary force, rode off homewards to announce Caesar’s defeat.

Caesar saw it all as he made his way from the left to the right wing. The men of the 12th were huddled together so closely that they could hardly use their swords; and nearly every officer was either killed or wounded. Sextius Baculus, the chief centurion of the legion, was so weakened by loss of

57 B.C.

blood that he could no longer stand. From the rear ranks men were slinking away to escape the showers of missiles. There were no reserves; and the numbers of the enemy were inexhaustible. Fresh swarms kept pressing up the hill, and closing in on either flank. Seizing a shield from a man in the rearmost rank, Caesar pushed his way through to the front: he called to his centurions by name: he told the men to open up their ranks—so they would be able to use their swords better—and charge. At the sound of his voice their spirits rose; and each man of them hoped that the General would see how bravely he could fight. But the 7th also, on their right, were hard pressed. Caesar told the tribunes to bring the two legions gradually closer together, and form them up so as to face the enemy on every side.¹ And now, as the men were relieved from the dread of being attacked in the rear, they fought with renewed confidence. The two legions which guarded the baggage had heard of the fight, and were marching up at their utmost speed. Suddenly above the ridge of Neuf-Mesnil they appeared; and presently the 10th, despatched by Labienus, recrossed the river, hurried up the hill side, and threw themselves upon the enemy's rear. The effect of their appearance was electrical. Even the wounded leaned on their shields, and plied their swords: the scattered camp-followers plucked up courage and turned upon the enemy: while the cavalry did all they could to atone for their flight. The Nervii in their turn were hemmed in. But in their last agony they made good their proud boast. Man by man, beneath the javelin and the thrust of the short sword, their front ranks fell. Higher rose the heap of prostrate bodies; and leaping on to them, the survivors snatched up the fallen javelins and flung them back, till they too fell; and all was still.²

So ended this wild fight,—a soldiers' battle, and withal the battle of a great man. Within an hour it was over, fought and wellnigh lost and won.³

¹ See p. 824.

² See pp. 654-60. Caesar's narrative (*B. G.*, ii. 27, §§ 3-5, 28, §§ 1-2) implies that a few of the Nervian contingent escaped: but whether they ran away from the fighting line or had not come into action at all, he does not say.

³ See p. 660.

The power of the Belgae was broken. What remained to 57 B.C. be done was only matter of detail. The old men of the Nervian tribe, with the women and children, had gathered before the battle in the midst of the marshes formed by the estuary of the Scheldt. Within a few days a deputation came from them to ask an audience of the conqueror. They were shrewd enough to exaggerate their losses.¹ Their army, they said, was all but annihilated. Only five hundred fighting men remained out of sixty thousand; and of six hundred senators no more than three. Wishing to establish a reputation for clemency, Caesar permitted the survivors to retain their lands and even their fortified villages, and warned the neighbouring tribes to refrain from molesting them. He then marched eastward against the Aduatuci. This people were different in origin from the rest of the Belgae. Fifty years before, the Cimbri and Teutoni, marching for the south, had left some of their number, under the protection of six thousand warriors, in Belgic Gaul, to herd the cattle and guard the booty which they could not take with them. After the destruction of their kindred, these men and their descendants had continued to maintain themselves against the enemies who surrounded them: they had achieved, by prolonged fighting, a commanding position; and they now occupied the broad plain of Hesbaye on the northern bank of the Meuse.² On hearing of the defeat of their allies, they had returned home and concentrated in one town of great strength, situated on Mont Falhize, opposite the modern fortress of Huy. The Meuse, winding in the shape of a horse-shoe, flowed through the meadows beneath the southern slopes of the hill; and the town, perched above its rocky heights, seemed inaccessible, save by one gentle ascent on the north-east, where a high wall frowned down upon the besiegers. Heavy stones and pointed beams were ranged upon the wall; and in front of it was a deep moat. At first the garrison made a succession of sorties: but Caesar threw up a rampart from one reach of the river, round the north of the hill, to the other; and, as was usual in regular sieges,

Caesar
treats the
survivors
with clem-
ency.

He besieges
the strong-
hold of the
Aduatuci.

¹ See pp. 169-70 of the larger edition.

² In 57 B.C. they may also have possessed lands on the right bank. See pp. 349-52.

57 B.C.

a terrace, composed of a core of earth and timber, supported by walls of logs piled cross-wise, was built up at right angles to the wall.¹ On this terrace was erected one of the wooden towers from the stories of which archers, slingers and artillery used to shower missiles among the defenders of a besieged town. It was intended that, as soon as the terrace approached the wall, a battering-ram should be employed to effect a breach. The garrison, confident in the strength of their fortress, watched these operations with ignorant contempt. They despised the Romans for their small stature, and asked them if they imagined that such pygmies as they could get a huge tower like that on to the wall. But the laugh was soon turned against them. When they saw the tower actually moving on its rollers and steadily nearing the wall, they fancied there must be some supernatural power at work, and in great alarm sent out envoys to beg for terms. They would surrender, the envoys said; only they entreated to be allowed to keep their arms, without which they could not defend themselves against their neighbours. Caesar insisted on unconditional surrender. He would take care that their neighbours did not molest them. The chiefs could only submit; and swords, spears and shields were pitched down into the moat until the heap almost reached the top of the wall. Towards sunset all the Roman soldiers who had gone into the town were withdrawn, for fear they might commit any excesses. The garrison had kept about a third of their weapons in reserve, and had improvised rude shields. They calculated that the Romans would be off their guard, and laid their plans accordingly. The contravallation was traced along rising ground. In the middle of the night the Aduatuci poured out of the gates, and advanced to attack it where the ascent was easiest. But Caesar had provided against the chance of treachery. Piles of wood, all ready laid, were set ablaze; and, guided by their light, the troops came streaming from the nearest redoubts. The Gauls fought with the courage of despair: but missiles rained down upon them from the rampart and from the towers which had been

They
surrender.

But after-
wards make
a treacher-
ous attack.

¹ The difficult questions relating to the construction of the siege-terrace (*agger*) are discussed on pp. 594-601. See also pp. 109-10, 113.

erected upon it; and they were driven back with heavy loss ^{57 B.C.} into the town. Next day the gates were burst open, and the Romans rushed in. Caesar was neither vindictive nor cruel: but to those who defied him, and especially to those who broke faith, he was absolutely ruthless. Fifty-three thousand of the Aduatuci—all who were found within the town—were sold as slaves.¹ Their punishment.

The campaign was over. The prestige which it had won for Caesar was so great that more than one German tribe sent envoys across the Rhine to offer submission. One partial failure alone marred the general success. Amid the clash of arms, Caesar did not forget the commercial advantages which his conquest might secure for Rome. On his way back to Italy,² he sent one of his generals, Servius Galba, Galba's campaign in the Valais. to open up the road leading from the Valais over the Great St. Bernard into Italy, which traders had only been able to use hitherto at great risk and by the payment of heavy tolls. The tribes with which he had to deal were the Nantuates, who occupied the Chablais and the southern bank of the Rhône as far as St. Maurice; the Veragri, whose chief town, Octodurus, stood upon the site of Martigny, near the confluence of the Rhône and the Dranse;³ and the Seduni, whose name is preserved in the modern Sitten. Galba's force consisted only of the 12th legion, which had suffered so severely in the battle with the Nervii, and a body of cavalry. Skirting the northern shore of the Lake of Geneva, the little column entered the broad valley of the upper Rhône, walled in on right and left by wooded mountains. Having inflicted several defeats upon the mountaineers, stormed several of their strongholds, and compelled the chiefs to surrender their sons as hostages, he posted two cohorts in the neighbourhood of St. Maurice, and took up his own quarters in Octodurus. The left bank of the Dranse, which then flowed in a different channel, down the middle of the valley, was on his right; and his camp was between Martigny-la-Ville and the more southerly Martigny Bourg. Besides the two cohorts which he had detached, he was obliged to send out a number of

¹ See p. 25, *supra*, and note on ADUATUCORUM OPPIDUM, pp. 353-8.

² Schneider's *Caesar*, i. 210, note.

³ See pp. 661-2.

57 B.C.

small parties for supplies. The camp was dominated on either side by the heights which border the valley of the Dranse; and the force which remained was insufficient for its protection. The mountaineers resented the deprivation of their children; and, as Caesar half naïvely remarked, they believed that the Romans, not content with occupying the roads, intended to annex their country. One morning Galba was informed that the heights were covered by armed men. They were evidently determined to cut his communications, and bar his exit from the valley. The fortifications were still unfinished, and the supply of corn was inadequate; for, as the mountaineers had submitted and given hostages, Galba had never dreamed that he might have to fight. A council of war was called. Some of the officers urged Galba to abandon the baggage and fight his way out: but he resolved, with the concurrence of the majority, to defend the camp. The troops had only just time to man the rampart before the enemy rushed down to the attack. They hurled stones and darts from every side. The Romans offered a vigorous resistance; and not a missile which they threw from their commanding position missed its mark. But the enemy's numbers enabled them to bring down fresh men as often as they were wanted; while the Romans had to fight on without relief. For six hours they fought at bay till their stock of missiles was nearly spent, and the enemy were beginning to fill up the trench and to break down the rampart. Just in time, Sextius Baculus, who had fought so gallantly on the Sambre, and a tribune named Volusenus ran to the chief, and convinced him that their only chance of averting destruction was to cut their way out. The men were told to stand quietly on the defensive for a few minutes, and rest themselves. Suddenly, at a given signal, four compact little columns dashed out from all four gates, and cut their way through the loose ranks of the astounded mountaineers. There was no time to rally. Discipline prevailed over numbers; and the mountaineers were driven with heavy loss out of the plain, and chased over the hills. But Octodurus was plainly untenable; and it appeared impossible to obtain supplies. Next day therefore Galba burned all the houses

in the village, and returned to spend the winter in the 57 B.C. country of the Allobroges.

The other legions had already been distributed in their winter-quarters. One, under Publius Crassus, the young general whose promptitude had contributed so much to the defeat of Ariovistus, had been sent, after the battle with the Nervii, to receive the submission of the maritime tribes of Normandy and Brittany.¹ This legion and the remaining six were cantoned along the valley of the Loire, from Angers to Orléans, so as to cut off all communication between northern and southern Gaul.

In Italy the news of Caesar's victories was received with an outburst of enthusiasm.² Men felt that he had avenged the disaster of the Allia; and even the Senate gave expression to the popular feeling. After his despatches had been read, it was decided to hold a thanksgiving service of fifteen days,—an honour which no Roman citizen had ever received before.

¹ The Veneti, Unelli, Osismi, Curiosolites, Esuvii, Aulerci and Redones.

² Plutarch, *Caesar*, 23.

CHAPTER IV

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE MARITIME TRIBES AND THE AQUITANI

56 B.C.

Delusive
prospects
of peace.

[The
country of
the Andes.]

THE barbarian invaders of Gaul had been destroyed or driven back: the Belgae had been chastised; and many of the other states had proffered their submission. The Aedui and the Remi were still friendly; and the countenance of Caesar had greatly increased their consequence, and therefore the influence which they were able to exert on his behalf. The Gallic peoples had little consciousness of national unity: they were familiar with the idea of Roman dominion; and, while Caesar did not interfere with their domestic affairs, they were not prepared to make any serious effort to throw off a supremacy which as yet seemed little more than nominal. So confident was Caesar in the prospect of tranquillity that he set out on a political tour to Illyricum,—the most distant quarter of his province. But Gaul was still a long way from being subdued. The legion under Publius Crassus had been quartered in the northern part of Anjou. The most considerable of the neighbouring tribes were the Veneti, who dwelt in the storm-beaten tract of western Brittany which comprises the department of Morbihan and the southern part of the department of Finistère. Like the modern Bretons, they were the stoutest and the most skilful seamen in Gaul: they had a numerous fleet of vessels, clumsy indeed, but of extraordinary size and strength; and their prosperity depended upon the carrying trade with Britain, of which they possessed the monopoly. They, however, as well as the more distant tribes of Brittany and Normandy, professed to submit; and Crassus sent a number of officers to arrange with them

for a supply of corn. But the chiefs of the Veneti were 56 B.C. beginning to repent of their tame submission. Besides their Rebellion of the Veneti, Curiosolites and Esvii. natural impatience of foreign ascendancy, they had, we are told, a business-like motive for resistance. They had heard, it would seem, that Caesar was contemplating an invasion of Britain; and they were naturally determined to prevent him from interfering with their trade.¹ Hoping to induce Crassus to restore their hostages, they detained as prisoners the officers who had come to them. With the rash precipitancy of Gauls, the tribes of Côtes-du-Nord and Orne followed their example: soon the whole north-western seaboard was sworn to resist the encroachments of Rome; and an embassy was sent to Crassus, to demand the restoration of the hostages.

Messengers were soon posting with despatches for Caesar, Caesar prepares for a naval war. who was still in Illyricum. He had studied the character of the Gauls to some purpose; and he knew that, if they soon lost heart, their blood was up on the slightest stimulus. Like other peoples, they preferred independence to subjection; and, above all things, their restless spirit craved variety. If he were to overlook the conduct of the Veneti, the other tribes of Gaul would fancy that they might defy him with impunity. The Belgæ indeed were only half subdued; and they were said to have solicited the support of the Germans. Accordingly Caesar sent instructions to his officers to have a fleet built in the ports at the mouth of the Loire, to raise oarsmen from the Province, and to collect as many pilots and seamen as they could.

Throughout his proconsulate Caesar was in a position The conference at Luca. different from that of a modern viceroy, who, if his work is almost beyond his strength, may securely concentrate upon it all the power of his mind. He was ever obliged to look back towards Rome, to look forward to the uncertain but stormy future, when he would have to struggle for political supremacy; and whenever an enemy attempted to weaken his position, he was obliged to parry the blow. Cicero manifested an inclination to oppose him; and he had reason to fear that Pompey would join Cicero. His term of office would expire

¹ Strabo, *Geogr.*, iv. 4, § 1.

56 B.C.

in about two years, on the 1st of March, 54 B.C. If he were recalled then, his work in Gaul would be left unfinished; and he would go back, too soon,—to chaos or civil war. From Illyricum he had returned to Ravenna, where his associate, Crassus, met him. Hearing of Cicero's measures, he moved southward, about the middle of April, to Luca, and invited Pompey to come thither as his guest. At this little town the fortunes of the world were decided. Caesar offered terms of such startling liberality that an agreement was come to at once. It was arranged that his term of office should be prolonged for another five years, and that Pompey and Crassus should exert their influence with the Senate to secure to him the right of increasing his legions to ten, and of charging the state-chest with the pay of those which he had raised on his own responsibility.¹

Caesar
returns
to Gaul.

[The territory of the
Treveri.]

[The Lexo-
vii, Unelli
and Curio-
solites.]

Prepara-
tions of the
Veneti.

From Luca he hastened to join his army, and took up his quarters in the neighbourhood of Nantes. His first step was to distribute the legions more widely. Labienus was sent to the country round Trèves, to keep an eye upon the Belgae and to prevent the Germans from crossing the Rhine. Sabinus was directed to disperse the allies of the Veneti in Calvados, the Cotentin and Côtes-du-Nord; while Crassus marched for Aquitania. It is most unlikely that the Aquitanians would have taken up arms on behalf of their alien neighbours; but Caesar may not have been aware of the want of sympathy between the two peoples; and, with or without provocation, he would of course have compelled the former as well as the latter to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. The Veneti and their allies, who saw that they had irretrievably committed themselves, were equally active. They provisioned their fortresses, assembled their ships in the Venetian ports, and even sent across the Channel to ask for help. They knew the strength of their country, and had little doubt of success. The coast of Morbihan was pierced by long estuaries and broken by numerous inlets, which would greatly hinder the progress of an invading army.

¹ Cicero, *Ad Fam.*, i. 7, § 10, 9, §§ 9-10; *Ad Quintum fratrem*, ii. 6, § 2; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 24; Appian, *B. C.*, ii. 17; Plutarch, *Crassus*, 14, *Caesar*, 21, *Pompeius*, 51. See also Strachan-Davidson's *Cicero*, 1894, pp. 263-70.

Little corn was grown in those parts; and the granaries had ^{56 B.C.} been emptied to supply the forts. Want of food therefore must soon force the Romans to beat a retreat; and, if the worst came to the worst, those born sailors knew that they could take to the stout ships which had weathered so many storms; while the frail Roman vessels would be sure to run aground among the shoals, or to founder in the tempestuous seas that buffeted the rock-bound shore.

The Roman fleet, which included ships impressed from the maritime tribes¹ between the Loire and the Garonne, was soon assembled, under Decimus Brutus, in the estuary of the Loire: but the weather was too stormy for it to put to sea. Meanwhile Caesar crossed the river Vilaine and entered the Morbihan, hoping, by the time the gales moderated, to get possession of the enemy's strongholds. This, however, as he soon found, was a work of extreme difficulty. The forts were situated at the ends of spits or promontories, connected with the mainland by shoals, which, at high tide, were completely submerged. Caesar constructed dykes across the shoals, along which the troops marched to attack the town. Before they could deliver the assault, however, the garrison took to their ships, and sailed away to the nearest fort. The greater part of the summer was frittered away in these tedious sieges; and Caesar was obliged to confess that all his labour had been expended in vain. Accordingly he resolved to wait for his fleet, and encamped on the heights of St. Gildas, south of Quiberon Bay. Hard by, in the river Auray, which discharges itself into the bay, the whole Venetian armada was assembled.²

At length the wind moderated; and one morning the long-looked-for fleet was descried in the offing. Forthwith, gliding out from the mouth of the Auray, appeared the hostile squadron, numbering two hundred and twenty sail. They stood out of the water like floating castles. The great sails were made, not of canvas but of leather, to withstand the force of the Atlantic gales. Clustering on the cliffs, the legionaries had a good view of the two fleets as they approached one another. Brutus and his officers were at their

The Roman fleet weather-bound in the Loire.

Caesar's fruitless campaign against the Veneti.

Sea-fight between the Veneti and Brutus.

¹ The Pietones and Santones.

² See pp. 663-74.

56 B.C.

wits' ends to know what to do. The rams of the light galleys would fail to make any impression on those huge hulls. The deck-turrets were run up: but even then the Romans were overtopped by the lofty poops, and could not throw their javelins with effect. But the Roman engineers had prepared an ingenious contrivance. Two or more galleys rowed up close to one of the enemies' ships. Then, with sharp hooks fixed to the ends of long poles, the Romans caught hold of the halyards, and pulled them taut: the rowers plied their oars with might and main; and the sudden strain snapped the ropes. Down fell the yards: the troops clambered on to the helpless hulk; and the struggle was soon ended by the short sword. When several ships had been thus captured, the rest prepared to escape. But they had hardly been put before the wind when there was a dead calm; and, as they had no oars, they could not stir. The swift little galleys ran in and out among them, and captured them one after another. When the evening breeze sprang up, a few slipped away in the dusk, and ran for the shore: but all the rest were taken.¹

Punish-
ment of the
Veneti.

This battle decided the war. All the chiefs and all the warriors of western Brittany had taken part in it. They had no reserves. They had staked everything upon a single throw, and had lost. Deprived of their ships, the survivors had no means of defending their forts. There was nothing for them therefore but unconditional surrender. They had made a very gallant fight for freedom; and Caesar respected a brave enemy: but he always took the straightest path to gain his end. He determined to teach the whole Gallic people, by a terrible lesson, that it was dangerous to rebel. As the Venetian senate were responsible for the outrage which had led to the war, every man of them was put to death; and all the rest of the tribe, or all that could be caught, were sold into slavery.

Campaign
of Sabinus
against the
northern
allies of the
Veneti.

About the same time despatches arrived from Sabinus. The allies of the Veneti, commanded by a chief named Viridovix, had mustered in the peninsula of the Cotentin. The tribes of Calvados and Eure, in their feverish eagerness

¹ See pp. 205-6.

for war, had massacred their senators, simply because they ^{56 B.C.} counselled peace. Bandits and desperadoes from every part of Gaul flocked to join the host. Sabinus encamped on a hill; and, having a wholesome respect for their numbers, he could not be provoked to come out and fight. The enemy put him down as a coward, and his own men grumbled at his inaction. But he was simply biding his time. He bribed a Gaul belonging to his auxiliary corps to go over to the enemy, in the guise of a deserter, and tell them that Caesar was in great straits, and that he himself was on the point of going to his assistance. The man had a ready wit and a glib tongue, and played his part well. The Gauls eagerly swallowed the tale, and clamoured to be led to the attack. Their commissariat had, as usual, been neglected; and they were impatient to finish the campaign at a blow. Viridovix and his brother chiefs were obliged to let them have their way. Their plan was to fall upon the Romans before they had time to man the ramparts. The ascent from the plain to the camp was about a mile. The Gauls ran up the slope at the top of their speed, each man carrying an armful of brushwood to fill up the trench. But Sabinus was ready for them. Sallying from the right and the left gate,¹ the disciplined cohorts fell upon the flanks of the panting multitude, and sent them flying. The cavalry allowed few to escape. No second blow was needed. The league fell to pieces at once. As inconstant as they had been impetuous, the tribes abandoned the struggle, and laid down their arms.

Meanwhile Crassus was carrying all before him in Aquitania. Unlike Galba, he took the greatest pains to ensure the regular delivery of supplies. Caesar had only been able to spare him twelve cohorts, or about five thousand men: but he had a powerful body of cavalry and some auxiliaries; and he summoned a number of brave provincials from Tolosa, Carcaso and Narbo to join him. He defeated the Sotiates near the source of the Ciron, and captured their stronghold, the site of which is now occupied by the town of Sos. Thence he penetrated into the basin of the Adour.

Brilliant campaign of Crassus in Aquitania.

[Toulouse, Carcasonne and Narbonne.]

¹ See Long's *Caesar*, p. 176, note.

56 B.C.

The Aquitanians, in great alarm, obtained reinforcements from their kinsmen, the Iberians of the Pyrenees. The leaders who were chosen had learned the art of war under the famous Sertorius, and their operations showed some degree of skill. They carefully selected a position for their encampment, and fortified it in the orthodox fashion. They sent out detachments to block the roads. Relying on their numbers, which were daily augmented, they hoped to gain a bloodless victory by cutting off the invader's supplies, and harassing his rear as soon as he should be obliged to retreat. But Crassus had no intention of retreating. He could not spare a man to secure his supplies, but he knew that sheer audacity will often work wonders. His men were in great heart, emboldened by the enemy's inaction, and confident in their young leader. Having offered battle in vain, he boldly assaulted the enemy's camp. They resisted stoutly, and threw their javelins from the high rampart with great effect: but they had neglected to secure the rear gate; and some fresh cohorts managed to get round by a circuitous way, break down the feeble defences, and steal in unobserved while the battle was raging at the opposite end. The imprisoned Aquitanians and Spaniards rushed pell-mell out of the entrenchment, and made a desperate effort to escape: but the country was one vast open plain; and they were ridden down and slaughtered in thousands. Forthwith all except the remoter tribes tendered their submission, and voluntarily sent hostages.

Fruitless
campaign
of Caesar
against the
Morini.

The conquest of the maritime peoples was all but complete. The Morini and the Menapii, two Belgic tribes who had formed an alliance with the Veneti, alone refused to submit. Their country, which extended from the neighbourhood of Étaples to the lower Rhine, comprised the northern parts of the Pas de Calais and of Nord, Flanders, Zeeland and North Brabant. Caesar had over four hundred miles to march, and the summer was nearly at an end; but he felt confident that he would be able to subdue the recalcitrant tribes in one brief campaign. He traversed Brittany and Normandy, joining Sabinus on the way; crossed the Seine and the Somme; and then pushed north-

ward through Artois. Taught by the sad experience of ⁵⁶ B.C. their impetuous countrymen to avoid a pitched battle, the Morini sought refuge, on the approach of the legions, in their vast forests. While the legionaries were fortifying their camp, the enemy, who had not yet been seen, suddenly dashed out of the woods and attacked them; and although they were beaten off with heavy loss, a few Romans, who chased them too far, were cut off and killed. This mishap made the legionaries more careful. They spent some days in cutting down the trees, piling them up on both flanks, as they advanced, to guard against surprise. The enemy's cattle and part of their baggage fell into their hands. But now the wind blew and the rain fell with such violence that the work of felling the trees had to be suspended: the troops could no longer live safely in tents; and it was necessary to abandon the campaign. The cultivated lands of the Morini were harried and their hamlets burned; and the legions returned to winter in the newly conquered districts between the Seine and the Loire.

CHAPTER V

THE MASSACRE OF THE USIPETES AND TENCTERI

55 B.C.
The Usi-
petes and
Tencteri
invade
Gaul.

GAUL was now, to all appearance, conquered. Throughout these three years the central tribes, influenced by the example of the Aedui, distracted by intestine rivalries, awed by the genius of the Roman Governor, had remained simply passive. But it was not enough merely to conquer: the conquest had also to be secured against foreign invasion. A fresh incursion of hungry Germans was imminent. The defeat of Ariovistus had struck terror into the Teutonic races: but it had not stilled the inward throes by which they had so long been convulsed. The Suevi had swept before them the lesser tribes of the Usipetes and Tencteri: a land to dwell in and food to eat the fugitives must needs obtain; and now, after three years' wandering, a vast horde of emigrants appeared in the neighbourhood of Emmerich, on the right bank of the lower Rhine.¹ The Menapii occupied lands on both banks of the river. Those who dwelt on the right bank, terrified by the appearance of the huge host, hurriedly abandoned their huts, crossed to the western side, and, joining their kinsmen, prepared to dispute the passage. Baffled in their attempts to cross, the Germans made a feigned retreat, which lasted three days: then marched rapidly back; surprised and massacred the Menapii, who had returned; seized their boats and crossed over; and for the rest of the winter lived at free quarters in the Menapian territory on the west of the Rhine.

The news reached Caesar in Cisalpine Gaul, while he was discharging the civil duties of his government. He knew the

¹ See pp. 678-9.

character of the Gauls,—the frivolity and craving for excitement that impelled them to rush blindly into new connexions without counting the cost. There was indeed no reason why they should trouble themselves to repel one invader for the benefit of another. But the chances were that some of the tribes might be impelled by jealousy of their rivals or hostility to the Romans to welcome the new-comers. Determined to prevent such a coalition or crush it in the making, Caesar returned to Gaul earlier than usual, and proceeded to join the legions, which had concentrated at some point near the lower Seine, probably in the neighbourhood of Evreux. His apprehensions were justified. Certain tribes had entered into negotiations with the Germans; and they had by this time moved as far southward as the territories of the Eburones and the Condrusi. The former included portions of the provinces of Limbourg and Liège: the Condrusi inhabited the district of Condruz, between the Meuse and the Ourthe. Caesar summoned the Gallic chiefs, including those who had committed themselves, to a council; and, pretending to be ignorant of the negotiations, told them that he was going to make war upon the common enemy, and called upon them to furnish their regular contingents of cavalry. When the contingents arrived, he made a selection from the whole number, and, having provided for the delivery of his supplies, marched towards the distant country in which he heard that the Germans were encamped. It is impossible to say where he crossed the Meuse, or what route he followed afterwards: but the general trend of his march was towards the neighbourhood of Coblenz. Apparently the Germans were in no aggressive mood. Tired of their enforced wanderings, they only wanted to settle down peaceably in some fertile part of Gaul. When Caesar was still some days' march from their encampment, their envoys met him. The Germans, they said, had no desire to fight: but, if Caesar attacked them, they would not flinch. All they asked was that he should assign them lands, or at all events leave them to enjoy those which their swords had won. They acknowledged no superiors but the Suevi; and against the Suevi the gods themselves could not contend. Caesar replied that he could make no

55 B.C.

Caesar fears that some of the Gallic tribes may join them.

He returns to Gaul, and summons a Gallic council.

He marches against the Usipetes and Tencteri;

and negotiates with their envoys.

55 B.C.

terms with them while they remained in Gaul. People who could not defend their own country had no right to encroach upon others: besides, there were no lands to spare in Gaul sufficiently extensive to support so vast a multitude. They were welcome, however, if they cared to recross the Rhine, to settle in the country of the Ubii, who had just put themselves under the protection of Rome. The territory of this people—the only German tribe which had definitely submitted to Caesar—extended from the neighbourhood of Coblenz to the neighbourhood of Bonn. The envoys said that they would refer Caesar's proposal to their principals, and return with an answer in three days. Till then they hoped that he would advance no further. This request he rejected; for he felt sure that it was simply a pretext to gain time for the German cavalry, who had crossed the Meuse in quest of corn and plunder, to return.

Marching on steadily, he was only eleven miles from the German headquarters when the envoys returned. Again they begged him to halt; and again he refused. They then asked for three days' grace, to arrange terms with the Ubii. What they really wanted, as Caesar saw, was to gain more time. He meant to do the same. He promised, however, not to advance that day beyond a river, four miles distant, where he intended to water; and told them to come back again on the morrow, that he might decide on their request, and to bring with them as many of their leaders as could come. What he desired was to get those leaders into his power, so that their formidable host might be helpless in his hands.¹ Perhaps he knew that his offer to settle the Germans in the country of the Ubii was impracticable: perhaps indeed he had only made that offer in order to gain time, and to put the Germans off their guard: certainly he believed that they were trying to outwit him, and he was determined to outwit them,—determined, by hook or by crook, to secure the essential object of ridding himself and Gaul of these dangerous immigrants, and to secure it at the least possible cost to his own army. Meanwhile, at the urgent entreaty of the envoys, he sent orders to his Gallic cavalry, who had gone

¹ See p. 191.

on in advance, to refrain from provoking a combat. The ^{55 B.C.} envoys took their leave. The cavalry, five thousand strong, were riding quietly along, on the faith of the truce, when, without a moment's warning, a band of horsemen swept down, and scattered them right and left. As they tried to rally, the enemy leaped to the ground, and stabbed their horses in the belly. An Aquitanian noble, named Piso, did his best to save the credit of the Gallic cavalry, hazarding his life to rescue his brother, and when he was unhorsed, fighting against desperate odds till he fell. His brother, who had escaped, would not survive him, and galloped back into the press to die. But their example was wasted. The Gauls were six to one: but they were thoroughly unnerved; and, while many lay dead, the rest galloped away, and never drew rein till they came within sight of the Roman column.

Caesar made up his mind. Those Germans were treacherous savages; and he saw no reason why he should make any terms with them. Besides, this paltry triumph they had stolen would make them heroes to the feather-pated Gauls. To hold his hand until they were reinforced would be sheer madness. Next morning the German chiefs came to his camp,—to apologise, as they said, for the unauthorised attack by their cavalry. Caesar was delighted. He determined to end the business by a single blow, bloodlessly,—for his own men. He refused to hear what the chiefs had to say. Believing, or professing to believe, that they only wanted to cajole him into granting an extension of the truce, he ordered them to be put under arrest, and then marched on rapidly against the Germans. They were taking their ease among their waggons, with their wives and children, when the legions appeared. Confounded by the sight, not knowing what had become of their leaders, they lost all presence of mind, and crying aloud in their terror, ran hither and thither about the camp. The infuriated Romans burst in. The few Germans who were quick enough to seize their weapons, clustered behind the waggons and tried to resist: but, distracted by piercing shrieks, they turned and saw their wives and children flying before the Roman cavalry; and flinging aside their arms, they rushed pell-mell to over-

Their cavalry, in violation of a truce, attack his.

He resolves to attack them at once:

arrests their chiefs, who had come, ostensibly to explain;

and virtually annihilates the host.

55 B.C. take them. Many were slain in the pursuit. Others scattered over the country and escaped. At length the panting remnant reached the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine.¹ Worn out and desperate, they plunged in; and the swift current swept them away.

His conduct condemned in the Senate. The conduct of Caesar was fiercely condemned by Cato and others in the Roman Senate. The refusal to listen to the explanation of the German chiefs; their detention, contrary, as it appeared, to the law of nations; and then the virtual extermination of an entire people,—these things perhaps shocked sensitive consciences, and certainly gave a handle to political opponents. Cato actually proposed that the perfidious Governor should be given up to the Germans.² Caesar pursued his course unmoved. The sacrifice of life was appalling: but it was made once for all. Thoroughly cowed, the Germans thenceforward ceased to disturb the tranquillity of Gaul.

He bridges the Rhine, punishes the Sugambri, and returns to Gaul. But Caesar determined to make assurance doubly sure. As the Germans thought so little of crossing the Rhine, he would cross it too, and teach them that invaders might in their turn be liable to invasion. Besides, it was necessary to chastise the Sugambri, the northern neighbours of the Ubii, in whose country the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tencteri had just found a ready welcome. When he sent to demand their surrender, the Sugambrian chiefs asked with what face he, who complained so loudly of the Germans' crossing the Rhine, could claim the right to dictate to the Germans in their own country. The Ubii, on the other hand, besought him to come and help them against the Suevi: his prestige, they said, was so great that the mere appearance of his army would be enough to secure them from attack: and they would gladly undertake to find boats to cross the stream. But Caesar did not think it safe to trust to boats; and he intended to make the passage in a way that would produce a greater moral effect. Broad, deep and swift as the river was, he would throw a bridge across it, to teach the Germans what Roman science could effect. He

¹ See pp. 680-91.

² Plutarch, *Caesar*, 22; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 24.

selected for the spot a site between Coblenz and Andernach, ^{55 B.C.} which was opposite the territory of the Ubii.¹ The Roman engineers were accustomed to bridge rivers: but this was an undertaking of unprecedented difficulty. But Caesar had inspired every man with faith in his star; and all ranks worked with extraordinary energy. Within ten days from the time when the first tree was felled, the great river was spanned by a firm bridge of piles, buttressed to withstand the force of the flood;² and the legions were encamped on the German bank. Leaving a strong guard at either end, Caesar marched northward against the Sugambri. Their country extended eastward of Crefeld, Dusseldorf and Cologne. Envoys from various tribes met Caesar on the way, and solicited his friendship. He answered them courteously, and directed them to bring hostages to his camp. The Sugambri, on the advice of the Usipetes and Tencteri, had taken refuge in the outlying forests; and, after burning their villages and cutting their corn, Caesar returned to the country of the Ubii. The Suevi had sent their wives and children into the secure recesses of the vast forest of central Germany, and were banded together somewhere in the heart of their country, ready for battle. But Caesar had neither the force nor the inclination to undertake the conquest of Germany. Having accomplished every object for which he had entered the country—punished his enemies, reassured his friends, and made the name of Rome respected—he crossed the Rhine and destroyed his bridge.

¹ See pp. 694-7. The accuracy of the statement in the text has been confirmed by the recent discovery of a Roman camp on the left bank of the Rhine near Neuwied, the identity of which with the camp constructed by Caesar after his second passage of the Rhine in 53 B.C. (p. 95, *infra*) seems morally certain. See *Bonner Jahrbücher*, Heft 104, 1899, pp. 1-55.

² See pp. 697-709.

CHAPTER VI

THE DISASTER AT ADUATUCA AND ITS RESULTS

55-54 B.C. CAESAR'S attention was now diverted for a time from the
Caesar's
invasions
of Britain. affairs of Gaul. During the few weeks of summer that fol-
lowed his passage of the Rhine and the latter part of the
ensuing season he made his two famous expeditions to Britain.
He went to Illyricum in the intervening winter, and did not
return to Gaul until the close of the following May. Quintus
Cicero, a younger brother of the orator, joined him on the
road, and took up the post of a *legatus*. Caesar often found
time to write to the elder Cicero, and even to read his verses.
The correspondence shows us what manner of men Caesar
had to entertain in his army when friends or political asso-
ciates asked favours of him. Cicero begged him to give a
place of some sort to a lawyer named Trebatius; and Caesar,
who knew how to render such appointments innocuous, good-
naturedly consented in a letter, the kindliness and the humour
of which are reflected in one which Cicero wrote to Trebatius
himself.¹

Caesar's avowed objects in invading Britain were to inform
himself about the island and its inhabitants, and to punish
the southern tribes, who had helped their kinsmen in Gaul
to resist him. On each occasion he left behind a force
sufficient to keep open his communications and to overawe
intending rebels; and on the second expedition he took with
him all the chiefs whom he had the slightest reason to sus-
pect. The one of all others whom he had been most careful
to summon was the notorious Dumnorix, who was as popular
with the masses and as determined an enemy of Rome as

Intrigues
of Dum-
norix.

¹ Cicero, *Ep. ad Fam.*, vii. 5-6, 8, 10, 18; *ad Quint. frat.*, ii. 13 (15 A).

when he had been detected in his intrigues with the Helvetii. ^{54 B.C.} Quite recently he had caused great alarm and indignation to the Aeduan council by giving out that Caesar intended to make him king.¹ Nothing could have provoked Caesar more; for the success of his policy depended largely upon his keeping the Aeduan government in good humour. Dumnorix was most reluctant to leave the country. He doubtless saw that he might never again have such an opportunity as Caesar's absence afforded of furthering his schemes; and he begged for leave to stay behind. He was terrified, he said, at the prospect of crossing the sea: besides, he had religious duties, which he could not fulfil unless he remained in Gaul.² Caesar was of course deaf to his entreaties and his pretended scruples. Dumnorix then tried to induce his brother chiefs to join him in refusing to go. He assured them that Caesar was only taking them to Britain that he might put them all to death. Caesar kept himself informed of his intrigues, and did his best to prevent him from rushing on his doom. All this time the fleet was weather-bound in the Portus Itius—the harbour of Boulogne—which, in those days, was a spacious estuary, sheltered by the far-reaching promontory of Alpreck.³ At length the wind shifted; and Dumnorix took advantage of the confusion that attended the embarkation to ride off with the Aeduan cavalry. Instantly stopping the embarkation, Caesar sent a strong body of horse in pursuit with orders to kill him at once if he attempted to resist. He ^{His fate.} fought desperately for life and liberty: but the troopers failed to support him; and he fell, passionately asserting with his dying breath the independence of his tribe.

The death of this resolute adventurer was a temporary relief to the Roman Governor: but it probably helped to kindle into a flame the discontent which had long been smouldering in the breasts of the Gauls. Doubtless the Aedui were glad enough to be rid of the Helvetii: doubtless

The Gallic nobles in a dangerous mood.

¹ Various writers have suggested that Caesar really had made the offer to Dumnorix, in order to purchase his support. It seems to me more likely that, as Schneider conjectures (*Caesar*, ii. 26), Dumnorix had made the statement in question in order to exasperate the Aedui against Caesar.

² See Schneider's *Caesar*, ii. 27.

³ See App. F.

54 B.C.

others besides the Aedui rejoiced at the overthrow of Ariovistus. But it was not to be expected that they should feel any gratitude to Caesar. Individuals like Divitiacus, tribes like the Remi, had of course gained something by his friendship. But Gaul, as a whole, had so far gained nothing. Not only were the constant presence of the legions and the endless requisitions of corn an intolerable burden, but to the high-spirited Celtic knights the fact of subjection was more galling still. They had indeed partly themselves to blame. Weakness of purpose, mutual jealousy, petty ambition had been their bane. They had not realised, or had not valued their national unity enough to make a united effort for its preservation. The Nervii indeed had fought like heroes: but the bulk of the Belgae had been too selfish, too faint-hearted, too distrustful of each other, above all, too feebly organised to support them. The Veneti had made a gallant resistance: but the enthusiasm of their allies had vanished at the first reverse. The states of the interior had acquiesced in the domination of Caesar, without a blow, nay even without a protest. It would, of course, be unjust to ignore the difficulties with which they had to contend. If Caesar was justified in the severity with which he criticised the infirmities of their national character, it would have been unreasonable to expect from a medley of tribes, which had hardly had time to outgrow their political infancy, the harmonious action which could only have been the fruit of ages of discipline. They were heavily weighted by the selfishness or the astuteness, call it which one will, of the Aedui and the Remi. Above all, no leader had appeared whose personality was sufficiently commanding to rally the patriots of every state round his standard. But, whatever the cause may have been, the chiefs were now in a dangerous mood; and the people were ready to back them. Caesar was perfectly aware of their temper. The harvest in Gaul this season was very scanty; and he was obliged therefore on his return from Britain, in order to ensure an adequate supply of grain, to distribute his legions for the winter over a wide extent of territory. As the Belgic states appeared to be the most restless, their country was selected for the occupation. One

Distribution of the legions for the winter of 54-53.

legion, under Gaius Fabius, was quartered among the Morini, ^{54 B.C.} who had recently submitted to Labienus: another, under Quintus Cicero, among the Nervii, in the neighbourhood of Namur: a third, under Labienus, on the Ourthe, or perhaps the Meuse, near the western frontier of the Treveri. Three, under Trebonius, Crassus and Plancus respectively, were stationed close together at Samarobriua and in the plain ^[Amiens.] round Beauvais. One, consisting entirely of recruits,¹ with five veteran cohorts, was sent to Aduatuca, in the country of the Eburones. The site of this famous camp has never been identified: but it was certainly east of the Meuse, and not far from Aix-la-Chapelle.² The garrison was commanded by Sabinus and Aurunculeius Cotta, the former of whom, as the senior officer, had the superior authority.³ One legion only, under Roscius, was sent outside Belgic territory to the country of the Esvii, in Orne. Caesar fixed his headquarters at Samarobriua. In view of the prevailing discontent, he determined not to leave Gaul for the winter until the various camps were fortified.

About this time an incident occurred which Caesar may *Divide et* have regarded as a sign of a coming storm. His motto was *impera.* *Divide et impera.* The Aedui and the Remi had both been faithful to him; and with the object of strengthening their influence and thereby diminishing the chances of revolt, he had always treated them with distinction. Moreover, he had elevated chiefs who had done him service to the thrones of their ancestors in states where monarchy had been overthrown by oligarchy; his object doubtless being not only to put a premium upon loyalty, but also to use the loyal as instruments for keeping the anti-Roman party in check. One of his nominees, Tasgetius, had, for three years, been king of the Carnutes, a tribe which dwelt in the country round Orléans and Chartres. How he used his power, we are not told: but soon after Caesar's return from Britain he was assassinated. Caesar instantly sent Plancus with his legion, to arrest all who were concerned in the deed, and to terrorise intending rebels.

Assassination of King Tasgetius, Caesar's nominee, by the Carnutes.

¹ See p. 717, n. 2.

² See pp. 335-47.

³ See p. 709.

54 B.C.

Intrigues
of Indutio-
marus
against
Caesar.

All this time one chief in particular, whose pride Caesar had humbled, was busily intriguing against him. In the spring of every year he convened a diet of the Gallic chieftains, partly, it should seem, to test their temper, partly to fix the strength of the cavalry contingents which their respective tribes were to provide. Since the battle with the Nervii, the Treveri, whose cavalry had witnessed the desperate struggle of his legions, had refused to send their representatives; and it was said that they were intriguing with the Germans. Just before the second expedition to Britain, Caesar entered their country at the head of a strong force with the view of re-establishing his authority. Two chiefs, Cingetorix and Indutimarus, were struggling for supremacy. Cingetorix at once presented himself before Caesar, promised fidelity to Rome, and gave full information of what was going on in the country. Indutimarus collected levies, and prepared to fight. Many of the leading men, however, influenced by Cingetorix and appreciating the power of the legions, came into Caesar's camp and made terms for themselves. Indutimarus soon found that he had miscalculated his strength, and hastened to excuse himself. Caesar, who had no time to spare, contented himself with taking hostages for his good behaviour. At the same time he of course did everything to strengthen the influence of his supporter; and Indutimarus smarted under the feeling that his credit with his countrymen was gone. It is probable that during Caesar's absence he was concocting schemes of revenge. The isolation of the various camps gave him his opportunity. A few days after the legions had taken up their quarters he instigated Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, each of whom ruled one half of the country of the Eburones, to attack the camp of Sabinus and Cotta. Caesar was about two hundred miles away: the nearest camp, that of Cicero, at least forty-five miles: at Aduatuca there were barely six thousand legionaries, all told, and two-thirds of them were recruits. Success seemed certain. Ambiorix and Catuvolcus, who had only just taken their quota of corn to the generals, mustered their tribesmen in great force, surprised and overpowered a fatigue party, who were engaged in felling wood outside the camp, and then

made a sudden onslaught upon the camp itself. But the camp was strongly fortified, and stood upon rising ground of great natural strength. The troops promptly manned the rampart: a squadron of Spanish horse made a successful sally; and the assailants fell back in discomfiture. Their leaders shouted out that they would like some one to come and talk over matters, so that all disputes might be peaceably settled. Two deputies accordingly were sent out to hear what they had to say. Three years before, Caesar had relieved Ambiorix from the burden of paying tribute to the Aduatuci, and had restored to him his son and nephew, whom they had detained as hostages. Ambiorix began by speaking of Caesar's kindness, and said that he was most anxious to prove his gratitude. He protested that he had not attacked the camp of his own free will, but simply because he could not resist the pressure put upon him by his tribesmen. Nor would they have stirred if they had not been forced to join in the national movement. His very weakness proved that he was speaking the truth. He was not such a fool as to imagine that his feeble levies could stand against the Romans. But the leading powers of Gaul were banded together to recover their independence; and on that very day all the Roman camps were to be simultaneously attacked. He most earnestly entreated Sabinus to be on his guard. A host of Germans had crossed the Rhine, and would be upon him in a couple of days. If the two generals would take his advice, they would abandon their camp at once, and make the best of their way to the quarters of Cicero or of Labienus. He would pledge his word that they should not be molested on the way. He would not merely be making some return for Caesar's kindness: it was to the interest of his people to be relieved from the burden of supplying the camp.

The deputies returned to camp, and reported what they had heard. Sabinus and Cotta were inclined to think that, whether Ambiorix were sincere or not in his professions of friendship, his warning was not to be despised. One thing was certain:—a single petty tribe like the Eburones would never have dared to pit itself against the power of Rome

54 B.C.
The Eburones, under Ambiorix, make a futile attack on the camp of Sabinus and Cotta.

Ambiorix advises Sabinus to withdraw to one of the nearer camps.

The advice discussed in a council of war.

54 B.C.

unless it had been strongly supported. The tribunes and centurions of the first rank¹ were summoned to attend a council of war. It took place in the middle of the camp, in full view of the soldiers. Cotta spoke first. He argued that, without Caesar's express command, they had no right to leave the camp. Behind its defences they could defy any force that could be brought against them. Had they not already beaten off the enemy, and inflicted heavy loss upon them into the bargain? They were not pressed for supplies; and doubtless they would soon be relieved. Anyhow, nothing could be more unsoldierlike, more puerile, than to take a step fraught with the gravest issues, by the advice of an enemy.

Most of the officers warmly supported this view. But Sabinus was only irritated by their unanimity. Speaking loudly and passionately, he insisted that it was not a question of being guided by the advice of an enemy, but by hard facts. Caesar had doubtless gone back to Italy, or the Eburones would never have attacked them: so they need not expect help from him. The Rhine was close by. Both Germans and Gauls had many an old score to wipe out; and they were naturally burning for revenge. The course which he recommended was safe either way. If the whole thing turned out to be a false alarm, then they risked nothing by going to the nearest camp. If, on the other hand, Gauls and Germans were really leagued against them, their one chance of safety was to retreat at once. To follow Cotta's advice would involve, at the best, the miseries of famine and blockade.

The dispute waxed warm. In spite of all that Sabinus could say, Cotta and the centurions remained inflexible. Sabinus rapidly lost all patience. Raising his voice so that the men might hear, "Have your own way," he shouted, "have your own way! Death has no terrors for me! These men will judge between us, and, if anything happens, they'll call you to account for it. If you would only let them, they could reach the nearest camp the day after to-morrow, and join hands with their comrades." The generals stood up.

¹ See pp. 571-83.

Their friends crowded round them, took them by the hand, 54 B.C. and entreated them not to quarrel. Go or stay, all would be well if only they could agree. The strife of words was prolonged till midnight. At length, overborne by the authority of his senior, Cotta gave up his point. All ranks were warned that they would have to quit the camp at dawn. The soldiers spent the small hours in looking over their belongings to see what they could carry away, and told each other that, after all, Sabinus was in the right. "They thought," wrote Caesar, "of every argument to persuade themselves that they could not remain without danger, and that the danger would be increased by their fatigue and their long spells of night duty."¹ The drivers had enough to do in loading their cattle. Everybody was too agitated to think of sleep.

In spite of the protests of Cotta, Sabinus decides to abandon the camp.

Meanwhile Ambiorix and his followers, hearing the hum of voices in the camp, concluded that the Romans had determined to follow their advice. Whether Sabinus intended to make for the camp of Labienus or for that of Cicero, the first stage of his route would be the same.² Ambiorix prepared to execute his plan.

Just as day was breaking, the Romans marched out of camp, in an extended column encumbered by a heavy baggage-train. It seemed as if Sabinus had implicit confidence in the good faith of Ambiorix; for he could not have adopted a more dangerous formation. He had decided to make for the camp of Cicero.³ After marching about two miles, the head of the column plunged into a defile shut in between wooded hills. Company after company tramped after. The last was just entering the valley when, rushing from the woods, the Gauls threw themselves upon the vanguard: the rear was hustled forward: before, behind, to right, to left, everywhere the enemy's masses were pouring down. Sabinus hurried about from place to place, and feebly attempted to make his dispositions. Cool and collected, Cotta did his best to rally the men; and, as the length of the column made it unmanageable, he agreed with his colleague to abandon the baggage,

The Romans march out.

They are surrounded by the Eburones;

¹ *B. G.*, v. 31, § 5. See p. 710.

² See p. 347.

³ See pp. 336-7.

54 B.C.

and form in a hollow square.¹ It was perhaps the only course to adopt: yet the result was that the Romans lost heart, and the enemy were emboldened; for both knew that such an expedient could only have been resorted to by leaders who despaired. Rough soldiers were actually weeping: confusion was worse confounded; and many contrived to slip away, and ran to save their valuables in the baggage-train while there was yet time. The Gauls on the other hand showed extraordinary steadiness; for their leaders told them they had only to win the battle, and they should have plunder to their hearts' content. Still the square remained unbroken. Now and again a cohort dashed out; and beneath their short swords many of the Gauls sank down. Ambiorix ordered his men to fall back some paces, and hurl their missiles from a safe distance. He reminded them that they were in good training, and with their light equipment could easily keep out of harm's way. If the Romans charged them, they were to retreat: when the Romans attempted to return to the square, they were to pursue. Maddened by the volleys they were powerless to return—for they had no slingers and no archers—one cohort and then another charged. Back darted the nimble Gauls. The right flank of the Romans was exposed, and missiles rained in on their unshielded bodies. The moment the baffled cohort retired, the enemy swarmed all round it; and then followed a swift butchery. The rest stood shoulder to shoulder in the square: but now their courage was of no avail: the enemy would not come to close quarters; and stones and arrows made havoc in the dense ranks. Yet, facing such fearful odds, after seven hours' fighting, they still held out; and, as Caesar put it, throughout that trying time they did nothing unworthy of themselves. Quintus Lucanius, a centurion whom Caesar singled out for special mention, was killed in attempting to rescue his own son. Cotta himself was struck in the face as he was cheering on the men. The sun was sinking. The battle could only end in one way; and Sabinus, catching sight of Ambiorix as he was moving about in the enemy's ranks, sent his interpreter to ask for quarter. Ambiorix replied that

¹ The term "square" is used loosely. See note on *Orbis*, pp. 712-13.

Sabinus might come and speak to him if he liked: he would answer for his personal safety; and he hoped his men might be prevailed upon to be merciful. Sabinus asked Cotta to go with him: but Cotta, true to Roman traditions, said that nothing would induce him to treat with an armed enemy. Accordingly Sabinus and a few tribunes and centurions went out alone. They were told to lay down their arms. A parley followed; and Ambiorix purposely spun out what he had to say. While he was speaking, a number of Gauls crept stealthily behind Sabinus; and in a moment he fell dead. Then with a yell of triumph the Gauls rushed into the exhausted legion; and Cotta and the bulk of his men were destroyed. The rest fled for the camp. The standard-bearer, finding himself hotly pursued, flung his eagle inside the rampart, and died fighting like a Roman soldier. His surviving comrades defended themselves till nightfall. Then, seeing that hope was gone, they fell upon each others' swords.

54 B.C.
and virtually annihilated.

A handful of men, more fortunate than their comrades, had managed to escape into the woods. They made their way to the camp of Labienus, and told him the whole story.

Ambiorix instantly followed up his victory. Bidding his infantry follow, he rode off westward with the horsemen. All that night and the day after he sped over the plateau of Herve and the plain of Hesbaye: just pausing to enlist the Aduatuci in the cause, he pressed on, and next day crossed the frontier of the Nervii. This people had not forgotten how their brethren had been slaughtered, three years before, on the banks of the Sambre. Ambiorix told the chiefs exultingly of his victory. Here was such a chance as they might never have again. Cicero's camp was close by. Why should they not do as he had done,—swoop down upon the solitary legion, win back their independence for good, and take a glorious revenge upon their persecutors. The chiefs caught at the suggestion. The small tribes that owned their sway flocked to join them: the Eburones, flushed with victory, were there to help; and the united host set out with eager confidence for the Roman camp. Their horsemen, hurrying on ahead, cut off a party of soldiers who were felling wood. Not the faintest rumour of the late disaster had reached

Ambiorix persuades the Nervii to join him in attacking Q. Cicero.

54 B.C.
Siege of
Cicero's
camp.

Cicero; and the Gallic hordes burst upon him like a bolt from the sky. Their first onslaught was so violent that even the disciplined courage of the Romans barely averted destruction. Messengers were instantly despatched to carry the news to Caesar; and Cicero promised to reward them well if they should succeed in delivering his letters. Working all night with incessant energy, the legionaries erected a large number of wooden towers on the rampart. The Gauls, who meanwhile had been strongly reinforced, returned in the morning to the attack. They succeeded in filling up the trench: but the garrison still managed to keep them at bay. Day after day the siege continued; and night after night and all night long the Romans toiled to make ready for the morrow's struggle. The towers, of which only the framework had been finished, were furnished with stories and battlements: sharp stakes were made for hurling at the besiegers, and huge pikes for stopping their rush if they should attempt an assault. Even the sick and the wounded had to lend a hand. Cicero himself was in poor health: but he worked night and day; and it was not until the men gathered round him and insisted on his sparing himself, that he would take a little rest. Meanwhile the Nervian leaders, who had expected an easy triumph, were becoming impatient. They asked Cicero to grant them an interview. Some of them knew him personally; and they doubtless hoped that he would prove compliant. They assailed him with the same arguments that Ambiorix had found so successful with Sabinus. They tried to frighten him by describing the massacre at Aduatuca, and assured him that it was idle to hope for relief. But they would not be hard upon him. All they wanted was to stop the inveterate custom of quartering the legions for the winter in Gaul. If he and his army would only go, they might go in peace whithersoever they pleased. Cicero calmly replied that Romans never accepted terms from an armed enemy. They must first lay down their arms: then he would intercede for them with Caesar. Caesar was always just, and would doubtless grant their petition.

Disappointed though they were, the Gauls were not disheartened. They determined to invest the camp in a scien-

tific manner. From the experience of past campaigns they ^{54 B.C.} had got a rough idea of the nature of Roman siege works; and now, with the quickness of their race, they proceeded to imitate them. Some prisoners who had fallen into their hands, gave them hints. Having no proper tools, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords, and use their hands and even their cloaks in piling the sods: but the workers swarmed in such prodigious numbers that in three hours they had thrown up a rampart ten feet high¹ and nearly three miles in extent.² They then proceeded, under the guidance of the prisoners, to erect towers, and to make sappers' huts, ladders and poles fitted with hooks for tearing down the rampart of the camp. The huts, which were intended to protect the men who had to fill up the trench and demolish the rampart, were partially closed in front, and had sloping roofs, built of strong timbers, so as to resist the crash of any stones which might be pitched on to them, and probably covered with clay and raw hides, as a protection against fire.³ On the seventh day of the siege there was a great gale. The besiegers took advantage of it to fling blazing darts and white-hot balls of clay,⁴ which lighted on the straw thatch of the men's huts; and the wind-swept flames flew all over the enclosure. With a yell of exultation, the enemy wheeled forward their towers and huts, and planted their ladders: in another moment they were swarming up: but all along the rampart, their dark figures outlined against the fiery background, the Romans were standing, ready to hurl them down: harassed by showers of missiles, half scorched by the fierce heat, regardless of the havoc that the flames were making in their property, every man of them stood firm; and hardly one so much as looked behind. Their losses were heavier than on any previous day. The Gauls too went down in scores; for those in front could not retreat because of the masses that pressed upon them from behind. In one spot a tower was wheeled right up to the rampart. The centurions of the 3rd cohort coolly withdrew

¹ Including the palisade?

² See pp. 713-14.

³ See Caesar, *B. C.*, ii. 10, and pp. 602-4.

⁴ See pp. 714-15.

54 B.C.

their men, and with voice and gesture dared the Gauls to come on: but none dared stir a step: a shower of stones sent them flying; and the deserted tower was set on fire. Everywhere the result was the same. The assailants were the bravest of the Gauls: of death they had no fear: but they had not the heart to hurl themselves upon that living wall; and, leaving their slain in heaps, they sullenly withdrew.

Still the siege went on; and to the wearied and weakened legion its trials daily increased. Letters for Caesar were sent out in more and more rapid succession. Some of the messengers were caught in sight of the garrison, and tortured to death. There was, however, in the camp a Nervian named Vertico, who, just before the siege, had thrown himself upon the protection of Cicero, and had been steadfastly true to him. By lavish promises he induced one of his slaves to face the dangers which to the Roman messengers had proved fatal. The letter which he had to carry was inserted in the shaft of a javelin. He passed his countrymen unnoticed, made his way safely to Samarobriva, and delivered his despatch. None of the other messengers had arrived; and so close was the sympathy between the peasants and the insurgents that Caesar had not heard a rumour of the siege.

A messenger from Cicero carries a despatch to Caesar.

Caesar marches to relieve Cicero.

It was about four o'clock in the afternoon. Within a few minutes messengers were spurring to the camps in the surrounding country. Crassus was ordered to come in to Samarobriva at once, and take the General's place. It was most important to leave Samarobriva in safe keeping; for there were collected the hostages of the various states, the winter's supply of corn, the heavy baggage of the whole army,¹ and the General's papers and accounts. Fabius was to join Caesar on the road. A letter went to Labienus, expressing the hope that he would be able to march direct to the relief of the besieged camp: but this able officer was trusted to use his own discretion. Plancus and Roscius

¹ *Impedimenta exercitus* (*B. G.*, v. 47, § 2). Perhaps the word "material" would be more accurate than "heavy baggage"; for the troops at Aduatua, and doubtless also the legions in the other camps, had their heavy baggage with them. It is impossible to say with certainty what the *impedimenta*, to which Caesar alludes, was; but it may have included siege material.

were too far off to be able to help. About nine o'clock next ⁵⁴ B.C. morning, hearing that Crassus was close at hand, Caesar set out with Trebonius's legion and about four hundred cavalry. No baggage-train accompanied the column: the men carried all that they required upon their backs. The first march was more than eighteen miles. Fabius joined his chief on the way: but Labienus did not appear. An express came from him instead, from which Caesar learned, for the first time, the fate of Sabinus and Cotta. It is said that, in his first burst of grief and wrath, he swore that he would not shave his beard or cut his hair until he had avenged their deaths.¹ Labienus went on to say that he was himself hard pressed by the Treveri, and thought it foolhardy to leave his camp. Caesar approved his decision, though it left him with barely seven thousand men. Everything now depended upon speed. Passing through the Nervian territory, Caesar learned from some peasants who fell into his hands that Cicero's situation was all but desperate: immediately he wrote a letter in Greek characters, assuring him of speedy relief, and offered one of his Gallic horsemen a large reward to deliver it. He told him, in case he should not be able to get into the camp, to tie the letter to a javelin and throw it inside. Fearing that the Romans might take him for an enemy, the man did as Caesar had directed: but the javelin stuck in one of the towers, and remained unnoticed for two days. A soldier then found it and took it to Cicero, who read the letter to his exhausted troops. As they gazed over the rampart, they saw clouds of smoke floating far away over the west horizon, and knew that Caesar was approaching and taking vengeance as he came.

That night Caesar received a despatch from Cicero, warning him that the Gauls had raised the siege, and gone off to intercept him. Notwithstanding their heavy losses, they numbered, it was said, some sixty thousand men.² Caesar made known the contents of the despatch to the troops, and encouraged them to nerve themselves for the approaching struggle. A short march in the early morning brought the legions to a river, on the opposite bank of which the enemy

The Gauls
abandon
the siege,
and march
to en-
counter
him.

¹ Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 67.

² See p. 208.

51 B.C.

were encamped. Caesar had no intention of fighting a battle against such heavy odds on unfavourable ground. Cicero was in no danger; and he was therefore not pressed for time. He sent out scouts to look for a convenient place to cross the river. Meanwhile he marked out his camp on a slope, and constructed it on the smallest possible scale in the hope of seducing the enemy to attack him. But the enemy were expecting reinforcements, and remained where they were. At dawn their horsemen ventured across the river, and attacked Caesar's cavalry, who promptly retreated in obedience to orders. Sitting on their horses, the Gauls could see inside the camp. An attempt was apparently being made to increase the height of the rampart, and to block the gateways. There was every appearance of panic. Caesar had told his men what to do; and they were hurrying about the camp with a pretence of nervous trepidation. The enemy hesitated no longer; and in a short time they were all across the stream. They had to attack up hill: but that mattered nothing against such craven adversaries. Not even a sentry was standing on the rampart. Criers were sent round the camp to say that if any man cared to come out and join the Gauls, he would be welcome,—till ten o'clock. The gates looked too strong to be forced, though there was really only a mock barricade of sods, which could be knocked over in a moment. The Gauls walked right up to the ditch, and began coolly filling it up, and actually tearing down the rampart with their hands,—when from right and left and front the cohorts charged: there was a thunder of hoofs; and reeling backward in amazement before a rush of cavalry, they flung away their arms and fled.

Defeat of
the Gauls.Caesar
joins
Cicero.

About three o'clock that afternoon the legions reached Cicero's camp. With keen interest Caesar asked for details of the siege, and gazed with admiring wonder at the enemy's deserted works. When the legion was paraded, he found that not one man in ten was unwounded. Turning to Cicero, he heartily thanked him for the magnificent stand which he had made, and then, calling out, one by one, the officers whom he mentioned as having shown especial bravery, he addressed to them a few words of praise. From some

prisoners, who had served under Ambiorix, he gleaned details of the massacre at Adnatuca. Next day he again assembled the men, and described to them what had befallen their comrades. They must not, he said, be downhearted; for Providence and their own good swords had enabled them to repair the disaster.

Meanwhile the news of the relief had spread like wildfire. Before midnight it was known in the neighbourhood of Labienus's camp, more than fifty miles away. A number of loyal Romans hurried to congratulate the general; and a shout of joy at the gates of his camp told him what had occurred. Indutiomarus, who was on the point of attacking him, beat a hasty retreat. A large force from the maritime tribes of Brittany and Normandy was advancing against the camp of Roscius, when an express came to warn them of Caesar's victory, and they precipitately fled.

54 B.C.
Immediate effects of his victory.

But even Caesar could not undo the effect of the annihilation of a Roman legion. The Gauls lacked perseverance: they wanted a great leader: but they had broken the spell of Roman success. Except among the Aedui and the Remi, there was hardly a chieftain in Gaul who did not dream of similar victories. Nocturnal meetings were held in secluded places; and embassies passed from tribe to tribe. As Caesar frankly remarked, it was all perfectly natural: the Gauls had once been the most dreaded warriors in the world, and to be forced to submit to Romans was most galling to their self-esteem. The state of affairs was so alarming that Caesar determined to break through his usual practice and spend the winter in Gaul. He ordered Fabius to return to his camp in the country of the Morini. His own quarters were at Samarobriua; and in the neighbourhood of that town he cantoned in three separate camps the legion of Cicero, that of Crassus, and the one with which he had gone to the relief of Cicero. He sent for all the chiefs who were in any way compromised, and when he had thoroughly frightened them by letting them know that he was aware of their intrigues, he tried to convince them that it was their interest to keep the peace. The bulk of the tribes were thus deterred from actually rebelling. The Senones, however, a powerful people

Many of the nobles continue to intrigue.

54 B.C.

Schemes of
Indutio-
marus.He is out-
witted by
Labienus,
defeated
and slain.

occupying the country round Sens and Montargis, had the temerity to banish a king whom Caesar had set over them; and when he ordered their council to come to Samarobriva and answer for this outrage, they flatly refused to obey. But of all the malcontents the most daring and the most dangerous was Indutiomarus. Rebuffed by the German chiefs, who answered his appeals for aid by reminding him of the fate of Ariovistus and the Teneteri, he offered rewards to all the outlaws and exiles in Gaul who would join his standard. His prestige rapidly increased; and all the patriots began to look to him for guidance. He summoned the warriors of his own tribe to muster in arms at a stated place; and, in accordance with Gallic custom, the unhappy wretch who arrived last was tortured to death in sight of his comrades. Indutiomarus began by declaring Cingetorix a public enemy, and confiscating his possessions. He then addressed the assembly. His plan was to make a raid into the country of the Remi, and punish them for their desertion of the national cause: then to join the Carnutes and the Senones, and raise a revolt in the heart of Gaul. First of all, however, he determined to make one more attempt against Labienus. But the Roman general was too strongly posted to fear any attack; and he determined to make an end of Indutiomarus and his schemes. He called upon the neighbouring tribes to furnish him with cavalry, which were to arrive on a fixed date; and, like Caesar, he did his best to lure on the enemy by a pretence of fear. Their horsemen rode up to the camp, hurled missiles over the rampart, shouted every insulting epithet at the Romans, and challenged them to come out if they dared. Labienus would not allow his men to reply. The cavalry which he had summoned arrived punctually; and in the night they were secretly admitted into the camp. Caesar afterwards noted with admiration the extraordinary precautions which Labienus had taken to prevent a single man from going outside, lest the enemy should hear that he had been reinforced. Next day, as usual, Indutiomarus and his men spent their time in swaggering round the rampart and abusing the Romans. In the evening, when they were scattered and off their guard, two of the gates were opened:

the cavalry charged ; and the astounded Gauls fled. Labienus ^{53 B.C.} gave orders that every one should pursue Indutiomarus, and him alone ; and he promised a large reward to the man who should kill him. He was caught in the act of fording a river ; and his head was cut off. Forthwith the assembled bands of the Nervii and Eburones dispersed ; and for a time Gaul was comparatively still.

Only for a time, however. Caesar had reason to believe that the chiefs were hatching a more formidable conspiracy : and he saw that the best way to counteract it was to convince them that, whatever successes they might gain, the fighting strength of Italy was inexhaustible. He accordingly raised two new legions, and asked Pompey, with whom his relations were still amicable, to lend him a third. Rome, whither he must soon return, was convulsed by the throes of anarchy, and the civil war that was coming cast its shadow before : but it was necessary that he should shut out from his mind all distracting thoughts, and perfect his work in Gaul.

Peace did not last out the winter. The Treveri, in spite of the death of Indutiomarus, succeeded in persuading, by promises of gold, some of the more distant tribes of Germany to join them. The Nervii, the Aduatuci, the Menapii and the Eburones were all in arms : the Senones and the Carnutes were still defiant. But Caesar, as usual, was the first to strike. While it was still winter, he left Samarobri-
briva with four legions ; made a sudden raid into the country of the Nervii : took numbers of prisoners before the bewildered tribesmen could either muster their forces or flee ; drove away their herds, ravaged their lands and compelled the cowed chiefs to submit. When he convened his annual council at Samarobri-
briva in the early spring, every tribe except the Senones, the Carnutes and the Treveri, sent its representatives.¹ A rapid march southward so disconcerted the Senones that they surrendered at once, and begged the Aedui to intercede for them. The Carnutes, without waiting to be attacked, induced their overlords, the Remi, to do them a like service ; and, as time pressed, Caesar accepted, without inquiry, the excuses of both peoples, took hostages

Caesar raises two new legions, and borrows a third from Pompey.

Continued troubles in north-eastern Gaul.

Caesar punishes the Nervii :

forces the Senones and Carnutes to submit :

¹ See pp. 354-5.

53 B.C.

and pre-
pares to
punish
Ambiorix.

As a pre-
liminary
step, he
crushes the
Menapii.

Labienus
disperses
the Treveri.

Caesar
again
crosses the
Rhine, and
threatens
the allies of
Ambiorix.

for their good behaviour, and turned northward to deal with the Treveri and the Eburones. He had not forgotten the shame and the suffering which Ambiorix had brought upon his soldiers; and he was determined to inflict upon him a most signal and awful retribution.

The first step was to deprive him of his allies, the Menapii, the Treveri and the Germans. Caesar had ascertained that he did not intend to fight; and the object was to bar against him every way of escape. The Menapii, alone of all the Gallic tribes, had never formally submitted to Rome. During Caesar's first expedition to Britain, Sabinus and Cotta had mercilessly ravaged their lands: but it was impossible to follow them into their fastnesses. Caesar took his measures with extreme deliberation. He sent all the heavy baggage to Labienus, and at the same time reinforced him with a couple of legions. He then marched in overwhelming force against the Menapii. Without attempting to resist, they again took refuge in their forests and marshes: but this time they were not to escape. Caesar bridged the rivers, constructed causeways over the marshes, and threw three separate columns into their country; and when their flocks and herds were driven away, their villages ablaze, and prisoners taken by scores, they were constrained to surrender. Caesar left a body of horse to watch them under Commius, the king of the Atrebatas, who had done good service in Britain; and warning them, as they valued the lives of their hostages, to give no refuge to Ambiorix or his lieutenants, he pushed southward to deal with the Treveri. Before he could arrive, however, Labienus marched out to meet them, enticed them by a feigned flight across a river, and then, suddenly wheeling round, sent them flying into the woods. Their German allies, who had not had time to join them, returned home; and within a few days the whole tribe submitted. Their leaders fled the country; and Caesar's adherent, Cingetorix, was appointed chief magistrate.

About this time Caesar joined Labienus; and with the twofold object of punishing the Germans and preventing Ambiorix from seeking an asylum in their country, he again

threw a bridge across the Rhine, a little above the site of 53 B.C. the former one. He left a force to hold the Gallic end of the bridge and keep the Treveri in awe. A few days later he was informed by the Ubii that the Suevi, who had been active in sending reinforcements against Labienus, were massing their warriors and warning their dependent tribes to send in their contingents. He immediately entrenched himself in a strong position, and ordered the Ubii to remove their stores from the open country into their strongholds, to drive in their cattle from the pastures, and to send out scouts to watch the enemy's movements. His hope was that finding themselves short of supplies, they might be enticed to venture a battle at a disadvantage: but the scouts, after a few days' absence, reported that the entire host had fallen back to the outskirts of a huge forest near the mountains of Thuringia. To follow them thither through a wild country, where little or no corn was to be had, would simply be to court destruction. There was nothing for it but to return. But, in order to keep the Germans in constant fear of a fresh invasion, he only destroyed that part of the bridge which touched their bank of the Rhine; built a wooden tower of four stories on its extremity; and detailed twelve cohorts¹ to hold the other end. [About 4000 men.]

And now, having made every preparation that forethought could suggest, Caesar bent all his energies to destroy Ambiorix. The road ran westward through the vast forest of the Ardennes. An officer named Minucius Basilus was sent on ahead with the cavalry. He was on no account to allow any fires to be lighted in his camp, lest Ambiorix should be warned of his approach. Caesar followed with the infantry till he reached the deserted camp which, a few months before, had witnessed the self-slaughter of the remnant of Cotta's legion. The entrenchments were still intact. There he left his heavy baggage and one of the

Returning
unsuccess-
ful to Gaul,
he marches
against
Ambiorix.

¹ Caesar makes no further mention of these cohorts, which were probably detachments from various legions; and I suppose that they were withdrawn from the Rhine before the army went into winter-quarters. Their services would certainly have been required in the seventh campaign. Guischart (*Mém. crit. et hist.*, t. iii., 1774, p. 32) conjectures that they were supernumeraries: but this is a mere guess.

53 B.C.

newly raised legions to guard it, under the command of Cicero. He promised to return at the end of a week, and charged his lieutenant on no account to allow a single man to venture out of camp until then. The army was divided into three corps, each consisting of three legions or, not counting auxiliaries, about ten thousand men. Labienus was sent to the northern part of the country of the Eburones, in the direction of the islands which bar the mouth of the Scheldt; and Trebonius to the south-western, in the direction of Huy. They were to harry the enemy's country, to ascertain his designs, and to return, if possible at the end of a week, to concert measures with Caesar for a final campaign. Caesar himself marched towards the lower Scheldt, in the hope of catching Ambiorix, who was said to have retreated to the extremity of the Ardennes.

The
Eburones
keep up a
guerilla
warfare.

Meanwhile that unhappy chief was being driven, like a hunted animal, from lair to lair. Basilus and his cavalry, guided by some peasants whom they had caught in the fields, rode through a wood till they came to a cottage, in a small clearing, where he was said to be hiding: but his retainers gallantly flung themselves upon the Romans, while their chief threw himself on horseback and disappeared among the trees. Catuvolcus, the aged prince who had shared his counsels, was too infirm to bear the hardships of a hunted fugitive, and committed suicide. The Eburones were less civilised than their neighbours, and had no walled towns to retreat to. Ambiorix sent word over the country-side that every one must shift for himself. Many fled the country altogether: others dived into the recesses of the forest: others lurked in the marshes or the islets in the estuary of the Scheldt. Caesar found that there was no regular force to oppose him: but every glen, every bog, every clump of trees held its nest of armed skulkers. Massed in their cohorts and companies, the legionaries were powerless against such foes: the only way to get at them was to send out small flying parties in every direction. But in those narrow woodland tracks it was not easy for even the smallest party to keep together. The enemy knew every inch of the ground: they were wary; and they were desperate: and a few legionaries

who strayed in search of plunder were cut off and killed. ^{53 B.C.} Always careful of his men's lives, Caesar was especially careful now, when their thirst for revenge tempted them to be rash. In order to spare them as much as possible, he invited the surrounding tribes to come and destroy the Eburones, and enrich themselves with booty. He intended, as he tells us, "that Gauls should risk their lives in the forests, and not his legionaries, and at the same time to surround the Eburones with a mighty host, and, in requital for their signal villainy, to destroy them, root, branch and name."¹ Multitudes of eager plunderers were attracted by the prospect; and Caesar's old enemies, the Sugambri, actually crossed the Rhine with two thousand horse and their attendant light-armed footmen,² in the hope of sharing in the spoil. The wretched Eburones were captured by scores, and their cattle driven off. But the Sugambri were soon tempted by a richer prize. One of their captives told them that Caesar was far away, and they need not be afraid of him. Why should they not pounce upon Cicero's camp, and carry off all the stores and the loot which it contained?

Caesar invites the neighbouring tribes to harry them.

It happened that on this very day Caesar was expected in the camp. But Cicero had heard nothing of or from him, and was beginning to fear that he would not be able to keep his promise. Hitherto he had carefully obeyed his instructions, and had not allowed a man to stir outside the rampart. But fresh rations were due: there were corn-fields within three miles of the camp: it was absurd to suppose that the persecuted Eburones would venture an attack so near; and besides it stung him to hear that the men were sneering at his caution. Accordingly he allowed half the legion, with a few convalescent veterans, who were under a separate command, two hundred cavalry and a number of slaves, to go out and cut corn. They were hardly out of sight, when a host of horsemen broke from an outlying wood, swept down upon the camp, and tried to burst in through the rear gate. The dealers who accompanied the army were massacred in their tents outside the rampart; and the

The Sugambri surprise Cicero.

¹ *B. G.*, vi. 34, § 8.

² See p. 44, and *B. G.*, i. 48, §§ 5-7.

53 B.C.

cohort on duty barely sustained the first shock. The enemy spread round the camp, looking for an entrance; and it was all that the guards could do to prevent them from breaking through the gates. The commanding nature of the site and the strength of the fortifications forbade any attempt to enter elsewhere. Within, all was confusion and panic; and the superstitious recruits remembered with horror that, on the very spot where they stood, the soldiers of Cotta and Sabinus had perished. Even Cicero lost his presence of mind. But it happened that there was in the camp an invalided centurion, whose deeds of daring Caesar was never tired of extolling,—Sextius Baculus. Ill and weak, he had not tasted food for five days. As he lay in his tent, he heard the uproar, and walked out to see what was the matter. Without a moment's hesitation, he snatched sword and shield from the men close by, and planted himself in the nearest gateway. The centurions on guard rallied round him; and alone they kept the enemy at bay. Severely wounded, Sextius fell down in a faint, and was with difficulty rescued: but his splendid courage shamed the trembling recruits into action; and the camp was saved.

Meanwhile the foragers were on their way back. They heard the uproar. The cavalry rode on, and saw the enemy. The rest followed. The recruits had never seen a sword drawn in anger: there was no cover near; and they were simply confounded by the apparition. They looked passively to their officers for orders: but the bravest of their officers were for the moment unnerved. The Germans, desecrating infantry and cavalry in the distance, took them for Caesar's legions and abandoned their attempt on the camp: but presently, seeing how few they had to deal with, rode off to attack them. The slaves, who had rushed up a knoll for refuge, were speedily dislodged, and, flying pell-mell into the maniples, increased their alarm. A hurried consultation was held. The recruits, in spite of all warnings, ended by clustering together on a ridge, where they fancied they might be safe. The handful of veterans who had accompanied the detachment kept their presence of mind, and saved themselves and those who had the sense to follow them by charging boldly

through the enemy's loose array. The recruits stood watching ^{53 B.C.} them in helpless hesitation. They could not make up their minds to stay where they were; and they knew that they could not follow the example of the veterans. At length they tried to reach the camp anyhow; and many of them were surrounded and slain. Those who escaped owed their lives to their centurions, who threw themselves upon the enemy, for a moment forced them back, and died, fighting to the last man.¹ The Germans rode away with the booty which they had left in the woods. Caesar's advanced guard reached the camp that night, and found the young soldiers almost beside themselves with panic. They were positive that the General himself and his army must have perished; and nothing could quiet them till they actually saw him arrive. But nobody knew better than he how much fortune has to do with war; and he contented himself with telling Cicero that he ought to have followed his instructions to the letter, and not have run the smallest risk.

One more effort was made to catch Ambiorix. Fresh plunderers from the surrounding tribes were hounded on by Caesar to hunt down his people and harry his land. Every hamlet, every building was burned down; everything worth plundering was carried off; and every ear of corn that was not sodden by the rain was devoured; for it was Caesar's deliberate intention that every man, woman and child who escaped the sword should perish of hunger. The soldiers knew that he had set his heart upon getting Ambiorix into his hands; and they made incredible exertions to win his favour. Cavalry in small parties scoured the country in pursuit of the king. From time to time they captured peasants, who declared that he was hardly out of sight. But, in spite of the desperate efforts of his exasperated pursuers, he was never caught. With four retainers, who would have suffered anything rather than betray him, he was lost in the dark recesses of the Ardennes.

Caesar ravages the country of the Eburones.

Ambiorix eludes pursuit.

The legions were distributed for the winter,—two on the western frontier of the Treveri, two among the Lingones,

The legions distributed for the winter.

¹ Caesar does not tell us what became of the cavalry; but we may infer from *B. G.*, vi. 44, § 1, where he estimates his loss at two cohorts, that they escaped.

53 B.C.

and the remaining six at Agedincum, now Sens, the chief town of the Senones. One other task Caesar had to perform before he started for Italy. He summoned a Gallic council to meet at Durocortorum, the modern Reims. An inquiry was held regarding the rebellion, which at the time he had necessarily condoned, of the Carnutes and the Senones. Acco, a Senonian chieftain, was convicted of having originated the movement; and, in accordance with Roman custom, he was flogged to death.¹

Execution
of Acco.

¹ *B. G.*, vi. 44, § 2, viii. 38, § 5; Suetonius, *Nero*, 49.

CHAPTER VII

THE REBELLION OF VERCINGETORIX

A STILLNESS that was not peace lay upon Gaul. Only half ^{52 B.C.} subdued, the Celts were smarting under the shock of Caesar's scourge: their proud necks writhed beneath his yoke. Early in the new year a gleam of hope shone out. A rumour ran through Gaul that Rome was a prey to sedition. The notorious Clodius had been murdered by Milo and his bravoës. Furious riots followed. Temples were in flames, and streets ran with blood. The story was of course embellished by the eager imagination of the Gauls. They persuaded themselves that Caesar would be detained in Italy, and that his legions would be at their mercy. Meetings were held in the recesses of forests and other secluded places. The death of Acco was keenly discussed. The formality of his execution seemed a sign that Caesar intended to make Gaul into a Roman province. Chieftains told each other that their own turn might come next. They must make a supreme effort to save their unhappy country. At one of these gatherings a definite plan was formed. The great object was to prevent Caesar from rejoining his legions. The conspirators persuaded themselves that there would be no difficulty in doing this; for the generals who commanded the legions would not venture to leave their quarters in Caesar's absence, and Caesar could not make his way to the legions for want of a sufficient escort. The question was put:—who would take his life in his hand, and strike the first blow for fatherland and freedom? He might count upon receiving a liberal reward. The chiefs of the Carnutes instantly responded to the appeal. All they asked was a

News of
the murder
of Clodius
reaches
Gaul.

Gallie
chiefs
encouraged
to conspire
against
Caesar.

52 B.C.

solemn assurance that their brother chiefs would not leave them in the lurch. Loud applause followed. Making a sheaf of their standards—a Gallic ceremony of the gravest import—the assembled chiefs swore to be true to their countrymen; and a date was fixed for the insurrection to begin.

The
Carnutes
massacre
Roman
citizens at
Cenabum

Cenabum, one of the chief towns of the Carnutes, stood upon the site now occupied by Orléans.¹ It was thus fitted to be the depot for the grain that came from the plain of La Beauce, and down the Loire from the fertile Limagne d'Auvergne. Some Roman merchants were settled there, and one of Caesar's commissariat officers. When the appointed day came round, a band of the Carnutes, led by two desperadoes, Gutuatrus and Conconnetodumnus, rushed into the town, massacred the Romans, and plundered their stores. The tidings sped swiftly through the length and breadth of Gaul; for whenever an important event occurred, the bystanders made it known by loud shouts, and those who heard them passed on the cry over the country side. When Cenabum was attacked, it was just sunrise. By eight o'clock that night the news, flying from man to man, had reached the country of the Arverni—the modern Auvergne—a hundred and forty miles to the south.²

The news
reaches the
Arverni.

Gergovia.

Gergovia, the chief town of this people, was situated on a mountain, some two thousand four hundred feet above the sea, about eight miles south-east of the Puy de Dôme. It was equally fitted for a place of refuge and for a capital. Streamlets watered the meadows which compassed it round: forage was abundant; and the town commanded a view ranging over a vast tract. Four miles to the north appeared the gently sloping eminence above which now soar the sombre lava spires of Clermont cathedral: the vast plain of the Limagne, watered by the Allier and backed by the distant range of the Forez, extended on the north-east: above wooded hills and valleys on the west, its summit crowned by the holiest sanctuary of Gallic worship,³ towered the huge blunt cupola of the Puy de Dôme; and all around, as far as

¹ See pp. 402-15.

² See pp. 721-2, and *Revue historique*, lxxv., 1901, p. 401.

³ See an interesting article in the *Revue historique*, xxxvi., 1888, pp. 1-28.

the eye could reach, rose the cones of the volcanic land where the Arvernian mountaineers had made their home. 52 B.C.

At that time there was living in the town a young noble named Vercingetorix. Caesar had already discerned his ability and attempted to purchase his support. His father, Celtillus, had been the most powerful chief in Gaul: but he had tried to restore the detested monarchy, and had paid for his ambition with his life. A Celt of the Celts, brave, impulsive, chivalrous to a fault, Vercingetorix possessed also, in a fuller measure than any of the patriots who arose before him, the gift of personal magnetism. He called his retainers together, and told them his plans. Their passions were easily inflamed. The government, however, had always adhered to Caesar. The leading men regarded the movement as quixotic, and ordered the young chief to leave the town. But Vercingetorix persevered. He took into his pay all the outcasts and desperadoes in the district. He went from village to village, and harangued the people; and all who listened caught the fire of his enthusiasm. At the head of his levies he returned to Gergovia, and banished the chiefs who had lately banished him. His adherents saluted him as king. He sent out his envoys in all directions: soon nearly every tribe in western Gaul from the Seine to the Garonne joined the movement; and the impressionable Celts, recognising Vercingetorix as the man of destiny who was to save their country, unanimously bestowed upon him the chief command. He levied from each state a definite quota of troops and of hostages, and ordered each to manufacture a definite quantity of weapons by a fixed day. He knew that the tribal militia-men would be of little use except for guerilla warfare, and therefore devoted all his efforts to strengthening his cavalry. Waverers and laggards he soon brought to their senses by ruthless severity. Torture or the stake punished grave breaches of discipline; while minor offenders were sent home, with their ears lopped off or an eye gouged out, to serve as a warning to their neighbours. These methods were effective. An army was speedily raised; and the bulk of the Celtic patriots were united, for the first time, under one great leader.

Vercingetorix, notwithstanding the opposition of the Arvernian government, rouses popular enthusiasm for rebellion.

Most of the tribes between the Seine and the Garonne join him, and elect him Commander-in-Chief.

How he raised an army.

52 B.C.
The dis-
sentient
tribes.

It must not, however, be supposed that even now the movement was general. The Aedui, jealous of their old rivals, the Arverni, and not prepared to break with Caesar, still kept aloof: the tribes who looked up to them remained passive. The Aquitanians naturally took no heed of what was going on among the aliens beyond the Garonne. The Belgae had been terribly punished for their late rebellion; and either for this reason or because they were jealous of their Celtic neighbours, they left them alone. It remained to be seen whether Vercingetorix would be able, by the spell of his personality, or by the victories which he might gain, to rouse the whole people into united action.

The Bitu-
riges join
Vercinge-
torix.

His first step was to send a chief, named Lucterius, the most daring of his lieutenants, to deal with the Ruteni, who dwelt in the district, bordering on the Roman Province, which is now called Aveyron. He himself marched northward, with the remainder of the force, into the great plain of the Berri, which belonged to the Bituriges. This people at once sent envoys to the Aedui, whose supremacy they recognised, to ask for help. The Aedui, acting on the advice of Caesar's generals, sent a force of infantry and cavalry to their assistance. The force marched to the banks of the Loire, which separated the two peoples, halted there for a few days, and then returned. They excused themselves to the Roman generals, on the plea that they had had reason to fear that, if they crossed the river, the Bituriges would combine with the Arverni to surround them. Caesar could never find out whether their plea was true or false. Directly after they had turned their backs the Bituriges threw in their lot with Vercingetorix.

Caesar re-
turns with
recruits
to the
Province.

By the time that the news of the rebellion reached Italy, Rome, in the strong hands of Pompey, was quieting down; and Caesar was able to start for Gaul without delay. He took with him a number of recruits, whom he had raised in Cisalpine Gaul, to repair the losses of the late campaigns.

How shall
he rejoin
his legions?

His first difficulty, on arriving in the Province, was to rejoin his army. The legions were quartered at Agedincum, on the plateau of Langres, and in the neighbourhood of Trèves, two hundred miles and more to the north. If he were to send

for them, they would be compelled to fight a battle as they 52 B.C.
 marched southwards; and he was unwilling to trust the issue
 to his lieutenants. On the other hand, it would be foolhardy
 for him, with only a slender escort, to attempt to make his
 way to them. Even the Aedui were believed to be untrust-
 worthy; while Lucterius had just won over the tribes [The
 Ruteni,
 Nitiobriges
 and
 Gabali.]
 between the Garonne, the Dordogne and the Cevennes, and,
 having raised fresh levies, was threatening to cross the Tarn
 and descend upon the opulent city of Narbo. Caesar saw [Nar-
 bonne.]
 that before all things it was necessary to safeguard the
 Province. Hastening to Narbo, he assured the anxious pro-
 vincials that there was no cause for alarm, and posted detach-
 ments, drawn from the troops who garrisoned the Province, He
 rescues the
 Province
 from a
 threatened
 invasion:
 in the surrounding country and also in the districts round
 Toulouse, Albi and Nîmes. Having thus checkmated Lucterius,
 he went to join his new levies, which had been ordered to
 concentrate in the country of the Helvii, a Provincial tribe
 who dwelt in the Vivarais, on the eastern side of the Cevennes.
 He now saw his way to reach the army. Beyond the Cevennes
 lay the country of Vercingetorix,—undefended, for Vercinge-
 torix was in the Berri, a hundred miles away. But the
 mountain track was buried beneath snow; and no one had
 ever before attempted the journey under such conditions.
 Nevertheless Caesar advanced. Moving up the valley of the
 Ardèche, he made for the watershed between the sources of
 the Allier and the Loire.¹ By prodigious efforts the men
 shovelled aside the snow; and the Arverni, who had never
 dreamed that any one would venture to cross their mountain
 barrier, were astounded to see the Romans descending into
 the plains. Caesar's horsemen swept over the country in
 small parties, carrying fire and sword. The news soon spread;
 and Vercingetorix, reluctantly yielding to the entreaties of his
 tribesmen, hurried to the rescue. This was just what Caesar
 had anticipated. Now that the rebel army was out of the
 way, he might, with comparative safety, travel northward to
 join his legions; and so confident was he in the soundness
 of his forecast that, before he learned that Vercingetorix had

¹ See *Archæological Journal*, xviii., 1861, p. 369, and Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 244.

52 B.C.

then seizes
the oppor-
tunity to
rejoin his
legions.

[Early in
March ?]

Vercinge-
torix
besieges
Gorgobina
[St. Parize-
le-Châtel ?]

Caesar
marches
from
Agedincum
(Sens) to
relieve
Gorgobina :

commenced his march, he acted as though he had done so. He left Decimus Brutus, who had commanded in the sea fight with the Veneti, to occupy the enemy's attention; and for fear his design might get abroad, he announced that he was only going to procure reinforcements, and would be back in three days. Then, recrossing the Cevennes, he hastened to Vienna on the Rhône; picked up there a body of cavalry, which he had sent on from the Province to wait for him; pushed on up the valley of the Saône as swiftly as horses could carry him, hoping to elude the Aedui, in case they were hostile; rejoined the legions which he had left near Langres; and, before Vercingetorix knew where he was, concentrated the whole army in the neighbourhood of Agedincum.¹

Vercingetorix, however, quickly recovered from this surprise. In the south of Nièvre, near the confluence of the Allier and the Loire,² there was a town called Gorgobina, belonging to the Boii, whom, it will be remembered, Caesar had placed in dependence upon the Aedui. To strike at Caesar's allies would be equivalent to striking at Caesar himself. Vercingetorix accordingly prepared to besiege the stronghold. Again Caesar was in a dilemma. If he left Gorgobina to its fate, the tribes that still remained loyal would conclude that he could not be relied upon to protect his friends, and would therefore probably join the rebels. If, on the other hand, he undertook a campaign so early in the year, the army would be in danger of starving; for, owing to the severity of the weather, it was very difficult to transport supplies. But anything was better than to lose the confidence of his allies. He must trust to the Aedui to supply him with corn. Leaving two legions at Agedincum to guard his heavy baggage,³ and sending messengers to tell

¹ Caesar does not tell us what became of Brutus after he had fulfilled his mission. Probably he retreated to the Province. He took part in the operations at Alesia,—the closing scene of the campaign.

² See note on GORGOBINA, pp. 426-22.

³ The recruits, who had been temporarily left behind with Brutus in the country of the Arverni, were ordered to march to Agedincum, though Caesar does not say so, doubtless to learn their drill; for Labienus left them there when he started on his campaign against the Parisii and the Senones. See p. 129, and *B. G.*, vii. 57, § 1.

the Boii that he was coming and encourage them to hold out, he marched for Gorgobina. Instead, however, of taking the direct route southward, he intended to go round by way of Cenabum; for, although time was precious, it was of paramount importance to punish, first of all, the people who had been the first to rebel, and who, by the massacre of Roman citizens, had outraged the majesty of Rome.¹ Moreover, by ravaging the lands of the Carnutes and Bituriges, he might count on forcing Vercingetorix to relax his hold on Gorgobina. His cavalry were comparatively weak, for some of the tribes which in former years had furnished contingents were now in revolt: but he had reinforced his Gallic and Spanish horsemen by four hundred Germans, whose value he had doubtless recognised in the campaign against the Usipetes and Teneteri. At the close of the second day's march he laid siege to Vellaunodunum, a stronghold of the Senones, probably on the site of the modern Montargis, in order to avoid leaving an enemy in his rear, and to facilitate the transport of his supplies. In three days the place surrendered, and, leaving Trebonius to disarm the inhabitants and take hostages for their good behaviour, he pushed on for Cenabum. The road crossed the great forest of Orléans; and Caesar accomplished the distance in two long marches. It was evening when he arrived,—too late to begin the siege: but the troops at once began to make the necessary preparations. The Loire was spanned by a bridge, the northern end of which could only be reached from within the town. The Carnutes, who had expected that Vellaunodunum would hold out longer, were not prepared for resistance, and tried to escape in the night over the bridge: but Caesar, foreseeing their attempt, had kept two legions under arms: the gates were instantly fired, and the town seized; and, as the thronging masses were struggling forward through the narrow streets, the legions fell upon them, and almost all were taken prisoners. The booty was given up to the soldiers: the town was set ablaze; and the army passed over

¹ This seems a sufficient explanation of Caesar's having made a *détour* (see my note on CENABUM, pp. 406-7). But it is also possible that, if there were any bridges over the Loire above Cenabum, Vercingetorix had destroyed them.

52 B.C.
crosses the
Loire, and
captures
Novio-
dunum
[Villate,
near
Neuvy-sur-
Baran-
geon ?];
and
marches to
besiege
Avaricum.

Vercinge-
torix per-
suades the
Bituriges
and other
tribes to
burn their
towns and
granaries.

the bridge, and pushed on to relieve Gorgobina. Noviodunum, which lay on their line of march, promptly surrendered. The cavalry of Vercingetorix, who had hurriedly raised the siege of Gorgobina, appeared in time to risk a battle for its recovery: but they scattered before the charge of the German squadron; and Caesar marched southward for Avaricum, the capital of the Bituriges, now occupied by the famous cathedral city of Bourges.

So far Vercingetorix had met with a succession of disasters. But his spirit was indomitable, and he knew how to learn from experience. He saw that the war must be conducted on a totally different principle. Nothing was to be gained by defending towns which could offer no resistance; and it was hopeless to encounter the Romans in the open field. But he had thousands of light horse who could scour the country and cut off their supplies. The grass was not yet grown, nor the corn ripe; and Caesar could only replenish his stores by sending out detached parties to rifle the granaries. Vercingetorix called his officers together, and told them his plans. They must hunt down the Roman foragers wherever they could find them, and attack the baggage-train. They must make up their minds to sacrifice their own interests for the national weal. Every hamlet, every barn where the enemy could find provender must be burned to the ground. Even the towns must be destroyed, save those which were impregnable, lest they should tempt men who ought to be in the field to go to them for shelter, and lest the Romans should plunder their stores. This might sound very hard: but it would be far harder for them to be slain while their wives and children were sold into slavery; and, if they were beaten, this would inevitably be their doom. This unpromising speech was greeted with unanimous applause. For such a leader men would consent to any sacrifice. Within a single day more than twenty villages in the Berri were burned down. All round the great plain, wherever the Romans looked, the sky was aglow. The wretched inhabitants told each other that they were going to win, and would soon recover what they had lost. But Vercingetorix could only govern by character and tact. He had not the

powers belonging to the general of an established common-wealth. He might venture to be severe: but he could not afford to lose his popularity. The question was raised, whether Avaricum should be defended, or destroyed like the lesser towns. The Bituriges were not restrained by the sense of discipline. Their spokesmen eloquently pleaded their cause. Their capital was the finest town almost in the whole of Gaul. Besides, its position was so strong that they could easily defend it. Vercingetorix strongly opposed their appeal: but they pleaded so pathetically, and their brother chiefs showed such sympathy with them, that he was obliged to give way. Following Caesar by easy stages, he finally halted about fourteen miles from Avaricum, on a strong position, from which he could communicate with the garrison and harass the besiegers.

Avaricum was surrounded, on every side except the south, by marshes intersected by sluggish streams. On the south it was approached by a natural causeway, which, about a hundred yards from the wall, suddenly shelved down so as to form a kind of huge moat.¹ Behind this neck of land Caesar pitched his camp. As the marshes rendered it impossible to invest the town, he proceeded to construct a terrace, by which picked troops were ultimately to advance to the assault. The flanking parts were to serve as viaducts, to carry the towers in which artillery were placed; and it is probable that the platform intended for the columns of assault occupied only the front portion of the intervening space. First of all, in order to provide a secure foundation, the ground was cleared of obstructions and levelled as far as possible by men working under stout huts.² The sides of each viaduct were constructed of parallel tiers of logs, the interstices between which were probably packed with earth and rubble. The workmen brought up the material through lines of sheds, which, being contiguous to one another and open at both ends, formed covered galleries; and they were further protected in front by a fence of high wooden shields

52 B.C.
The Bituriges, contrary to his advice, resolve to defend Avaricum.

Siege of Avaricum.

¹ See Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 255, and Planche 20.

² See Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César*,—*Guerre civile*, ii. 257, and Caesar, *B. C.*, ii. 2, § 4.

52 B.C.

moving on rollers. Between the walls of timber, which served as lateral supports, they built up the core of the viaduct, which was composed of earth, stones and timber. The artillerymen who manned the tower kept their catapults playing upon the defenders of the wall. As the structure rose daily higher, the elevation of the tower was correspondingly augmented.¹ When the viaduct was completed, the tower could be moved backwards or forwards along the surface; while the sheds were ranged on either side, and served as a means of safe communication. The central mound was probably raised higher than the other two,² in order to facilitate the assault; and sheds were placed upon it also, to screen the assailants from observation and attack.

Meanwhile the new policy of Vercingetorix was beginning to make itself felt. His scouts kept him informed of Caesar's movements, and conveyed his instructions to the garrison. Whenever the Romans went out to forage or procure corn, his horsemen kept them in sight, and handled them severely if they ever ventured to disperse. Caesar did all that ingenuity could suggest to baffle him, sending the men out at odd times and in varying directions: but the enemy seemed ubiquitous. Supplies were running short, and Caesar called upon the Aedui and the Boii for corn; but the Aedui were half-hearted; and the Boii, though they did their best, had little to give. For several days the soldiers had no bread, and were obliged to kill the cattle, driven in from distant villages, in order to subsist at all. Yet, as Caesar proudly related, not one of them uttered a word that was unworthy of their own victorious record or of the majesty of the Roman people. Caesar went among them as they worked, and did all he could to keep up their spirits. He would abandon the siege, he told them, if they found the pangs of hunger too hard to bear. But they would not hear of such a thing. They proudly reminded him that they had

¹ See p. 600.

² Forming what is technically called a "cavalier." See my note on "The *Agger*," pp. 597-600, and *Rev. des études anciennes*, ii., 1900, pp. 331, n. 2, 337, n. 2.

fought under his command for six years with untarnished ^{52 B.C.} honour; and they would cheerfully endure any hardship if only they could avenge the massacre at Cenabum.

Vercingetorix, when his provender was consumed, moved some miles nearer the town. It was reported that he had left his infantry in their new encampment, and gone with his cavalry to lie in wait for the Roman foragers in the place where he expected that they would be found on the following day. Caesar saw his opportunity, and marched at midnight to attack the encampment. But the enemy were well served by their scouts. They removed their waggons and baggage out of harm's way into the recesses of a wood; and in the early morning Caesar found them securely posted on a hill surrounded by a belt of morass, not more than fifty feet wide. They had broken down the causeways which spanned the morass, and posted piquets opposite the places where it was fordable. The legionaries clamoured for the signal to advance: but Caesar told them that victory could only be purchased by the slaughter of many gallant men, and that their lives were more precious to him than his own reputation.

Vercingetorix, on returning to the encampment, was accused of treachery. His officers told him to his face that he would never have left them without a leader, exposed to that well-timed attack, if he had not intended to betray them. He ought never to have moved from his original position. It was plain enough that he wanted to reign as Caesar's creature, not by the choice of his countrymen. Vercingetorix was at no loss for an answer. He had moved, he reminded them, at their own request, simply in order to get forage. They had not been in the slightest danger; for the position in which he had left them was impregnable. He had purposely refrained from delegating his command to any one, for fear they should worry his substitute into risking a battle; for he knew that they had not resolution enough to adhere to a system of warfare which required patient toil. They ought to be thankful that the Romans had tried to attack them, because they could now see for themselves what cowards the Romans were. He had no need to beg Caesar for a kingdom which he could win for himself by the sword; and

52 B.C.

they might take back their gift if they imagined that they were doing him a favour, and not indebted to him for their safety. "And now," he said, "that you may satisfy yourselves that I'm speaking the truth, listen to what the Romans themselves say." Some camp-followers, whom he had captured a few days before, stepped forward. They had been carefully drilled in the part they were to play. Questioned by Vercingetorix, they stated that they were Roman soldiers, and had secretly left the camp in the hope of finding something to eat; that their comrades, one and all, were half-starved, and too weak to get through their work; and that Caesar had made up his mind, unless within three days he had achieved some tangible results, to abandon the siege. "You see," said Vercingetorix, "I—I whom you call a traitor—have brought this mighty army, without the loss of a drop of your blood, to the verge of starvation. No course is open to them but an ignominious retreat; and I have arranged that not a single tribe shall give them refuge." Clashing their weapons, as their custom was, the tribesmen swore that Vercingetorix was the greatest of generals and that they would trust him through thick and thin. They realised how much was staked upon the safety of Avaricum; and ten thousand picked men were sent into the town. But jealousy had much to do with this decision. If the Bituriges succeeded in holding the fortress unaided, the glory of the triumph would be theirs.

In devising expedients to baffle the operations of the besiegers, the Gauls showed astonishing ingenuity. The wall, compacted with transverse balks and longitudinal beams of timber, was too tough, so to speak, to be breached by the battering ram; and, being also largely composed of stone and rubble, it was proof against fire.¹ The Roman engineers used powerful hooks, riveted to stout poles, to loosen and drag down the stones. These hooks the garrison seized with nooses; and then, by means of windlasses, pulled them up over the wall. They made daily sorties, fired the woodwork of the terrace, and harassed the workers by frequent attacks. They erected towers along the wall, in imitation of those of

¹ See pp. 729-31.

the besiegers, and filled them with archers and slingers. 52 B.C. They drove galleries under the terrace, and dragged away the timber of which it was composed; and, assailing the Roman sappers with sharp stakes, heavy stones and boiling pitch, they stopped the galleries by which they were approaching to undermine the wall.¹

The siege had lasted twenty-five days; and, in spite of numbing cold and drenching rains and harassing opposition, the indefatigable Romans had built up the terrace, three hundred and thirty feet wide and eighty feet high,² till it almost reached the wall. To complete the final section of the work was always a difficult and troublesome operation. It was no longer possible to rear a compact and uniform structure, as the enemy, standing right above on the wall, could pitch heavy stones and other missiles on to the workmen. Huts of extraordinary strength, the sloping roofs of which were protected against fire by bricks, clay and raw hides, were therefore placed near the edge of the terrace; and, screened by them, the men shot earth, timber and fascines into the vacant space until the mass reached the necessary height.³ About midnight, when the men were putting the finishing touches to the work, a cloud of smoke was seen rising above it. Some miners had burrowed underneath, and set the woodwork on fire. A yell of exultation rang from the town. Flaming brands shot down from the wall and illumined the figures standing above: pitch and logs were flung on to the fire; and the enemy's masses came streaming through the gates. If the Romans were confused, it was only for a moment. Caesar himself was on the spot; for he had been personally superintending the workmen. Two legions were always kept under arms in front of the camp, ready for emergencies; and while some cohorts threw themselves upon the enemy, others drew back the towers out of reach of the flames or dragged asunder the woodwork of the terrace to save the hinder part of it from catching fire; others again ran to extinguish the flames. The small hours

¹ See pp. 595-7.

² See pp. 731-2.

³ See pp. 600 and 602-4, and Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, II. 359.

52 B.C.

dragged by ; and in the grey dawn the battle was still raging. The mantlets that screened the workmen who moved the towers had been burned ; and it was therefore hazardous to wheel the towers to the front.¹ More than once it seemed that the Gauls were winning ; and Caesar himself was moved to admiration by their stubborn valour. He saw a man taking lumps of fat and pitch from his comrades, and flinging them into the flames. A missile struck him ; and he fell dead. Another man stepped across his prostrate body, and took his place. He too was struck : but in a moment a third was doing his work, and presently a fourth ; and, though others had to die, the post was never deserted until the Romans finally extinguished the flames, and the Gauls, beaten at every point, were forced back into the town.

Vercingetorix knew that it was useless now to prolong the defence. He therefore sent word to the garrison to slip out in the dark and come to his camp. They were confident that the marshes would prevent the Romans from getting at them. Night came on ; and the men, gathered in the streets and open places, were just starting. Suddenly there was a rush of women : weeping, they flung themselves at their husbands' feet, and besought them not to abandon them and the children who belonged to father and mother alike to the vengeance of the Romans. Deaf to their entreaties, the men pressed on. Frantic with terror, the women screamed and gesticulated, to put the besiegers on their guard ; and the men were obliged to give way.

Storming of
Avaricum.

Next day Caesar completed the repair of the terrace, and moved forward one of the towers. Rain fell in torrents ; and noticing that the sentries on the wall were posted carelessly, he determined to deliver the assault. The workmen were told to loiter, in order to put the garrison off their guard. The troops were concealed within and in the rear of the sheds which stood upon the terrace.² Caesar harangued them, and promised rewards to those who should be the first to mount the wall. The artillerymen in the tower made play with their engines, to give their comrades every chance.³ The

¹ See p. 605.

² See pp. 732-3.

³ See *B. G.*, vii. 27, § 1 ; Stoffel, *Hist. de Jules César,—Guerre civile*, ii. 361 ; and Guischard, *Mém. mil. sur les Grecs et les Romains*, ii. 7.

signal was given. Instantly the columns, darting forth from 52 B.C. their cover, streamed over the front of the terrace and swarmed up the ladders; and, panic-stricken and confounded, the defenders were overborne and driven down on to the space below. Quickly rallying, they formed up in compact wedge-shaped masses, resolute to fight it out if they should be attacked. But the Romans were too wary to attack them. They lined the wall all round; and not a man of them would come down. Throwing away their weapons, the Gauls ran for their lives through the town to its furthest extremity; and there many, jostling one another in the narrow gateways, were slaughtered, while others, who shouldered their way out, were cut down by the cavalry. Plunder was forgotten. Exasperated by the long weariness of the siege, burning to avenge the massacre at Cenabum, the Romans slew the aged, they slew women and infants, and spared none. Some forty thousand human beings—all but eight hundred who made their way to the camp of Vercingetorix—perished on that day.

Indiscriminate
massacre.

It was late at night when the fugitives approached the camp. Vercingetorix had a turbulent host to control. They were not a regular army, but an aggregate of tribal levies, each commanded by their tribal chiefs. He had reason to fear that the pitiable plight of the fugitives might excite their emotions, and lead to disturbance and subversion of discipline. He therefore sent out his trusted friends and the leading men of the several tribes to which the fugitives belonged, who waited for them on the road, and conducted them in separate groups to their several quarters in the camp.

Next day Vercingetorix called the remnant of his people together, and made them a speech. The Romans, he said, had not beaten them in fair fight. They had merely stolen an advantage over them by superior science. As they all knew, he had never approved of defending Avaricum. But he would soon repair the loss. He would gain over all the dissentient tribes to the cause; and against an united Gaul the whole world could not stand in arms. Meanwhile he had a right to expect that in future they should adopt the Roman custom of regularly fortifying their camps.

Vercingetorix
consoles his
troops.

52 B.C.

This speech made an excellent impression. The multitude could not but admire the cheery courage of their leader: they could not but admit that the event had proved his foresight. They respected him too because he had had the courage to confront them in the hour of defeat, when another leader might not have dared to show his face. So far then from lessening, the disaster only increased the estimation in which he was held.

He raises
fresh levies.

He immediately set to work to fulfil his promise. Agents, chosen for their eloquence and tact, bore lavish bribes and still more lavish promises to the dissentient chiefs. New weapons and new clothing were provided for the survivors of the siege. New levies, including large numbers of bowmen, were speedily raised; and Tentomatus, king of the Nitobriges, who occupied the country round Agen, hastened to join Vercingetorix with his own cavalry and with others whom he had hired from the Aquitanians. Thus the losses which had been incurred at Avaricum were made good; while those who had already fought under Vercingetorix had learned a salutary lesson, and, in spite of their natural laziness and impatience of discipline, were in the humour to do or to suffer whatever he might command.

Caesar, at
the request
of the
Aedui,
decides be-
tween rival
claimants
for the
office of
Vergobret.

The hungry Romans found an abundance of corn in Avaricum; and Caesar remained there a few days to recruit their strength. Winter was just over; and he was about to open his campaign in earnest. The Gauls, in their new-born zeal, had entrenched their camp; and he was too prudent to attack their strong position: but he hoped either to lure them into the open or else to blockade and force them to surrender. Suddenly his attention was distracted by serious news from the Aedui. Two chiefs, Cotus and Convictolitavis, were contending for the first magistracy, each insisting that he had been legally elected: their retainers were up in arms; and a civil war was imminent. A deputation of leading men begged Caesar to arbitrate. He saw that it was of vital importance to prevent the weaker side from appealing for aid to Vercingetorix. Accordingly, though he was most reluctant to delay his operations, he summoned the rivals and the council to meet him at Decetia, or Décize, on the Loire. This town

was in Aeduan territory, and nearly sixty miles from Avaricum: ^{52 B.C.} but it was illegal for the Vergobret to cross the frontier; and Caesar was too wise to offer a needless slight to native custom. He was informed that Cotus had been nominated by his brother, the late Vergobret, in defiance of an Aeduan law which prescribed that no man should hold office or even sit in the senate while any member of his family who had done so survived. He accordingly settled the dispute in favour of Convictolitavis, who, as was the custom when the outgoing Vergobret failed to nominate an eligible successor, had been appointed by the Druids.¹ Before dismissing the council, he urged them to forget their differences, and told them that, if they wanted to share in the spoils of victory, they must honestly help to put down the rebellion. He should require ten thousand foot to guard his convoys, and all their cavalry. He then divided the army into two parts. Labienus was sent northward with four legions, including the two that had been left at Agedincum, to restore order in the upper valley of the Seine; while Caesar himself, with the remaining six, marched southward, up the eastern bank of the Allier, to strike a blow at Gergovia,—the heart of the rebellion.


He sends Labienus to suppress rebellion in the basin of the Seine, and marches himself to attack Gergovia.

On the hill now crowned by the cathedral of Nevers, which rises above the Loire, in the peninsula formed by its confluence with the Nièvre, was an Aeduan town called Noviodunum. Caesar had marked the strength of the position; and here he established his chief magazine.

He establishes a magazine at Noviodunum (Nevers):

Vercingetorix was still on the western bank of the Allier. As soon as he heard of Caesar's advance he broke down all the bridges. The two armies moved in full view of one another, with the river between them. The Gallic scouts were so vigilant that Caesar found it impossible to repair any of the bridges; and he began to fear that he might be barred by the river during the entire summer. But Vercingetorix had not learned the necessity of watching his rear. One

¹ The question whether the influence of the Druids was generally exerted on Caesar's side is discussed on p. 534. See also M. Camille Jullian's *Vercingetorix*, 2nd ed., 1901, pp. 107-11, and *English Historical Review*, April, 1903, p. 336.



Roman Miles

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52 B.C.
crosses the
Allier by
a strata-
gem ;

evening, Caesar encamped on a wooded spot, opposite one of the bridges. Next morning he took forty out of the sixty cohorts composing his force ; arrayed them in six divisions, so that, seen from a distance, they would look like the six legions ;¹ and ordered them to make a long march on. Vercingetorix suspected nothing. Caesar remained behind with the rest of the force, waiting for the hour when, as he calculated, the four legions and the enemy should have encamped for the night. Then he set the men whom he had kept behind, to work at the repair of the bridge. When it was finished, he made them cross over, and sent for the other cohorts. Vercingetorix, finding that he had been outwitted, and unwilling to risk a battle, hurried on southward by prodigious marches.

Caesar followed more leisurely ; and moving across the level expanse of the Limagne, found himself, early on the fifth day, approaching the mountain of Gergovia. Rising on his right front, fully twelve hundred feet above the plain, the northern face, with its upper terraces broken here and there by sheer precipices, manifestly defied attack ; and, as he moved on past the long spurs, he saw that the eastern side, steep, rugged and scored by deep ravines, was equally unassailable. Presently, observing on his left front a suitable spot for a camp, he halted near the foot of the south-eastern slope. His cavalry were soon engaged in a skirmish ; and in the afternoon he reconnoitred the stronghold from the south. The town stood on an oblong plateau, which formed the summit, extending about seven furlongs from east to west, and six hundred yards wide. The higher terraces, and also the outlying heights of Risolles, linked by a col or saddle to the south-western angle of the plateau, were bristling with the tents of the Gauls ; and the encampment was protected by a wall of loose stones, which, about half-way up the slope, ran along the whole southern side. From the very foot of the mountain, below the central point of the wall, rose a low but steep hill, now called *La Roche Blanche*, which projected southward at right angles, and terminated in an almost sheer precipice. A small stream, the *Auzon*,

¹ See pp. 733-6.

flowed eastward through the meadows which extended past ^{52 B.C.} the base of the hill; and two miles beyond the valley, on the left as one looked up the stream, the view was closed by a long ridge, the Montagne de la Serre. Beyond the heights of Risolles was the high pass of Opine, which at one point gave access to them by a comparatively easy slope, and separated them from the distant Puy Giroux.

The result of the reconnaissance was not encouraging. The ascent to the stronghold appeared less difficult on the south than on the other sides: but even on the south the ascent was not easy. Moreover, the Gauls held the whole space between the outer wall and the town; and their appearance, as Caesar remarked, was truly formidable. Even if the Romans could gain the col on the south-west, they would still be confronted by a steep though short incline. All round the plateau ran a natural glacis, to climb which, in the face of a determined enemy, would have been impossible. To assault the town was therefore evidently out of the question; and Caesar resolved to make sure of his supplies before proceeding even to blockade it. Meanwhile he pitched his camp on a low plateau north of the Auzon, about half a mile north-west of the modern village of Orcet and three thousand yards from the south-eastern corner of the town. ^{and encamps before Gergovia.}

For some days no event occurred more important than a cavalry combat. Vercingetorix kept his troopers busy; and frequent skirmishes took place in the plain between the south-eastern spurs and the Roman camp. He made the tribal chiefs repair daily to his quarters before sunrise, to furnish their reports and receive his instructions. But one detail escaped his vigilance. Caesar had detected a weak point in the enemy's position. The Roche Blanche, which commanded the only descent from the town to the rich meadows of the Auzon, was inadequately garrisoned. If only he could get possession of this hill, he would cut off the Gauls from the chief source of their supplies. The ascent on the eastern side was practicable. In the dead of night Caesar stole out of camp with two legions, drove out the startled garrison, and occupied the hill. There he constructed ^{First operations at Gergovia.}

52 B.C.

a small camp, and connected it with the larger one by a pair of parallel trenches, so that men might pass unobserved from camp to camp under cover of the ramparts formed by the excavated earth.¹ Even now, however, he had cause for anxiety; for his entire force was hardly more than five-and-twenty thousand men,—too few to invest a position fully twelve miles in extent.

Defection
of the
Aeduan
Vergobret.

Just at this time the alarming news arrived that the Aedui were on the brink of revolt. They had not embraced the cause of Rome with the same unanimity, the same resolution as the astute and far-seeing Remi. Divitiacus had been Caesar's best friend: but he had not been able to silence the anti-Roman party; and even the Caesarians were no longer staunch. If they adhered to Caesar, they would no doubt be rewarded,—if Caesar gained the day. But was it certain that he would? Vercingetorix was a formidable antagonist. He might perhaps succeed after all; and then their old rivals, the Arverni, would supplant them. If, on the other hand, they threw in their lot with him, their strength would surely turn the scale. To them would belong the glory of liberating Gaul from the invader; and then they would hold sway, not as his servile nominees, but as the champions of a great and independent confederation. Caesar had suspected them from the outset of the revolt: but the story which he now heard must have taken him by surprise. The ringleader was no other than Convictolitavis, the Vergobret, whose election he had himself secured. Vercingetorix had offered him a bribe; and he promptly responded to that most potent spur of Gallic patriotism. He in turn talked over some of the younger chiefs, and gave them part of the money. But the senate would certainly think twice before venturing to turn upon their powerful patron. The chiefs took counsel together. The infantry contingent, which Caesar had demanded, was just starting for Gergovia. A chief named Litaviccus was placed in command of it; and his brothers were sent on

An Aeduan
contingent,
marching
to join
Caesar,
persuaded
by its
leader to
declare for
Vercinge-
torix.

¹ Napoleon, *Hist. de Jules César*, ii. 271. "Si l'on s'étonnait," says Napoleon, "que les Romains eussent creusé deux petits fossés de 6 pieds de largeur chacun et de 4 pieds de profondeur, au lieu d'en faire un seul de 8 de largeur sur 6 de profondeur, ce qui aurait donné la même déblai, on répondrait que les deux petits fossés étaient bien plus vite faits qu'un seul grand fossé."

ahead to join Caesar. About half-way to Gergovia, near the ^{52 B.C.} site of the modern village of Serbannes,¹ Litaviccus halted the column, and delivered an inflammatory harangue. The troops were horrified to hear that all the Aeduan cavalry with Caesar, and among them two chiefs named Eporedorix and Viridomarus, had been massacred on a trumped-up charge of treachery. Some men, who were in the secret, came forward and swore that the story was true: they themselves, they declared, were the sole survivors of the massacre. The thoughtless Aedui drank in the lying tale and put themselves in the hands of their leader. It was settled that as soon as they reached Gergovia, they should join Vercingetorix and avenge the slaughter of their countrymen. Some Roman citizens were travelling under the Aeduan escort with grain and stores for Caesar. Litaviccus had them tortured and killed; and, before resuming his march, he sent off messengers to spread the news of the pretended massacre among the Aedui, and urge them to arm.

Rumour flew fast. The intrigue was soon known at Gergovia. Eporedorix himself came to Caesar in the middle of the night, and told the whole story. He entreated him not to allow a few wrong-headed men to drag a friendly people into revolt: if Litaviccus and the ten thousand succeeded in joining Vercingetorix, the Aeduan authorities would have no choice but to throw in their lot with them. Caesar was intensely anxious; but he did not hesitate. He determined to go and intercept the deluded infantry at once, though he knew that the large camp would, in his absence, be exposed to a most serious risk. The camp on the Roche Blanche, in the hands of a few resolute men, would be virtually impregnable.² Before starting, Caesar ordered the arrest of Litaviccus's brothers: but they had already fled. He took with him all the cavalry and four legions, leaving two only to hold the camps. The defence was entrusted to Fabius, who, two years before, had joined in the relief of Cicero. Caesar told his men that he must call upon them to make a most trying effort: but, he added, the occasion was urgent, and they would not grumble. They were in the best of

Caesar makes a forced march, overawes the contingent, and returns just in time to rescue his camp.

¹ See pp. 748-9.

² See p. 740.

52 B.C.

spirits and ready for anything. They had marched twenty-three miles down the valley of the Allier when the Aeduan column was descried. Caesar sent on the cavalry to stop them, but warned them to do violence to no man. At the same time he made Eporedorix and Viridomarus show themselves. The Aedui were overawed; and they saw that they had been duped. They grounded their arms and begged for mercy: but Litaviccus managed to escape with his retainers, and made his way to Gergovia. Caesar knew that his action was sure to be misrepresented. He therefore took the precaution of sending messengers to give the Aeduan authorities a true account of what had passed, and to impress upon them that he had treated the mutinous contingent with forbearance. Darkness was now closing in. Caesar allowed three hours for rest; and then the Aedui went back quietly with the legions. On the march a party of horsemen came to meet the column, and reported that Vercingetorix had been attacking the large camp with desperate fury. The artillery had alone enabled the little garrison to hold out; and Fabius was busily erecting breastworks upon the rampart, in view of a renewed attack. The news stimulated the tired men to do their utmost. Pressing on all through the small hours, Caesar reached the camp before sunrise, having accomplished the extraordinary march of forty-six miles in little more than twenty-four hours, just in time to avert the destruction of his exhausted legions.

Outrages of
the Aedui
against
Roman
citizens.

For the moment the danger was over. But there were unmistakable signs that the Aedui would soon go over to the rebels. The ignorant populace took for granted the truth of the news about the massacre of the cavalry. Some were exasperated; others simply rapacious. They burst open the dwellings of Roman residents, robbed them, murdered them, sold them as slaves. Convictolitavis worked upon their passions. Once they had committed themselves, he saw, they would feel that Caesar would never forgive them, and that they had everything to gain and nothing to lose by taking up arms. The Aedui took care of course to send apologies and explanations to Caesar, as soon as they heard that their contingent was in his power. The Government, they said,

had not sanctioned the outrages which had been committed: 52 B.C. the property of Litaviccus had been confiscated; and full restitution should be made. But they had tasted the sweets of plunder: they had little hope of being forgiven; and they secretly commenced preparations for war. Caesar received their envoys with all possible politeness; but he was not for a moment deceived. He doubtless wished to leave the door of repentance open for his old allies. There was perhaps just a chance that, if he affected to believe that the authorities were not responsible for the excesses of the rabble, they might be wise enough to draw back. Meanwhile he would prepare for the worst. The defection of so powerful a state would inevitably give a fresh stimulus to the rebellion; and it seemed probable that, if he delayed where he was any longer, he might find himself hemmed in. Yet, besides the humiliation of failure, to abandon the siege would of itself encourage waverers to turn against him. How was he to get away and rejoin Labienus without leaving the fatal impression that he was obliged to flee? ¹

Anxiety of
Caesar.

While he was considering this problem, he ascended the Roche Blanche in order to inspect the works of the camp. Standing upon the plateau, he noticed with astonishment that a hill forming part of the mass of Risolles was abandoned. What could this mean? Some deserters explained the mystery. Vercingetorix was greatly alarmed for the safety of the saddle which connected Risolles with Gergovia. If the Romans captured this place as well as the hill on the south which they already occupied, it would be hardly possible for foragers to get out; and the garrison would be starved into surrender. Every available man therefore had been called away to fortify the western approach to Risolles, where alone the ascent was practicable.

Caesar immediately devised a stratagem. About mid-^{He}night he sent several squadrons of cavalry up the valley of ^{attempts}to take

^{Gergovia}
^{by a coup-}
^{de-main.}
¹ "César," says M. Jullian (*Vercingetorix*, p. 204), "avait décidé-
ment commis une faute en réconciliant les deux partis éduens; s'il les avait laissés
se battre, il aurait été certain d'en avoir un pour allié." Perhaps the event
may have convinced Caesar that he had made a mistake: but his aim had
been to keep the Aedui wholly on his side; and I am not sure that, on the
information before him, he did wrong to interfere.

52 B.C.

the Auzon, whence they struck off to the left and moved along the slopes of the Montagne de la Serre, as though they intended to make for the pass of Opme. In obedience to orders they moved with a show of excitement and made a noise, in order to attract attention. At daybreak a number of baggage-drivers, equipped to look like troopers, rode after them. One of the legions followed, and, after advancing a short distance, moved down towards the Auzon, and concealed itself in a wood. Vercingetorix, who, from his commanding position, could discern these movements, became thoroughly alarmed, and sent the rest of his forces to push on the work of fortification. Now was Caesar's opportunity. He made the soldiers move in small parties, so that they might not be observed, from the larger camp to the foot of the Roche Blanche.¹ Some cohorts of the 13th legion were detailed for the protection of the smaller camp; while the 10th was to remain as a reserve under Caesar's personal command. When all was ready, he explained his plans to his generals. The ground, he said, being so unfavourable, he did not want to fight a battle, but to effect a surprise: their one chance of success was to ascend with all possible speed; and he particularly warned them not to allow the men, in their eagerness for plunder, to get out of hand. Once in possession of the camps, he doubtless hoped that they would have time to cut off the Gallic troops from the town.

The legions were formed up on nearly level ground, on the right of the Roche Blanche. Their path ascended a hollow or gentle depression. From where they stood the actual distance to the town was rather more than two thousand yards; while the place which the Gauls were fortifying was barely five furlongs from the nearest gate. The legionaries advanced rapidly until they came to the outer wall: over it they clambered, and took possession of three of the camps. The few men who had been left in them fled up the hill. The king of the Nitiobriges, roused from his siesta, had but just time to spring up half naked,

¹ Though Caesar does not say so, I suppose that a sufficient force was left to hold the large camp and protect the baggage.

scramble on to his horse and gallop away. Caesar was with ^{52 B.C.} the 10th legion on the hill-side, on the right of the valley by which the column had ascended. Perhaps he had reason to believe that it would be impossible to follow up his advantage: possibly he intended to re-form the scattered legionaries, retain possession of the camps, and force Vercingetorix to fight: anyhow he made his trumpeter sound the recall.¹ Separated from him by the valley, the troops did not hear the blast of the trumpet, and, heedless of the commands of their officers, pressed on still higher up the slope, close to the southern gate of the town. A centurion, named Lucius Fabius, had reminded his comrades of the rewards which Caesar had offered before the assault of Avaricum, and boasted that no one should get into Gergovia before him. He was hoisted on to the wall by three of his men, and then hauled them up in turn. A cry of terror rose from the town. The women threw down money and clothes to satisfy the soldiers, and, craning over with bare breasts and outstretched hands, besought them not to treat them as they had treated the women and children at Avaricum; while many in the distant parts of the town, fancying that the Romans were inside, ran for their lives. Now, however, the men who had been engaged in fortifying Risolles, hearing the uproar and stimulated by a succession of messengers, came hurrying back and formed up at the foot of the wall. The women held up their little ones in their arms and screamed to their men-folk to fight for them. Standing high above them, these dense and ever-growing masses were too much for the tired legionaries; and they had to fight desperately to hold their ground. Anxiously watching the struggle, Caesar sent an order to Sextius, the officer whom he had left in command of the smaller camp, to lead out his cohorts and form them up at the foot of Gergovia, so that, in case the legions were repulsed, he might fall upon the right flank of their pursuers. He himself moved with the 10th a little nearer to the outer wall. Meanwhile the panic in the town had subsided. The centurion and the soldiers who had got in first were killed,

¹ See pp. 211-14.

52 B.C.

and their bodies pitched over the wall. Another centurion, Marcus Petronius, while attempting to hew down one of the gates, was surrounded and severely wounded. The men of his company had followed him. "I cannot save myself and you too," he cried: "but I led you into danger, and so help me Heaven, I'll save you. You have your chance: use it!" With these words, he flung himself into the thick of the enemy, killed two of them, and beat off the rest from the gate. His men rallied round him. "It's useless," he cried: "I am dying: you cannot help me. Go while you can, and return to your legion." Fighting to the last, Petronius fell: but he saved his men.

The attack
repulsed
with heavy
loss.

The battle was still raging when the Romans caught sight of a column moving over the shoulder of the hill on their right flank. It was the Aedui, whom Caesar had sent up the eastern slope, in support of the attack: but the Romans, deceived by their armour, took them for enemies: the Gauls were closing in upon them on every side; and now thoroughly unnerved, they were hurled back, and fled headlong down the valley. Blindly pursuing them, the Gauls were roughly checked, on right and left, by the cohorts of Sextius, and by the 10th, who had moved lower down the hill. As soon as they reached level ground, the runaways halted and faced the enemy, who then moved off: but forty-six centurions and nearly seven hundred private lay dead upon the hill.¹

Caesar
marches
to rejoin
Labienus.

Next day Caesar assembled the troops, and lectured them severely for their disobedience. He admired their spirit, he told them: but discipline was as necessary to a soldier as courage; and it was the height of presumption in them to imagine that they knew how to gain a victory better than their general. At the same time they must not be disheartened; for they had only been beaten because they had been rash enough to fight on unfavourable ground. To give effect to his words, he formed them up in line of battle on the most advantageous ground which he could select: but Vercingetorix naturally refused to walk into the trap. On that day, however, and the next, there were slight cavalry skirmishes, in which the Romans had the advantage. Then,

¹ Regarding the operations at Gergovia, see pp. 738-48, and App. G.

feeling that he had done enough to abate the exultation of the enemy and restore the confidence of his men, Caesar abandoned the siege, and marched once more down the valley of the Allier.¹

The situation was serious indeed. The Gauls had found out that he was not invincible. For the first time in all these years he had been beaten; and his defeat would inevitably weaken his prestige and act like a tonic upon the spirits of his enemies. Fortunately Vercingetorix did not venture to pursue him. On the third day of his retreat he repaired one of the bridges over the Allier. He had only just recrossed the river when Eporedorix and Viridomarus told him that Litaviccus had left Gergovia with the Gallic cavalry, and gone to recruit for Vercingetorix among the Aedui. Might they go too? It was of the last importance that they should reach home first, so that they might persuade their brother chiefs to return to their allegiance while there was yet time. Caesar was convinced that the Aedui were lost irretrievably, and he believed that the departure of the chiefs would precipitate the rupture: still he thought it best to let them go, as it would be wiser not to betray any anxiety or give the slightest ground for saying that he had treated his allies as enemies. When they took their leave, he reminded them of all that he had done for their people, and made a last earnest appeal to their loyalty. It is just possible that they may have meant what they said: but when they reached Noviodunum, and found that the Vergobret and the council had definitely declared for Vercingetorix, they saw their opportunity. Two or three days after their departure, Caesar learned that they had seized Noviodunum, where all his hostages, a quantity of his baggage, his stores, treasure and

His critical position.

Eporedorix and Viridomarus seize Noviodunum, and try to prevent Caesar from crossing the Loire.

¹ "La défaite," says M. Julian (*Vercingetorix*, p. 216), "qu'il venait de subir n'était pas due seulement à la faiblesse de ses effectifs et de ses positions. Elle était la conclusion de cet entêtement continu qui l'avait arrêté pendant un mois devant une ville imprenable, usant les forces de ses soldats dans l'illusion avant de les briser contre les murailles." But what ought Caesar to have done? I doubt whether he could have declined, without serious loss of prestige, to follow Vercingetorix to Gergovia; and he could not safely leave the stronghold without making some effort to take it. If there had been no Gergovia, there would have been no Alesia.

52 B.C.

cavalry remounts were collected, plundered and burned it to the ground, sent off all his hostages to Bibracte, thrown into the river all the corn which they could not carry away, and massacred the slender garrison and the Italian traders who had settled in the town.¹ Cavalry were scouring the country to cut off his supplies, and infantry threatening to prevent him from crossing the Loire. The water, swollen by the melting of the mountain snows, was rushing like a torrent. Caesar saw that the crisis of the war had come. The Aeduan infantry had deserted him. The Arverni, elated by their victory, were on his rear: on his left the Bituriges, exasperated by the bitter memory of Avaricum: the perfidious Aedui barred the road in front. His chief magazine was destroyed; and his supplies were fast running out. The Province itself was insufficiently protected. The object of the Aedui was to hem him in between the Allier and the Loire, and there starve him into surrender; or if, in desperation, he should make a dash for the Province, to cut him off from the easier way over the Loire, and drive him back towards the Cevennes into the clutches of Vercingetorix. Retreat, however, was not to be thought of: with the mountains barring the way, it would be very difficult as well as disgraceful; and above all, he could not leave Labienus and his four legions to perish.² At all costs, he must reach the Loire before the Aedui had had time to assemble in strength. They had not burned their granaries in accordance with Vercingetorix's plan; and he might perhaps get supplies in their country. Night and day he marched till he reached the river a few miles south of Nevers.³ Some troopers rode to look for a ford, and found one which was just practicable, the water being breast-high. The cavalry rode into the river, and formed a line from bank

He saves himself by a series of extraordinary marches.


¹ Merivale's narrative of this episode (*History of the Romans under the Empire*, ii. 57 [cabinet ed.]) is remarkable. He says that Caesar "arrived in front of Noviodunum in time to hear the last crash of the sinking bridge, and to see the devouring flames rise triumphantly behind it." Now *after* Caesar heard that Noviodunum had been burned, he made a series of forced marches in order to reach the Loire. Yet, when he reached it, according to Merivale, he found the fire still blazing and the bridge still falling! There is not a word in the *Commentaries* about a bridge at Noviodunum; and there is no evidence that Caesar went to Noviodunum at all after its destruction. See p. 755.

² See pp. 750-55.

³ See p. 755.

LABIENUS'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST CAMULOGENTUS.

Notes, page 129



Scale 1:630,000 (nearly 10 miles to 1 inch)
Kilometres Roman Miles

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to bank, to break the force of the current :¹ then the infantry, ^{52 B.C.} holding their weapons above their heads, waded across the stream. Once more Caesar was saved by his marvellous speed. The Aedui were so confounded by his unexpected arrival that they fled without attempting to hinder the passage : the soldiers took all the grain and all the cattle that they needed ; and the army marched on towards the valley of the Yonne to succour Labienus.


That officer meanwhile was in great peril. Leaving the heavy baggage at Agedincum in charge of the recruits who had accompanied Caesar from Italy, he had marched with his four legions down the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, for Lutetia, the capital of the Parisii. Master of this central position, he would be able to overawe those old offenders, the Senones and the Carnutes. A large force assembled to oppose him. Their leader was Camulogenus, an Aulercau from the neighbourhood of Evreux, who, though weighed down by extreme old age, was looked up to as a soldier of extraordinary skill. On the approach of the Romans, he encamped on the edge of a far-reaching morass, about twenty miles south of Paris, through which the Essonne crept sluggishly to join the Seine. Labienus tried to construct a causeway across the slush : but finding this impossible in the face of the enemy, he silently quitted his camp in the night ; marched back as far as Metiosedum, or Melun, a town standing on an island in the Seine ; seized some fifty barges and rapidly lashed them together ; threw a detachment across ; chased away the panic-stricken inhabitants : repaired the bridge, which they had demolished ; transported his army to the opposite bank ; and then moved down the valley in the direction whence he had come. The townsmen who had fled from Metiosedum hurried with the news to Camulogenus. He at once sent messengers to order the destruction of Lutetia, and then moved northward from the marsh. The barges accompanied the Roman column ; and with their aid Labienus crossed the Marne. Lutetia was

Labienus's
campaign
against the
Parisii.

¹ I am inclined to infer from a passage in the *Civil War* (*B. C.*, i. 64, §§ 5-6) that the cavalry may have been formed in two lines, one above the infantry, the other below, to rescue any soldiers who might be carried off their feet.

LABIENUS'S CAMPAIGN AGAIN

To face page 129



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52 B.C.

built upon the island in the Seine on which now stands the cathedral of Nôtre Dame. When Labienus arrived, the bridges had been broken down and the town burned to the ground. He encamped just opposite the island; and the enemy established themselves over against his army on the southern bank.

Just at this time the news arrived that Caesar had been forced to retreat from Gergovia, and that the Aedui had joined the rebellion. The story lost nothing in the telling. Labienus was dependent on Gallic peasants for his information; and their statements were positive. Caesar had tried to cross the Loire and had failed. He could get no supplies. He was in full retreat for the Province. The Bellovaci immediately rose in arms. Labienus found himself threatened by this warlike people on the north-east: on the south the Parisii and their allies confronted him; while the broad flood of the Seine separated him from his base at Agedincum. Back to that town he must somehow find his way; for he saw that, in his altered circumstances, it would be folly to think of an offensive campaign. But how to return? That was a problem that would tax all the force of his mind; and, as Caesar said, who so appreciated his worth, he knew that he must rely upon the force of his own mind alone. He might have gone, as he had come, by the right bank of the Seine: but he had never yet fled before the face of an enemy; and to flee at such a crisis would shatter the enfeebled prestige of the Roman arms. Besides, to reach Agedincum, he must, sooner or later, recross the river; and, hurry as he might, cross where he would, the enemy would be there to dispute his passage. There was nothing for it but to cross there and then by some skilful stratagem; and, if he must fight, to clear the way by victory.

In the evening he assembled his officers, and urged them to carry out his instructions to the letter. The barges were lying under the bank, ready for use. A number of small boats were also collected. Labienus placed each of the barges under the charge of an officer, and ordered them to drop down the stream about ten o'clock for a distance of four miles, and there await his arrival. He left half a legion to protect the

camp; sent the other half with the baggage-train up the ^{52 B.C.} bank; and ordered the boats to be rowed alongside of them with a loud splashing of oars. Soon after midnight he moved stealthily in the opposite direction with his remaining legions, till he came to the spot where the barges were waiting, near the southern end of the Bois de Boulogne. A furious storm was sweeping over the valley; and in the rush and roar of wind and rain the enemy's outposts were surprised and cut down; and the troops were ferried across the river. The stratagem, however, only partially succeeded. About day-break messengers hurried one after another into the Gallic encampment, and reported that there was a great uproar in the Roman camp, soldiers tramping and oars splashing up the stream, barges crossing below. Camulogenus was perplexed. He fancied that the Romans were crossing the river in three places, and would soon be in full retreat. Sending a small detachment in the direction of Metiosedum, and leaving another to watch the Roman camp, he marched in person against Labienus.

It was about half an hour before sunrise. The Roman general harangued his troops. He reminded them of the glorious victories which they had won in the past, and told them that he expected them to fight as they would have fought if Caesar had been there to command them. The Gallic left broke before the first charge: but the right fought with extraordinary resolution; and for a long time the issue was doubtful. The aged Camulogenus was in the forefront of the battle, cheering on his men. At length, however, the victorious Roman right fell upon their rear. Even then not a man would give way: but all were surrounded and slain. Camulogenus shared their fate. The troops which had been detached to watch the Roman camp hurried to the rescue, and established themselves on the hill of Mont Parnasse: but they were speedily dislodged. The runaways from the left wing who failed to reach the woods were cut to pieces by the horse. The road to Agedincum was again open. Labienus returned thither to take up the heavy baggage; and thence marched southward to rejoin Caesar.¹

He extricates himself from a perilous position by victory;

and marches to rejoin Caesar.

¹ See pp. 753-66.

52 B.C.
The rebellion stimulated by the adhesion of the Aedui.

They claim the direction of the war.

Vercingetorix re-elected Commander-in-Chief by a general council.

His plan of campaign.

Still the rebellion was rapidly gaining ground. The defection of the Aedui was a turning-point in the war. Other tribes were won over by their influence and their gold. Waverers they terrified by threatening to put to death the hostages whom Caesar had left at Noviodunum. But discord and jealousy even now made themselves felt. The Aedui asked Vercingetorix to come to them and concert operations; and he readily consented. Forthwith they claimed the right of directing the campaign: but their demand was disputed; and a general assembly was convened at Bibracte to settle the question. The Remi and the Lingones, who steadily adhered to the stronger side, and the Treveri, who were themselves hard pressed by the Germans, alone failed to appear. All the other tribes, even the most distant, sent their representatives to the mountain city. It was the supreme moment in the life of Vercingetorix. A few weeks before, while they were still smarting under defeat, he had told his men that he would win over the rest of Gaul to the cause, and that against an united Gaul the whole world could not stand in arms. And now his promise seemed about to be fulfilled. With a fraction of the people he had vanquished the invincible conqueror; and the whole people was rallying to his side. The question was put to the vote; and, without one dissentient, the representatives of the Gallic nation chose Vercingetorix as their General. Bitterly chagrined, the Aedui repented the rashness with which they had flung aside the friendship of the Romans: but it was too late now to draw back.

Vercingetorix determined to adhere to his original plan of campaign. His infantry were sufficient for a guerilla warfare; and he contented himself with levying fifteen thousand horse from his new allies. Relying on his superiority in this arm, he intended simply to cut off his enemy's supplies; and once more he appealed to his countrymen to destroy their crops and burn their granaries that they might achieve their liberty. He forced the peoples who had just joined the movement to give hostages for their fidelity. That he might have a stronghold to retreat to in case of necessity, he fortified and provisioned Alesia, a town belonging to the Mandubii,

which covered the plateau of Mont Auxois, in the highlands of Côte-d'Or. But he intended also to carry the war into the enemy's country. The Roman Province was a tempting prize. If he could seize it or could seduce the Provincials to join him, would not the triumph of his cause be assured? He hounded on the neighbours¹ of the Helvii and the Volcae Arecomici to attack them; and, believing that the Allobroges were still smarting under the punishment which Rome had inflicted upon them a few years before, he sent envoys to bribe the chiefs and to hold out to the government the prospect of supremacy over the Province, and raised a levy of ten thousand Aeduians to coerce them if persuasion should fail.

He hounds on the neighbours of the Provincial tribes to attack them.

It was a master-stroke; and Caesar knew that, if it succeeded, he would be in extreme peril. Everything depended upon the Allobroges. They had been badly treated by former Governors; and before Caesar entered Gaul they had been the most disaffected subjects of Rome. But Caesar had rescued them from the Helvetii: he had distinguished two of their leading men, who had rendered him signal services, by special marks of favour;² and, doubtless by the exercise of his unerring tact, he had taught them to believe that his cause was theirs.³ The Province was fairly satisfied with Roman rule. The Allobroges guarded the fords of the Rhône and presented an impenetrable front to the enemy;⁴ while ten thousand men, raised in the Province itself and commanded by Lucius Caesar, a kinsman of the Governor,

¹ The Gabali, Arverni, Ruteni and Cadurci.

² *B. C.*, iii. 59, § 3.

³ Mr. W. H. Hall (*The Romans on the Riviera and the Rhône*, 1898, pp. 132-4) does well to emphasise the importance of the loyalty of the Allobroges, if he somewhat exaggerates the evils that would have resulted from their disaffection: but, trusting to the authority of a Monsieur J. J. Pitot (*Recherches sur les antiquités dauphinoises*, 1833), he makes certain statements as to the steps which Caesar had taken to safeguard the Province, for which there is no evidence.

⁴ Merivale, setting Caesar's testimony at defiance and yet appealing to it in a footnote, says that the Allobroges "took measures to defend the points at which the upper Rhône could be crossed, so as to anticipate any attempt the proconsul might make to regain the Province in that direction."—*History of the Romans under the Empire*, vol. ii., 1850, pp. 27-8.

52 B.C.

were posted at various points along the threatened frontier. The Helvii, however, who risked a battle, were defeated with heavy loss and driven into their strongholds. Meanwhile Caesar contrived a plan for counteracting the enemy's superiority in cavalry. No reinforcements could be expected from the Province; for the roads were blocked. He therefore sent across the Rhine to the tribes which he had reduced to submission,¹ and procured from them numbers of horsemen with their attendant light infantry, who eagerly welcomed the chance of sharing in the plunder of Gaul. But the German horses, though hardy, were small and light; and Caesar saw that his new allies would be at a disadvantage when they encountered Vercingetorix's well-mounted troopers in the shock of battle. He therefore remounted them on the horses of his tribunes and body-guard and of the time-expired centurions and legionaries who, on his invitation, had volunteered for service, and were accordingly privileged to ride on the march.


Caesar
enlists
German
cavalry.

Hemarches
to succour
the Pro-
vince.

Some weeks had passed since Caesar had rejoined Labienus. The meeting had taken place on the south of Agedincum, near the confluence of the Armançon and the Yonne; and, as Agedincum itself had been abandoned, the united army took up its quarters not far from Troyes, among the friendly Lingones.² It was the most convenient breathing-place that Caesar could have found. The Remi, steadily loyal to him and steadily false to their countrymen, were close by on the north, to support him and to receive his support: the Aedui were on the south; and, while he was near enough to watch their movements, he could collect fresh stores and rest his troops in comparative security. But the Province was still threatened; and he saw that he must march to its relief. Probably he intended also to reinforce his troops there, and then to return and make an end of the rebellion. Accordingly he moved down the valley of the Tille, intending to cross the Saône near St. Jean-de-Losne, and take the road through the country of the Sequani. Vercingetorix with his infantry and his fresh hosts of horsemen moved off from Alesia to intercept him, and took up a position behind a

¹ See p. 215.

² See pp. 766-70.



stream, not far from Dijon,¹ about ten miles south of the spot 52 B.C. where the Romans were encamped. He made up his mind to risk an action, although, only a few weeks before, he had declared that he would not tempt fortune; so much harder is it to pursue than to adopt a wise plan of campaign. It would be rash, however, to affirm that he consciously departed from his original resolution.² He did not contemplate a regular engagement. He was proud of his own cavalry; and he was perhaps ignorant that Caesar had been reinforced by those doughty squadrons from beyond the Rhine. The legions were of course too strong to be attacked: but they were hampered by an immense baggage-train; and they must either lose precious time in defending it, or abandon it at the cost of their honour, nay of their means of subsistence. He would draw up his infantry in front of his encampment, to encourage his cavalry and overawe the Romans. If he allowed Caesar to reach the Province, he would soon come back stronger than ever; and then all hope of liberating Gaul would be at an end. Such, we are told, were the arguments by which he tried to animate his officers. With one voice they cried, in an outburst of enthusiasm, that every man must be sworn, by a solemn oath, to ride twice through the enemy's ranks, or never again be admitted to hearth and home, never again be suffered to come nigh unto father or mother or wife or child. Vercingetorix assented; and the oath was taken. Next morning the Roman column was discerned. Vercingetorix ranged his infantry in front of his encampment, in an imposing array; while the cavalry swept down upon the Roman vanguard and on either flank. Caesar was surprised as completely as in the battle on the Sambre. The lie of the ground had prevented him from discerning the approach of the Gauls; and, marching securely through a friendly country, he had neglected to send out scouts. He made his dispositions, however, with his usual calmness. He sent his cavalry, in three divisions, to repel the triple attack; and the legions formed a hollow square outside the baggage,

Vercingetorix attacks Caesar's cavalry,

¹ See pp. 771-81. The exact position of the battle-field cannot be ascertained. In the note referred to I have, I think, proved that it was in the neighbourhood of Dijon.

² See p. 771.

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and re-
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Alesia
(Mont
Auxois).

ready to support them if they were hard pressed.¹ For a time the Gauls had a slight advantage: but the legions prevented them from following it up. At length from a hill on the Roman right the German horse came thundering down on their flank; and the battle was won. The Gauls galloped for their lives: the infantry, passive spectators of the slaughter, fell back upon their camps; and Vercingetorix, ordering his baggage-drivers to follow him, hastened westward towards Alesia. With his beaten force he could not keep the field, lest his disheartened followers should fall away and disperse.² Either he must submit to the fate of Ambiorix, or he must again plant himself in a stronghold and defy his enemy to dislodge him. But Caesar was pressing upon his rear; and at nightfall, when the pursuit ceased, three thousand of the fugitives were slain.

Next day the Romans arrived at Alesia, where Vercingetorix was preparing to make his final stand. The column descended a valley closed on the right and the left by the hills of Bussy and Pevenel. On their left front, connected with Pevenel by a broad neck of land, rose a hill, much lower than Gergovia, but still too steep to be taken by assault. The Gauls were swarming on the eastern slope, beneath the scarpd rocks of the plateau, on which stood the town; and Vercingetorix had made them build a wall and dig a ditch to protect their encampment. Just at their feet the legions saw a stream, the Oze, winding like a steely thread through the greenery that fringed the north of the hill; and beyond its southern side, parallel to the Oze, but invisible, flowed the little river Ozerain. Moving down past the hill of Réa, the soldiers came to a miniature plain, which extended, three miles in length, beneath the western slope of Alesia, and was

¹ To effect this formation, if, as Napoleon infers from *B. G.*, ii. 17, § 2, each legion was separated on the march from the one that followed it by a baggage-train (see p. 53, *supra*), would of course have required a considerable time; and M. Masquelez may perhaps be right in inferring that the army was marching "en plusieurs colonnes séparées par des intervalles dans lesquels Jules César fit entrer les bagages." *Spectateur militaire*, 2^e sér., t. xlvii., 1864, p. 54. Caesar's statement (*Consistit agmen; impedimenta intra legiones recipiuntur* [*B. G.*, vii. 67, § 3]) leaves it doubtful whether one square was formed, or more.

² See pp. 781-2.

bounded on its further side by a range of heights: the river Brenne, which received the waters of the Oze and the Ozerain, meandered through it from south to north; and beyond the Ozerain the steep declivities of Flavigny completed the zone of hills.

Caesar harangued his troops and encouraged them to brace themselves for a toilsome effort. As it was evident that the place could not be taken except by a blockade, he drew a line of investment, fully ten miles in length, along which a ring of camps was constructed. Those intended for the cavalry were on low ground,—three in the plain and one in the valley of the Rabutin, which entered the Oze from the north. The rest were strongly placed upon the slopes of the outlying hills. Close to the camps redoubts or blockhouses, twenty-three in all, were thrown up; and strong piquets were placed in them, to guard against any sudden sortie.

Soon after the commencement of the works, Vercingetorix sent all his cavalry down the hill; and a desperate combat was fought in the western plain. Caesar's Gallic and Spanish horse were soon in trouble; and he sent his Germans to reinforce them. The legions were drawn up in front of their camps, to deter the enemy's foot from attempting a sortie. The Gauls were beaten, and galloped back along the valleys of the Oze and the Ozerain, hotly pursued by the Germans: but the gates of the camp being too narrow, many of the thronging fugitives were cut down; while others threw themselves off their horses and tried to scramble over the wall. The legions, by Caesar's order, moved forward a little. The Gauls inside the wall were smitten with panic: "To arms," they cried, "to arms": many of them fled helter-skelter up the hill-side; and Vercingetorix was obliged to shut the gates of the town, for fear the camp should be left unprotected.

He saw with dismay that the toils were closing around him. He had never expected that Caesar, who had failed so ignominiously at Gergovia, would be strong enough to attempt a systematic blockade. But there were now ten legions instead of six;¹ and wherever he looked, over the

Caesar
invests
Alesia.

The Gallic
cavalry
make a
sortie, but
are beaten.

Vercinge-
torix sends
them out
to fetch
succour.

¹ See pp. 782-3.

52 B.C.

plain or down in the valleys, there were soldiers at work with axe or spade. There was nothing for it but to appeal to the whole Gallic people to extricate him from the trap in which he was caught. The ring of redoubts was not yet complete: the Romans were far too few to blockade the whole circuit of the mountain; and the cavalry might perhaps steal out in the dark without attracting notice. He charged them to go, each to his own country, and bring back with them every man who could wield a sword. He reminded them of all that he had done for the good cause, and adjured them not to abandon him to the vengeance of the Romans. Everything depended on their using all speed: if they left him to perish, the whole garrison would perish with him. By reducing the rations, he reckoned that he might make the provisions last a little over a month. Silently up each river valley sped the shadowy cavalcade, until it was lost to view.

Caesar constructs lines of contravallation and circumvallation.

Caesar learned the whole story from some deserters. Its only effect was to stimulate his inventive genius. If he could keep the army of Vercingetorix from breaking out, he could also keep the relieving force from breaking in. The most vulnerable part of his position was the open meadow on the western side of the mountain. Across this expanse, from the Oze to the Ozerain, a trench was dug, twenty feet wide with perpendicular sides to prevent the enemy from attacking the troops while they were constructing the proper works. About four hundred yards behind the ends of this trench, but bending outwards, was traced the line of contravallation, which was prolonged so as to surround Alesia, and ran along the lower slopes of the encircling hills and across the valley of the Rabutin. First of all, two parallel trenches were dug, each fifteen feet wide and eight feet deep, the outer of which extended only across the plain, while the inner, embracing the whole circuit of the hill, was filled, where the level permitted, with water drawn from the Ozerain and the Rabutin. Just behind the outer trench, and also behind that portion of the other which encompassed the rest of the position, a rampart was erected, surmounted by a palisade, with an embattled fence of wattle-work in front, from the

bottom of which projected stout forked branches. The combined height of rampart and palisade was twelve feet. Wooden towers were erected upon the western section of the rampart at intervals of eighty feet, and also at certain points along the rest of the contravallation.

To repel the reinforcements for which Vercingetorix had sent, a line of works somewhat similar to these, forming the circumvallation, was traced along the heights of Flavigny, Pevenel and Bussy, and across the intervening valleys and the plain. The circuit of this line was fully ten miles.

But even these works were not deemed sufficient. The Gauls made frequent and furious sallies. Comparatively few of the Romans were available as combatants; for many had to go in quest of corn and timber, while others were labouring on the works. Caesar therefore invented various subsidiary defences. Ditches, five feet deep, were dug just inside the large moat that was filled with water; and five rows of strong boughs were fixed in each, with one end protruding above ground, sharpened and with the branches projecting so as to form a kind of abatis. In front of them and rising a few inches above the ground, but purposely concealed by brushwood, were sharp pointed logs embedded in small pits. In front of these again, concealed, but barely concealed, beneath the turf, were barbed spikes fixed in pieces of wood. Fringed by these formidable defences, Caesar expected that contravallation and circumvallation would be alike impregnable.

Nevertheless, the struggle was likely to be prolonged; and it would certainly tax to the utmost the endurance and the fighting power of the men. As soon as the relieving army should arrive, the Romans would be hemmed in between two desperate enemies. Every moment for preparation was precious. Flying parties scoured the country for corn and provender: but they could not collect a sufficient supply; and the rations had to be reduced.¹ Every day—even by night, when the moon was up, or in the glow of the watch-fires—the besieged could see the indefatigable legionaries labouring to finish their works before the time for the great hazard should arrive.

¹ Cf. *Caes., B. C.*, iii. 47, § 6.

52 B.C.

Meanwhile Vercingetorix had abandoned his camp, and withdrawn the troops who occupied it into the town. He took every precaution to husband his scanty resources. He ordered the whole of the grain to be thrown into one common stock and brought to him for safe keeping; and he let it be known that disobedience would be punished with death. From time to time each man received his scanty ration. Meat was tolerably abundant; for the Mandubii had driven large numbers of cattle into the stronghold.

Organisa-
tion of an
army of
relief.

The appeal of Vercingetorix had meanwhile been answered. A council of chieftains met to consider the situation. Vercingetorix, in his great need, had asked for an universal levy: but the cooler judgement of the council rejected his demand. So vast a multitude would become unmanageable; and it would be impossible to find food for so many mouths.¹ It was resolved, therefore, to call upon each tribe for a limited contingent. The summons was obeyed with alacrity; and from north and south and east and west, from the Seine, the Loire and the Garonne, from the marshes of the Scheldt and the Sambre and the mountains of the Vosges and the Cevennes, from the Channel and the Atlantic Ocean, horse and foot came swarming to save the hero of Gaul. But even in this supreme moment, in one instance, tribal jealousy prevailed over patriotism. The Bellovaci peremptorily refused to send a single man. They intended, they said, to attack Caesar on their own account, and had no intention of being dictated to by any one. They consented, however, as a personal favour to Commius, king of the Atrebates, who had great influence with them, to despatch a small contingent. Four generals were chosen; for, except Vercingetorix himself, there was no one leader of sufficient eminence to command universal confidence. And, as if this weakening of authority were not enough, the generals were fettered by civil commissioners, whose instructions they were to follow in the conduct of the campaign. One of the four was Commius, who had, in former years, rendered good service to Caesar, but was now swept away on the wave of patriotic enthusiasm. He had indeed good reason to abhor the Roman name. Just before

¹ See p. 800.

the outbreak of the rebellion, Labienus had discovered that 52 B.C. he was conspiring against Caesar, and had sent the tribune Volusenus to assassinate him. He escaped with a wound; and now he saw a prospect of taking his revenge. His brother generals were Eporedorix and Viridomarus, representing the Aedui, and Vercassivellaunus, a cousin of Vergingetorix. The vast host mustered in the country of the Aedui, eight thousand horsemen and nearly two hundred and fifty thousand foot, and marched for Alesia in the certain confidence of victory.

By this time the garrison were in great straits. Their Famine in Alesia. grain was all consumed.¹ Day after day they strained their eyes, trying to catch a glimpse of the relieving army: but there was never a sign. At length the chieftains called a council of war. Some advised surrender: others were clamorous for a grand sortie: but one proposal equalled in atrocity the worst that has been told of Jerusalem or Samaria. An Arvernian chieftain, called Critognatus, reminded his hearers that their fathers, when driven into their fastnesses Critognatus proposes cannibalism. by the Cimbri and Teutoni, had sustained life by feeding upon the flesh of those who were useless for warfare; and he urged that, to give the garrison strength to hold out to the last against the tyrants who made war only to enslave, this glorious precedent should be followed. Finally it was decided that all who were too old, too young, or too feeble to fight should be expelled from the town; that those who remained should try every expedient before having recourse to the desperate remedy of Critognatus; but that, if the relieving army failed to arrive in time, they should even follow his counsel rather than surrender. Accordingly the The fate of the Mandubii. Mandubii, to whom the town belonged, were compelled to depart, with their wives and children. They presented themselves before the Roman lines. Many of them were weeping. They piteously begged the soldiers to receive them as slaves, —only give them something to eat. To grant their prayer was impossible; and a line of guards, whom Caesar posted on the rampart, forbade any attempt to escape.

¹ According to Napoleon I. (*Précis des guerres de César*, 1836, p. 110), more than 50 days must have elapsed between the departure of Vergingetorix's cavalry and the arrival of the relieving army.

52 B.C.

Arrival of
the army
of relief.

But suspense was nearly at an end. It was just after the expulsion of the Mandubii when the anxious watchers on the hill saw, moving over the plain, a multitude of cavalry. The infantry were on the heights of Mussy-la-Fosse behind. In a fever of exultation men ran to and fro, exchanging congratulations. The garrison descended the hill, prepared for a sortie. Vercingetorix had forgotten nothing. His men were provided with fascines for filling up the trenches, and movable huts to protect their approach. Soon a fierce combat of horse was raging over the plain. The legionaries were posted, ready for emergencies, along the outer and the inner lines. Archers were scattered among the Gallic ranks; and the arrows fell so thick and fast that scores of wounded horsemen were seen riding off the field. Every man fought like a hero; for they knew that from the heights around friends and enemies alike were anxiously watching. The numbers of the Gauls began to tell; and their countrymen, behind and before, encouraged them by loud yells. All through the afternoon the battle raged uncertain. But towards sunset the ever-victorious Germans charged in a compact body, and threw the division opposed to them into disorder: the archers were exposed and killed: the rout was general; and the besieged who had sallied forth turned in despair, and reascended the hill.

The final
struggle.

But Commius and his brother generals were still hopeful. Next day their men were hard at work, making fascines and scaling ladders for a grand assault on the Roman lines. About midnight they quitted their camp, and moved in silence across the plain. As they approached the works, they raised a simultaneous shout, to put the besieged on the alert; and, as they flung their fascines into the ditch, the trumpet was heard, calling the garrison to arms. Stones flew from slings: arrows whizzed through the air; and, though the Romans too plied their slings, and supports hurried from the neighbouring redoubts to the relief of any point that was too hardly pressed, the enemy were too many for them, and they suffered heavily: but when those ghost-like companies rushed in to storm the rampart, they trod upon the spikes, or, stumbling into the holes, impaled them-

selves on the pointed logs, while heavy pikes were hurled ^{52 B.C.} down from the towers into the seething multitude. The Roman artillery made great havoc. The losses on either side were very heavy; for they were fighting in the dark, and shields were of little use. Towards dawn the Gauls retreated, fearing an attack in flank; and the besieged, who had lost much valuable time in attempting to cross the inner trench, went back before they could strike a blow.

One more chance remained. The leaders of the relieving army questioned the rustics about the lie of the ground on the north and the nature of the Roman defences. Mont Réa, which bounded the plain and rose above the further bank of the Oze, extended so far to the north that Caesar had not been able to enclose it in his line of circumvallation.¹ On the southern slope, close to the stream, stood one of the Roman camps. It was held by two legions—perhaps about eight thousand men—under Reginus and Caninius. In order to avoid observation, it would be necessary to approach the camp by a wide détour. The Gauls sent scouts to reconnoitre. It appeared that Mont Réa was connected by a ridge with a further group of heights. Just after dark sixty thousand picked men, under the command of Vercassivellaunus, left the Gallic camp, and, passing right round the sweep of the northern hills, halted at daybreak for a rest in a hollow north-east of Mont Réa. About noon, just as they were moving down on the camp, the cavalry, by a preconcerted arrangement, streamed over the plain towards the Roman lines: the rest of the infantry showed themselves in front of their encampment; and Vercingetorix, observing these movements from the citadel, descended the hill and moved towards the plain.

This time there was no delay. The inner trench was filled up, where necessary, with earth and fascines: stout sappers' huts, destined to protect the men when they should approach to storm the lines, long poles fitted with hooks for tearing down the rampart, and other implements which Vercingetorix had provided, were carried across; and the besieged moved on to make their last effort.

¹ See pp. 373-4.

52 B.C.

A desperate struggle then began. Wherever there was a weak spot in the defences, the Gauls threw themselves upon it; and the Romans, comparatively few in numbers, and scattered owing to the vast extent of their lines, found great difficulty in massing themselves upon the exposed points. Moreover, they were painfully distracted by the roar of battle in their rear; for both on the inner and the outer line men felt, as they fought, that they must perish if their comrades behind suffered the enemy to break through. Yet, agitated as they were, they combated with a nervous eager energy; and the besieged struggled as desperately as they; for both knew that that day's fight would decide all:—the Gauls were lost unless they could break the line; the Romans, if they could but hold that line, saw their long toil at an end. From the slope of Flavigny, south of the Ozerain, the view from which embraced the whole plain, Caesar directed the battle, and sent supports to every point where he saw his men hard pressed. The attack on the circumvallation in the plain was comparatively feeble; for the bulk of the relieving force was formidable only in numbers. Nor were those numbers wisely directed. The Aedui may have been treacherous: the generals may have disagreed, or they may have been fettered by the civil commissioners; anyhow the Gauls made no attempt upon the circumvallation, except on Mont Réa and in the plain. The fighting was fiercest on Mont Réa. The Gauls were so numerous that Vercassivellaunus could always send fresh men to relieve their comrades. Coming down on the camp from a higher level, the assailants hurled their missiles with fatal momentum: they shot earth in heaps over the pointed logs and the spikes, and, locking their shields over their heads, passed unscathed to the rampart; and then their numbers began to tell. Suddenly a galloper rode up and told Caesar that the garrison were worn out, and their stock of missiles failing.¹ He immediately sent Labienus with six cohorts to the rescue, telling him to hold on as long as he could, and, when he could hold on no longer, to sally forth, and fight it out in the open. Then, riding down between the lines on to the

¹ See p. 798.

plain, he harangued his weary soldiers and adjured them not ^{52 B.C.} to give in: just one short hour, and the prize was won. At last the besieged abandoned in despair the attempt to break through, and, wheeling to the left, crossed the Ozerain, and flung themselves against the works at the foot of Flavigny. They drove the artillerymen from the towers with volleys of missiles: they shot earth and fascines into the ditch, and made their way across: they tore down the palisading of the rampart: six cohorts, then seven more were sent down to help, and still they pressed on,—till Caesar himself hurried to the spot with fresh reinforcements, and drove them away. Everywhere, except at Mont Réa, the victory was won. Caesar called out four cohorts from the nearest redoubt, told his cavalry to follow him, and sent a horseman galloping to the northern cavalry camp to send another detachment down upon the enemy's rear.¹ They were now swarming over the rampart; and, as a last resource, Labienus summoned every available man from the neighbouring redoubts to his aid. By good luck these reinforcements amounted to eleven cohorts,—perhaps four thousand men. And now, conspicuous in his crimson cloak, Caesar was descried, hurrying across the plain. The enemy made a supreme effort. Labienus and his men took heart, and rushed into the thick of the stormers. As Caesar approached, he heard the shouts of the combatants: he saw the camp abandoned and the short swords flashing over the slopes beyond. Suddenly the cavalry appeared on the heights above the enemy's rear: Caesar's reserves came up to attack them in front; and they fled in bewilderment,—into the midst of the hostile squadrons. Vercassivellaunus himself was captured, and seventy-four standards; and of the sixty thousand chosen men who had marched out of camp the night before only a remnant returned. The whole scene was visible from the town; and in despair the officers left in command sent to recall their comrades from below. The vast host without vanished in the gathering darkness. The legions were too tired to follow, or all might have been destroyed: but at midnight the cavalry were sent in pursuit; and when day broke, they

¹ See pp. 797-8.

52 B.C. were still hunting the fugitives and capturing or slaying them in scores.¹

The self-sacrifice of Vercingetorix.

All was lost: so Vercingetorix clearly saw. In the night he formed his resolve. Next morning he gathered the tribal chiefs around him. He told them that he had fought, not for himself but for his countrymen; and, since they must needs all bow to fortune, he was ready to place himself at their disposal,—to die, if they wished to appease the Romans by his death, or to yield himself up as a prisoner of war. They accepted his offer, and consented to purchase life by sacrificing the leader of their own choice. Ambassadors were sent to learn the pleasure of the conqueror. He ordered the chiefs of the garrison to be brought out, and all the arms to be surrendered. The chiefs were led forth; and Caesar, seated on his tribunal, received their submission. Vercingetorix, mounted on a gaily caparisoned charger, rode round the tribunal, and then, leaping to the ground, took off his armour, laid down his sword, and bowed himself at Caesar's feet.² He was sent to Rome, and imprisoned in a dungeon. Six years later he was brought out, to adorn Caesar's triumph; and then he was put to death.³

Surrender of the garrison.

Vercingetorix and his place in history.

Two thousand years have passed away; and still the name of Vercingetorix retains its hold upon the imagination. Our neighbours think of him as the Germans think of Arminius and the Scots of Wallace; and the traveller who stands upon the wind-swept plateau of Gergovia and looks down upon the vineyards that cover the slopes over which he drove Caesar's legions, or, speeding on his way to the Swiss mountains, looks out, as the train whirls him past the station of Les Laumes, upon the colossal statue which marks the western promontory of Mont Auxois, must be dull indeed if he does not sympathise with the nation's veneration for the great Gaul. Looking back across that vast gulf of time, we behold him, as he appears by the testimony of his conqueror, not only a chivalrous patriot, but also a born leader of men. In this character he is the equal of Caesar himself.

¹ All questions relating to the operations at Alesia are discussed on pp. 783-99.

² See p. 799.

³ See p. 799.

The Gauls and their descendants have sometimes mistaken ^{52 B.C.} a charlatan for a hero: but the hero to whom they are loyal while they are still smarting under a defeat, must be a hero indeed. When Vercingetorix at Avaricum regained his ascendancy over the fickle Celtic multitude, he showed a knowledge of human nature as profound as Caesar when he quelled the mutiny of the Tenth Legion. If he knew how to use flattery as an instrument for fortifying self-respect, he never condescended to the arts of the demagogue: he could tell wholesome truths, however unpalatable; and with the most winning persuasiveness he possessed a capacity for being terribly severe. He recognised the softness of moral fibre, the *mollities animi*, which in the Gauls coexisted with personal bravery; and with springing energy he stimulated them to transmute that weakness into strength, to undergo toils from which they had ever shrunk, and to sacrifice their particular interests for the national weal. Who shall imagine the intensity with which he lived?—within that year the youth became a veteran. Those only who have some knowledge of affairs can appreciate the genius for organisation, the unremitting toil, the sleepless vigilance that were needed to force those diverse levies into the field, to arm and clothe and feed them, to direct their operations, to procure information, to raise money, to negotiate, to bribe, to persuade. It must moreover be remembered that his power depended upon sheer unaided force of character: he might control only so long as he could please: his commission was held at the pleasure, nay the caprice, of the most inconstant of the races of men. Yet, alone among the Gallic leaders, he united the discordant elements of the greater part of Celtican Gaul; and, by his tact in gaining over the dissentient tribes, he drove one of the greatest generals of the world, whose army was in all but numbers far superior to his, to the point of withdrawing from the theatre of war. But Caesar vanquished him; and with Caesar he may not be compared. His generalship was not equal to his mastery of men. He knew indeed how to choose a position. He had the good sense to learn from his enemy. He had the courage to confess the inferiority of his army

52 B.C. upon the open battle-field, and the wisdom to originate a guerilla warfare. We cannot tell whether circumstances would have allowed him to work out his conception with the thoroughness which might have forced his adversary to retreat or to starve. But the fact remains that he lost golden opportunities and committed irreparable errors; and therefore, whatever his capacity may have been, it is impossible to affirm that he approved himself a great general.

But after all, if Vercingetorix had been a weaker man, his place in history would still be assured. For the heart of the reader is always tender to the hero of a lost cause. He cares for Hannibal more than for Scipio, for Mary more than for Elizabeth, for Charles more than for Cromwell. And so, while reason tells him that it was well that Caesar should conquer, his sympathies are still with Vercingetorix.

Caesar distributes his legions for the winter.

Caesar determined, instead of going to Italy, to spend the winter in the Aeduan capital. The Aedui were only too ready to return to their allegiance. The Arverni, who had given no trouble in former years, were quite cowed, and promised implicit obedience for the future. Caesar was too politic to bear hardly upon either. He therefore restored to them the prisoners whom he had made, though he demanded a large number of hostages. But the soldiers had to be rewarded for their protracted labours; and every man received, by way of booty, a prisoner, whom he might sell as a slave. Caesar was generous as well as politic; and doubtless his officers were not overlooked. For himself, there was no law of prize to limit the general's share. When he came to Gaul, he was poor and in debt: when he quitted Gaul, he was rich enough to lend and to bribe.¹ The legions were quartered for the winter among the Remi, the Sequani, the Aedui, the Ambivareti, the Bituriges and the Ruteni, that is to say, around Reims, Besançon, Mont Beuvray, Chalon and Mâcon, Bourges and Rodez.² By this arrangement the friendly Remi would be protected from the

¹ See Long's *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 475, and Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 54.

² The habitat of the Ambivareti is uncertain. See p. 378.

vengeance of the Bellovaci: the submission of the Aedui ^{52 B.C.} was assured: the legions quartered among them could easily communicate, on the east, through the territory of the friendly Lingones, with their comrades in Sequania, on the north-east, with those quartered among the Remi: the Arverni were hemmed in on the north by the legion which menaced the Bituriges, on the south by that which watched the Ruteni; and this last was on the borders of the Province, whence it could, if necessary, summon aid. Thus the troops were distributed in such a way as to safeguard the loyal, to overawe the disaffected, to cover the Province, and to be ready for mutual support.

CHAPTER VIII

THE END OF THE STRUGGLE

52 B.C. THE victory at Alesia was decisive. Their great leader gone, their entire host shattered, like a billow surging against a rock, by the little army which it had marched to destroy, the confederacy was dissolved as quickly as it had been formed.

Effects of Caesar's victory at Alesia.

Various tribes prepare to renew the struggle.

Nevertheless some of the more resolute patriots were preparing to renew the struggle. They knew, indeed, that all the men whom they could muster had no chance of standing against Caesar in a pitched battle: but they allowed themselves to hope that, if they all rose simultaneously, his forces would not be strong enough to engage them all at once in detail. Such is the account, based probably upon the reports of Caesar's spies, which Aulus Hirtius¹ has given us. But it may perhaps be doubted whether the rebellious tribes had any such definite and concerted plan. It is probable that they were actuated, not jointly but severally, by sheer abhorrence of a foreign yoke, by sullen despair, by desire for plunder, perhaps by the vague hope that when Caesar was gone, his successor would leave such obstinate rebels to themselves.

Caesar disperses the Bituriges and Carnutes.

The Bituriges, who had not forgotten the slaughter at Avaricum, were the first to stir. The single legion which had been quartered in their country was powerless to restrain them. Caesar was anxious to give a long rest to his soldiers, who were tired out by the extraordinary duration and severity of the late campaign: but before the year was out he took

¹ The last book of the *Commentaries on the Gallic War* was written, not by Caesar, but by his friend Aulus Hirtius.

the field ; and while the chiefs were still talking over their plans, another legion was upon them. Thousands of peasants were captured, while they were working in the fields : others had just time to flee : but hurry where they might, Caesar was too quick for them ; and his swiftness so impressed men's minds that the friendly tribes saw that it was their interest to remain loyal to a Governor who was strong enough both to protect and to punish, while waverers hastened to sue for peace. Caesar sent the legions back to quarters with the promise of a substantial present for every officer and man ; while he himself returned to his civil work at Bibracte. But in little more than a fortnight his rest was interrupted. When the humbled Bituriges begged for his aid against the Carnutes, who had turned upon them, he put two fresh legions in motion ; and, on the mere rumour of his coming, the Carnutes fled in every direction. Chased from place to place by cavalry and auxiliary infantry, numbed by the cold and drenched by the rains, they finally dispersed among the neighbouring tribes ; and their pursuers returned, laden with plunder. The lesson sufficed for the time : but the legions were left at Cenabum, to keep the unruly tribesmen in awe.

Still, there was another tribe to be reckoned with, the warlike Bellovaci, who, six years before, had headed the Belgic league. They had some grudge against the Suessiones, whom Caesar had placed in dependence upon his steady allies, the Remi, and were mustering their forces and those of the neighbouring tribes to attack them. The confederacy comprised the Atrebates, the Ambiani, the Velocasses, the Caleti and the Ebuovices, who inhabited the districts round Arras, Amiens, Rouen, Lillebonne and Evreux. The leaders were a Bellovacan chief called Correus, and Commius, whose spirit was not subdued by his defeat at Alesia. On Caesar's approach they established themselves in the forest of Compiègne, on Mont St. Marc, a hill protected by a marshy watercourse, which oozed northward into the river Aisne.¹ Caesar's force consisted of four legions, which, without reckoning auxiliaries, probably numbered about fifteen thousand men. He was very anxious to bring on a battle : but

Campaign
against the
Bellovaci.


¹ See pp. 803-8.

51 B.C.

the enemy were too wary to quit their vantage ground: their numbers were great; and the hill, rising abruptly above the further side of the deep valley, was hard to ascend. Accordingly he encamped on Mont St. Pierre, the height just opposite theirs. The fortifications which he constructed were of extraordinary strength; for he hoped that the enemy would be emboldened by his caution to attack him, and, as his foragers were obliged to go long distances, it was necessary that the camp should be defensible by a comparatively small force. During the next four days frequent skirmishes took place: but nothing would induce the enemy to come out and hazard a general action. It was impossible to storm their camp without fearful bloodshed; and, as a large force was needed to invest it, Caesar sent for the three legions which he had left at Cenabum and in the country of the Bituriges.

When the rebel leaders heard of their approach, they remembered the dismal fate of Alesia, and determined to send off their non-combatants and baggage in the night. The long line of waggons was barely in motion when day broke, and the Romans caught sight of them. The enemy formed up in front of their camp to cover the retreat, intending to follow as soon as possible. Caesar was too wary to attempt to fight his way up that steep ascent: but he determined not to let the enemy move off unscathed. On their left and separated from their camp only by a narrow depression, was a plateau with gently sloping sides. Caesar rapidly bridged the marsh, led his troops across, ascended the plateau, and just on its edge placed engines to throw missiles against the enemy's masses. They dared not send off their troops, for fear they might become confused as they broke into detachments, and fall victims to the Roman cavalry. For some hours, therefore, they remained under arms. Caesar made a new camp on the plateau, formed up the legions in front of it, and kept the troop-horses bridled, ready to charge at a moment's notice. Towards nightfall, as the enemy could not remain where they were any longer without food, they had recourse to a stratagem. Bundles of straw and sticks were laid in front of the line and set ablaze. In a moment a vast wall of flame hid the entire multitude,

UXELLODUNUM.




and they instantly fled. Suspecting, though he could not ⁵¹ B.C. see what they had done, Caesar made the legions advance cautiously, and sent his cavalry up the hill in pursuit. But the cavalry were afraid to ride through the fiery barrier; and a few bold troopers who spurred in, could hardly see their horses' heads for the smoke. Meanwhile the enemy were well on their way down the valley of the Aisne; and having crossed the Oise, of which it is a tributary, they encamped on Mont Ganelon in the plain beyond.

On the southern bank of the Aisne, in the angle formed by its confluence with the Oise, there was a large meadow, the luxuriance of which, Correus expected, would attract the Roman foragers. In the woods which encompassed this meadow he posted a strong force of horse and foot. Having learned his design from a prisoner, Caesar sent his cavalry and light-armed auxiliaries down the valley of the Aisne, and followed himself in support with the legions. Discerning the cavalry as they approached, the Gauls rode out from the wood and charged: but the disciplined squadrons sustained the shock with admirable coolness: supported by the auxiliaries, they baffled every effort to outflank them; and they had already won the day when the infantry appeared. The flying Gauls, caught in their own trap, were hunted down and slaughtered in the woods and by the banks of the Oise. But Correus would neither yield nor fly. Standing alone upon the field, refusing to accept quarter, he struck fiercely at his opponents and wounded numbers of them, until, infuriated by his obstinacy, they hurled a volley of javelins into his body, and he fell dead.

This was the expiring effort of the Bellovaci. Commius escaped to wage a guerilla warfare, but ultimately made his peace with the conqueror, stipulating only that, as a concession to his fears, he might never again look upon the face of a Roman. Those who had remained in camp appealed to Caesar's clemency, and obtained a contemptuous forgiveness. Their excuse was that Correus had stirred up the populace to rebel, in defiance of the senate. Caesar reminded them that they had borne arms against him before: it was easy to blame the dead, but no single man could raise a revolt

UXELLODUNUM.



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51 B.C.

with the support of a mere rabble if the friends of order were determined to prevent him. From many parts people were actually emigrating, so intense was their reluctance to submit to the authority of Rome: but Caesar distributed his legions in such a way as to bar their escape. He himself marched against the Eburones, whom he had already so ruthlessly punished, and sent out flying columns everywhere to ravage, burn and slay. Ambiorix evidently was not to be captured: but Caesar resolved that the wretched man should never dare to show his face again among the people upon whom he had brought such a terrible doom.

Caninius
and Fabius
compel
Dumnacus
to raise the
siege of
Lemonum.

The end was at hand. The most warlike states were subdued or overawed: only some tribes in the west were still restless. A rebel chief named Dumnacus, with a motley force from Brittany and the country round Orléans and Chartres, was besieging Lemonum, on the site of the modern Poitiers, in which an adherent of Caesar's had taken refuge. Two of Caesar's generals, Caninius and Fabius, compelled him to raise the siege; and while he was hurrying to escape across the Loire, Fabius pounced upon him and defeated him with heavy loss. The fugitives, rallied by an adventurer called Drappes and Lucterius, the chief who had so ably supported Vercingetorix, went off to plunder the Province: but, finding themselves hotly pursued by Caninius, threw themselves into the fortress of Uxellodunum, the modern Puy d'Issolu,¹ of which, before the great rebellion, Lucterius had been the over-lord.

Drappes
and Lucter-
ius take
refuge in
Uxello-
dunum.

Blockade
of Uxello-
dunum.

They had hardly shut the gates before their pursuers arrived. The hill overlooked the left bank of the river Tourmente, which, about two miles to the south-west, emptied itself into the Dordogne. It rose fully six hundred feet above the valley; and steep rocks on every side forbade any attempt to ascend. Caninius, therefore, proceeded to invest the town. On the west, rising above the valley of the Tourmente, and on the north-east, linked to the stronghold by a broad neck of land, there were hills of considerable height. Caninius made two camps on the former and one on the latter, and began to connect them by a line of con-

¹ See pp. 493-504.

travallation. Watching the progress of the works, the 51 B.C. garrison remembered the story of Alesia: Lucterius had been there, and knew how Vercingetorix and his people had suffered; unless his own men bestirred themselves at once, they too would be starved into surrender. It was agreed that Lucterius and Drappes should make an attempt to procure supplies. On the following night, leaving two thousand men to hold the town, they stole out with the rest of the force. For several days they scoured the surrounding country, collecting corn. During this time they occasionally attacked the Romans by night with such vigour that Caninius was obliged to suspend the construction of his lines. One morning, in the early twilight, the Roman sentries heard an unusual noise: scouts were sent out, and returned with the news that a string of pack-horses was moving up a narrow path leading to the town. The troops instantly turned out: the drivers rushed helter-skelter down the hill; and the escort were slaughtered almost to a man. Lucterius with a few followers escaped. Within a few hours another division under Drappes, encamped a few miles off, was surprised; and every man who escaped the sword was made prisoner.

Next day Caninius was reinforced by the legions of Fabius, who had just concluded a most successful expedition along the valley of the Loire. Promptly following up his victory over Dumnacus, he had fallen upon the Carnutes, who, having suffered severely in that battle, were ill prepared to resist. This warlike people, who had never been thoroughly subdued, were now completely cowed and forced to give hostages; and the maritime states of Brittany, which, like them, had supported Dumnacus, hastened to follow their example. Caesar, who had been making a political progress, and trying to conciliate the humbled chiefs, was now at Cenabum. The Carnutes were still uneasy at the remembrance of the provocation which they had given in the great revolt; and it seemed likely that despair might drive them to fresh excesses. Caesar saw that the only way to restore their confidence was to make an example of the chief who had led them astray, and frankly forgive the rest.

51 B.C.

He therefore demanded that Gutuatrus, who had been the author of the massacre at Cenabum in the preceding year, should be delivered up to him for punishment; and the people, eager to purchase the favour of the conqueror, hunted him down and brought him a prisoner into the Roman camp. Caesar, if Hirtius is to be believed, was unwilling to order his execution, but could not afford to disregard the clamours of the soldiery. But Caesar knew how to silence any clamour; and, if he had told the story himself, he would have told it without excuse. The wretched man was flogged till he was insensible; and his head was cut off.

Execution
of Gutua-
trus.

Caesar
marches
for Uxello-
dunum.

Caesar now received a series of despatches informing him of the obstinate resistance of Uxellodunum. Contemptible as were the numbers of the rebels, their example might encourage other states to renew the wearing struggle. Only one more summer had to pass, as the malcontents had doubtless reckoned, and his government would be at an end.¹ But Caesar determined that, before that time, they should be forever subdued. Taking his cavalry with him, he hurried southward, followed by two legions, for Uxellodunum.

He cuts
off the
garrison
from their
supply of
water.

He instantly detected the weak point in the enemy's position. His lieutenants had merely intended a blockade. But the garrison were amply provisioned;² and the only effectual way of reducing them was to cut off their supply of water. Archers, slingers and artillery were posted on the western bank of the Tourmente, so as to command every approach to the stream. Thus menaced, the enemy were afraid to descend; and thenceforward they could get no water except from a spring on the western slope of the hill. Opposite this spring, Caesar proceeded to construct a terrace. From the heights above, the enemy hurled down missiles; and many of the Romans were struck: but the rest toiled doggedly on; and the terrace was built up nearer and nearer still. A tower was erected upon it, of the extraordinary height of ten stories, high enough to overtop the spring; and

¹ See p. 809.

² It must be remembered that, although the attempt to procure fresh supplies had failed, the numbers of the garrison had been greatly reduced, and therefore there were far fewer people to feed.

the garrison dared not approach under the shower of stones ^{51 B.C.} and arrows which its engines rained down. Men and cattle alike were parched by thirst. Torture and death stared them in the face. But there was the spring still gushing forth. As a last resource, the garrison set fire to a number of barrels, filled with pitch, grease and shavings, and rolled them on to the terrace. The woodwork and the sheds were presently in a blaze. The garrison with desperate energy flung down missiles to deter the Romans from advancing to put out the fire. But right up against the roaring flames, undaunted by the missiles, unheeding the sight of their falling comrades, the Roman soldiers pressed steadily on: with a mighty shout they answered their enemy's yells; and each man, eager that his valour should be observed, fought as he had never fought before. Still the flames shot up; and precious lives were sacrificed in vain. In this extremity, Caesar sent a number of cohorts to climb the hill and feign an assault upon the town. Panic-stricken, the garrison recalled their comrades from below; and the moment they had turned their backs, the Romans ran forward and extinguished the flames. Still the Gauls held out; for the spring itself was still untouched. At length, however, a party of sappers crept through a gallery which had been secretly driven into the hill-side to the source of the spring, and diverted its flow. Then at last, feeling that Heaven was fighting against them, the garrison surrendered.

Surrender
of the
garrison.

Caesar saw that, if these rebellions were to break forth again and again, his work would never be at an end. He determined, therefore, to inflict upon the garrison a punishment so appalling that all malcontents should in future remain quiet. He would not put his prisoners to death, because, if he did, their fate, though it might be talked of for a time, would soon be forgotten. They were to remain as a living warning to intending rebels. He ordered their hands to be cut off, and sent them forth to exist as they best might.

Their punishment.

One notable survivor of the great rebellion was still at large. Lucterius, the lieutenant of Vercingetorix, a man who, as Caesar said, was ready to dare anything, had wandered far from Uxellodunum. He knew that for him there was no

51 B.C.

forgiveness; and he went from place to place in fear of betrayal. At length he fell into the hands of a renegade Aeduan, who brought him in chains to Caesar; and what was his fate we can only guess.

Caesar
follows up
coercion by
concilia-
tion.

But Caesar knew that conquest can never be complete until coercion has been followed by conciliation. In little more than a year he would be leaving the country; and he must contrive to leave it at peace. The time had not come, nor had he the authority to organise a government: it would be enough if his successors could enter upon that task without encountering opposition. He had no wish to oppress the Gauls, or to hurt their national pride: on the contrary, he desired that they should learn to feel themselves really citizens of Rome. He fixed their tribute at a moderate amount.¹ He did not interfere with their institutions, though he doubtless used his influence to promote his own adherents to power. He distinguished certain tribes, in which the party that adhered to Roman interests appeared sufficiently strong, by the bestowal of a comparatively free constitution. He loaded the chiefs with presents: he won their hearts by the charm of his address; and when he quitted Gaul, and threw down the gauntlet, on a wider arena, to a mightier foe, they sent their bravest warriors to fight under his flag.²

¹ 40,000,000 sesterces or about £400,000. See Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 25, and Mommsen's *Hist. of Rome*, iv. 283.

² *B. G.*, viii. 49; Cicero, *Ep. ad Att.*, ix. 13; *B. C.*, i. 39, § 2; Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 25; F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France*, — *la Gaule rom.*, 1891, 66, n. 1, 84, n. 1; Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii. 48-9.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

THE conquest of Gaul, fraught with illimitable issues, was at last complete.¹ Destiny had decided that Gaul was to be either German or Roman; and Caesar did not hesitate to grasp the gift of destiny for Rome. The Gallic warriors were perhaps as brave, man for man, as the Roman legions; and their numbers were far greater. But, whatever may have been their political capacity, when Caesar came among them they were only feeling after political union: they did not combine to expel him until it was too late, and not with a whole heart even then. With all their dash and nervous enthusiasm, they lacked the tenacity of the Roman: rushing vehemently to the attack, they fell away at the first reverse. ¶ This weakness, which Caesar so often notices, may have been inherent in the race: it may have been wholly or in part the result of a want of mutual confidence:² but

¹ This statement will naturally be taken in a general sense. The subjugation of the north-western part of the country was doubtless, as Mommsen says (*Hist. of Rome,—The Provinces*, i. 79), comparatively superficial: there was fighting in Aquitania in 38 and 28-27 B.C.; and there was a partial insurrection in the reign of Tiberius. Still, the thoroughness with which Caesar had done his work was demonstrated, first by the peace which prevailed during the civil war, when Gaul was almost entirely denuded of troops, and secondly by the fact that, during the long reign of Augustus, notwithstanding the disturbances in Germany, Gaul remained submissive, and that, as Mommsen puts it (*Ib.*, pp. 80-81), Vercingetorix found no successor. See also F. de Coulanges, *Hist. des inst. pol. de l'ancienne France,—la Gaule rom.*, pp. 71-84, and Desjardins, *Géogr. de la Gaule rom.*, iii. 49-50.

² The numerous host of the warlike Baluchis was defeated by Sir Charles Napier's little force at Miani principally because it was a loose aggregate of tribal levies which had not been trained to act in concert (see my article on

whatever the cause, the fact remained. Nor, for the most part, were the heterogeneous levies who opposed Caesar the equals of the purer Gauls who had routed a Roman army on the banks of the Allia. The Helvetii, the Parisii, the Senones and a few of the Belgic tribes alone maintained the ancient renown of the Celtic infantry. The Gauls had no regular army: they had no science: they had no discipline; and, until Vercingetorix arose, they had no great leader. Their conqueror, on the other hand, was master of a compact, disciplined and well-equipped army, the finest in the world:¹ he was free to pursue a definite aim in opposition to the sporadic efforts of his enemies; and, while he became a general only to achieve higher ends, he was one of the greatest generals that have ever lived. His writings leave so much to the intelligence of the expert that few can conceive how hard it was to conduct the operations which, in the narrative, appear so easy; what resolution was needed to adhere, in the face of unforeseen obstacles, to plans readily formed, to banish distracting doubts, to preserve equanimity under the friction of accumulating difficulties, to sustain the military virtue of the army in privation and in the bitterness of defeat, to carry out combinations when calculations were disturbed.² How Caesar did these things the war-bred soldier can alone realise; but we can all form some conception if we rightly study what he wrote. He knew that a well-organised commissariat is the foundation of success in war; and the truth of this maxim is borne in at every turn upon the reader of

the battle of Mian in *Macmillan's Magazine*, January, 1900); and it is probable that the defeats which Vercingetorix suffered were partly due to the same defect.

¹ It has been asserted that the legionaries with whom Caesar conquered Gaul were themselves Gauls. No one could make a statement so misleading who had any knowledge of ethnology, or who had noted the emphasis with which Caesar marks the distinction, in regard to stature, between the Gauls and his legionaries (*E. G.*, ii. 30, § 4). All the legions which he raised during the Gallic war, with one possible exception (see p. 783, n. 2), were levied from the mixed population, composed of Italian, Gallic, Ligurian, and doubtless also Etruscan and aboriginal elements, which inhabited Piedmont and the Plain of Lombardy.

² "Everything," says Clausewitz (*On War*, translated by Col. J. J. Graham, i., 1873, p. 40), "everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult."

his memoirs. While his enemies were more than once obliged to strike prematurely or to disperse because they had not secured their means of subsistence, he was always able to keep his army together and to choose his own time. For a few days' raid the legionaries could carry their food on their backs : but whenever his operations were likely to be protracted, he stored his grain in magazines and provided for its transport and protection. His geographical intuition was as unerring as that of Napoleon. He knew both how to govern and how to fascinate his soldiers, so that they would strain every nerve to win his praise,—all the more because they saw that he was more careful of their lives than of his own. Emergencies the most sudden and confounding, even when they resulted from his own mistakes, seemed only to make him more calm. He was not only master of all the science of his time, but he showed an inexhaustible fertility in inventing expedients. He concentrated his strength upon the decisive point : he was always ready to put everything to the hazard for a great end. He knew the rashness of his enemy, and lured him on by an affectation of fear. He confounded him by the swiftness of his marches : he seized the best of the ground before he attacked ; and when he had won the victory, he followed it up with an energy that overwhelmed.

Nor would it be just to forget the support which the general received from his lieutenants. Few of them failed to do what was required ; and one may fairly rank among the great marshals of the world. The genius of Labienus has not been adequately appreciated : but it needs little insight to see that Caesar placed him in a class by himself. Caesar trusted him to the full ; and, so long as his engagement lasted, that faithless man was true. The most difficult enterprises were imposed upon him ; and he accomplished them all. He fulfilled his instructions to the letter : he assumed responsibilities without fear. Beset by dangers the most appalling, his judgement was unerring, his decision unflinching. In the crisis of the most critical campaign he avenged his chief's defeat by victory : in the crisis of Alesia he repelled the fiercest onslaught, and struck the decisive blow ; and

throughout those eight years, from first to last, he never made a single mistake.

But Caesar's was the directing mind. And Caesar was much more than a great general. He was a far-seeing statesman and withal a dexterous politician.¹ Many historians have affirmed that the oligarchies in the Gallic states supported him, and that the adventurers who aimed at winning royal power were his opponents. There is some truth in this view; but it needs qualification. No generalisation can be safely made about the attitude of the various parties in Gaul. Caesar shaped his policy according to circumstances; and if Dumnorix and Indutiomarus were his enemies, he himself, as we have seen, set up kings in various republican states. With cool calculation he took advantage of the fears, the necessities, the jealousies, the intestine broils, the spasmodic revolutions, the petty ambitions of those incoherent multitudes. For it must never be forgotten that, as we conquered India with the aid of Indians, Caesar conquered Gaul with the aid of Gauls. At first indeed he was welcomed as a deliverer; and when he had expelled the Helvetii and the Germans, it is doubtful whether he was generally feared as a conqueror. It was only when the presence of his legions was felt as a burden, and when ambitious chieftains saw reason to fear that he would blast their schemes, that he awakened partial opposition. The Gauls were not devoid of patriotism: but it was choked by the tares of jealousy; and when Vercingetorix was fighting for the fatherland, it is probable that there were many who had as much to fear from his success as from his failure. Those who courted Caesar's friendship and adhered to his cause, were distinguished by every mark of favour, and might reckon with certainty upon his support. The Aedui adhered to him for six years, and when they changed their minds they found that they had served his turn:¹ the Remi saw from the first that he was going to win, and, having made their choice, they abided by it to the end. The Aquitanians cared nothing for

¹ "Ces chefs éduens," says M. Jullian (*Vercingetorix*, p. 236), "qui n'embrassaient une cause que pour en regretter une autre, étaient toujours traités à la trahison même."

the Gauls, and their isolated resistance was paralysed in a single campaign. The Celticans, with the exception of the maritime tribes, submitting, for the most part, without an effort, looked on, with folded hands,¹ until, at the eleventh hour, Vercingetorix roused them to a convulsive resistance; and then the Belgæ, who had hitherto borne the brunt of the struggle, held aloof until it was too late.

It has been said that it is impossible to conquer a people who are determined to be free. Perhaps, in our modern age; and doubtless in every age, when the people dwell in a country which nature has fortified, and when they are brave, numerous, and of one mind. But Caesar succeeded, as William the Conqueror succeeded, not merely because the people with whom he had to deal were disunited, but also because he was prepared to go any lengths rather than fail. The Gauls were willing to sacrifice myriads of lives, so they might preserve their liberty? Then he would slay a million, aye and slay women and children, and ravage their lands, and burn their houses over their heads, and lop off their limbs, so he might at last subdue them! And, though he was ruthless, he was also merciful.² When he had beaten down opposition, he held out his hand in friendship; and the Gauls took it, and bore him no grudge.

And when he had gone, what motive had they to rebel? Many of the states retained administrative independence: and none had exchanged independence for servitude. National independence they had never had; for they had never been a united nation. As a nation, they could make no effort to throw off the Roman yoke; for there was none among them who could command the confidence of the nation, or weld it into a coherent whole. Many of the smaller peoples had already been in subjection to powerful neighbours; and it was less humiliating to obey an alien master than one of their own race. Rome was distant; and her glory wrought upon the imagination. Rome was the resistless power which, for centuries, had been bringing, one after another, the nations

¹ Unless the Treveri are to be counted as Celtæ (see pp. 384-5).

² *In Cæsare hæc sunt: mitis clemensque natura.* So wrote Cicero in 46 B.C. (*Ep. ad Fam.*, vi. 6, § 8).

of the earth within her empire. Jealousies were hushed beneath her sway. Her yoke was easy ; and her rule brought peace, security and prosperity. ✱ If adventurers in Gaul, as in India, regretted the good old days when they could win thrones by their wits and their swords, the many gained more than they had lost ; and so it happened that the few spasmodic outbreaks which followed Caesar's departure were foredoomed to failure, and that his conquest was effected once for all.

APPENDIX

A

PROFESSOR RHYS holds that the existence of the Goidelic language in Gaul "has been placed beyond doubt by the discovery of fragments of a calendar engraved on bronze tablets . . . at a place called Coligny in the department of the Ain," that is to say, in the country of the Sequani; and he adds that "two inscriptions in what appears to be the same language have come to light also at a place called Rom, in the Deux Sèvres," which belonged to the Pictones. He points out, however, that in this language "several of the phonetic changes characteristic of Goidelic had not taken place. . . . Among other things it preserves intact the Aryan consonant *p*, which has since mostly disappeared in Goidelic."¹

M. d'Arbois de Jubainville,² on the other hand, still maintains that "the Goidels formed a Celtic group which must be distinguished from the Gauls"; and, referring³ to the calendar of Coligny, he refuses to admit the existence among the Sequani of a Celtic dialect "in which, while initial *q* was changed into *p*, medial *q* remained." Such an hypothesis, he argues, is refuted by the Sequanian place-names, *Epam-anduodurum* and *Loposagium*. We can no more conclude, he insists, that the language of the calendar was a Celtic dialect than that Welsh is a dialect of English.

M. Seymour de Ricci points out⁴ that while some scholars, for example Otto Hirschfeld and M. J. Loth, regard the language of the calendar as Celtic, others consider it Ligurian.

B

In a recent number of the *Classical Review*,⁵ Mr. Warde Fowler did me the honour of devoting an article to a criticism of the statement which I made in the larger edition of this book as to Caesar's belief in

¹ *Report of . . . the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1900, p. 895. See also Mr. E. W. B. Nicholson's *The Language of the Continental Picts*, 1900.

² *Principaux auteurs de l'antiquité à consulter sur l'hist. des Celtes*, 1902, pp. 183-4.

³ *Rev. celt.*, xx., 1899, pp. 108-9.

⁴ *Ib.*, xxi., 1900, p. 19.

⁵ April, 1903, pp. 153-6.

Fortune. In the present edition I have allowed the statement to stand, merely substituting the words "an unwavering faith" for "the faith of a devotee," which was certainly open to criticism; and I believe that it is supported by the evidence to which I have referred in the first footnote to page 23. I cannot help thinking that Mr. Warde Fowler misunderstood me. I really was not so simple as to suggest that Caesar believed in a personal goddess called *Fortuna*. What I meant to convey was simply that, in common with many men of action, he believed that fortune may wreck the most wisely planned and most diligently executed operations, while she may rescue her favourites from the penalties of their own mistakes; and that, in common with Sulla, Napoleon, and other great commanders, he had a firm faith, touched perhaps by mysticism, in his own star.

C

The eminent archæologist, M. Salomon Reinach, has censured me for not having taken note, in the larger edition of this book, of M. Colomb's "admirable study" on the campaign of Caesar against Ariovistus, which appeared in the *Revue archéologique* for July, 1898. This number had unfortunately not reached the library of the British Museum at the time when I sent my manuscript to the printer; but I have read the article since. M. Colomb begins by insisting that his extraordinary knowledge of the whole theatre of the war places him in a position to speak with authority; and his conclusion is that the defeat of Ariovistus took place not in the plain of Alsace but between Arcey and Présentevillers. Readers who do not know the country as intimately as M. Colomb will find that Sheets 101 and 114 of the *Carte de l'État-Major* ($\frac{1}{50,000}$) will enable them to control his arguments.

M. Colomb makes Caesar advance from Vesontio (Besançon) by way of Oiselay to Pennesières, that is to say, by a longer and more westerly route than the one adopted by Napoleon III. and Colonel Stoffel;¹ but from Pennesières to Arcey the route which he adopts coincides with theirs. He argues that Caesar marched by way of Oiselay in order to approach the river Saône, "by which the Aedui and the Lingones were forwarding him supplies."² But a glance at the map will show that, by following the route indicated by M. Colomb, Caesar would, in the most favourable circumstances, only have begun to receive supplies from the Aedui and the Lingones one day earlier than if he had gone by Vovay, Rioz, and Filaine,—the route adopted by Colonel Stoffel: for the first few days his troops unquestionably carried their food with them; and the Aedui and the Lingones were obliged to forward supplies right up to the actual theatre of war.

According to Colonel Stoffel, Caesar marched on from Arcey through the pass of Belfort into the plain of Alsace: according to M. Colomb,³ his march terminated at Arcey. M. Colomb defends his view by the

¹ See pp. 629-30, 636 of the larger edition of this work.

² *Rev. arch.*, xxxiii., 1898, p. 36.

³ *Ib.*, pp. 34-5, 40-45.

following arguments :—(1) Caesar, he insists, could not venture to advance beyond Arcey either north-eastward in the direction of Héricourt, or eastward in the direction of Montbéliard, because, if he had taken either of these routes, Ariovistus would have seized the other, planted himself in the rear of the Romans, and thus severed their line of communication. (2) The distance from Besançon by Oiselay to Arcey is 90 kilometres, and M. Colomb argues that Caesar would not have marched more than this in seven days. He says that in 52 B.C. Caesar took four days to march from Sens to Gien by way of Triguères, that is to say, that he marched not more than 25 kilometres a day at the very outside ; and he infers that from Besançon to Arcey he only marched 14 kilometres a day. He admits that Caesar marched from Sens to Gien very early in the year, when the roads were in bad condition, whereas he marched against Ariovistus at the most favourable season ; but he says that the road from Besançon to Arcey must, at the best of times, have been bad, and he maintains that Caesar had no motive for hurrying. (3) He points out that in the Hungarian invasion of 929 A.D. and in Bourbaki's campaign of 1871 fighting took place along the line Villersexel—Arcey—Montbéliard ; and he holds that these examples prove that this is the natural route for all invasions coming from the east and for all attacks coming from France and having the pass of Belfort as their objective.

The first argument depends upon the unverifiable assumption that Ariovistus waited for Caesar in the pass of Belfort. But I am willing, for the sake of argument, to grant the assumption. Now if Ariovistus had attempted, with his whole force, to cut Caesar's line of communication, he would have played a dangerous game ; for, by doing so, he would have found himself cut off from his own dominions in the plain of Alsace. If, in the case which M. Colomb supposes, Caesar had advanced beyond Arcey, he would have left detachments to guard Arcey, or the gorge of Présentevillers on the road leading to Montbéliard, or both, and would have advanced himself by way of Héricourt. Now, supposing that Ariovistus had been so rash as to quit Belfort and advance by the Montbéliard road in order to seize Arcey, what would have happened ? In the gorge of Présentevillers he would have found a force ready to dispute his passage. Meanwhile would Caesar have neglected his opportunity ? Turning to the right, he would have hotly pursued the German column, and Ariovistus would have found himself caught inextricably in a trap. If he had merely sent a detachment to operate against Caesar's communications, he would evidently have had no prospect of success. Besides, as we shall presently see, M. Colomb, contradicting himself, holds that Caesar *did* advance a few kilometres from Arcey in the direction of Héricourt, and *did* leave Arcey undefended ! The second argument depends upon a string of blunders. Caesar, as I have demonstrated elsewhere,¹ never went near Triguères or Gien : he marched from Sens not to Gien but to Orléans, a distance of at least 108 kilometres. Moreover, the argument that because Caesar marched

¹ *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*, 1899. pp. 402-15, 504-9.

25 (or rather 27) kilometres a day on a bad road in the winter, therefore he did not march more than 14 kilometres a day on a bad road in the summer, is one which I find rather difficult to follow. I maintain, in opposition to M. Colomb, that Caesar marched against Ariovistus as fast as he conveniently could : otherwise, why did he make a point of telling us that he marched for seven consecutive days without allowing one day for rest (*septimo die cum iter non intermitteret* etc.)?¹ The historical precedents which M. Colomb quotes, might perhaps have weight if it could be proved that Ariovistus waited for Caesar in the pass of Belfort : but I find it difficult to believe that Ariovistus would ever have committed himself to an offensive movement against Caesar westward of the pass.

But when we come to scrutinise the kernel of M. Colomb's argument, we find that his case completely breaks down. Caesar says that his conference with Ariovistus took place at a *tumulus terrenus*, which may mean either a natural knoll or an earthen mound, in a great plain (*magna planities*).² I have assumed in the text³ that the great plain was the plain of Alsace ; and I agree with Colonel Stoffel, who is not a bad topographer, that there is no other great plain in any part of Gaul in which the conference can possibly be supposed to have taken place. No ! says M. Colomb : the great plain was that in which Montbéliard is situated ; it was between the Savoureuse and the Lisaine, which flow into the Allain, and it was bounded on the south by the Doubs. Its extent from east to west was more than 6 kilometres, and from north to south nearly 7.⁴ Well, I will not quarrel about measurements, although, if M. Colomb's description is just, Port Meadow, near Oxford, might fairly be called a great plain. But is M. Colomb's great plain a plain at all ? Certainly it looks like one in M. Colomb's sketch-map : he contrives to make it do so by the simple process of leaving the area blank and shading the surrounding hills. By a similar process I could produce a map in which the Matterhorn would look like a plain. If the reader will take my advice, he will check M. Colomb's map by Sheet 114 of the *Carte de l'État-Major*. He will there find that the entire area of M. Colomb's plain is covered by hill-shading. The *tumulus terrenus*, according to M. Colomb, was the hill called *La Chaux*. M. Colomb observes that, viewed from the summit of this hill, the plain "semble être rigoureusement plate." I can only reply that within a fraction of the area, not including La Chaux itself, I find the following different elevations, expressed in terms of metres above the level of the sea,—320, 347, 349, 366, 312, 349. Is not this "great" little plain somewhat uneven ?

Let us now examine M. Colomb's explanation of the flank march by which Ariovistus succeeded in temporarily cutting Caesar's line of communication. According to M. Colomb, the hill at the foot of which Ariovistus halted on the night before he made this march was a hill overlooking Montbéliard : Caesar's camp was on the north-west, between

¹ *B. G.*, i. 41, § 5.

² *Ib.* 43, § 1.

³ See p. 41, *supra*.

⁴ *Rev. arch.*, xxxiii., 1898, p. 49.

Sémondans and Desandans, and on the road leading from Arcey to Héricourt; and Ariovistus advanced through the gorge of Présentevillers, passed Ste-Marie, and encamped at Arcey. When the reader looks at the map, he will want to know how Ariovistus came to undertake so desperately hazardous a movement, and why Caesar tamely allowed him to execute it. But M. Colomb¹ is ready with an answer. He shall speak for himself:—"César oublie assez volontiers de raconter les événements qui n'ont pas tourné à son honneur. Dion Cassius . . . dit en effet qu'il y eut une lutte acharnée dans laquelle la nombreuse cavalerie germane . . . ayant fait éprouver de grandes pertes aux Romains, les força à se renfermer dans leur camp et à y demeurer spectateurs impuissants de la marche hardie qui, conduisant Arioviste à Arcey même, c'est-à-dire à l'orifice supérieur du col de Granvillers et au point de croisement de toutes les routes de Séquanie, coupait César et l'isolait." I take leave to say that Dion Cassius says nothing of the kind. What he says is that Ariovistus, having been warned by his "wise women" not to fight a pitched battle before the new moon,² contented himself at first, although the Roman infantry challenged him, with engaging in cavalry combats, in which he handled the Romans severely; and that, in consequence of this success, he conceived a contempt for the Romans, and occupied a position beyond their camp etc. (διὰ τοῦτο ὁ Ἀριοβίστος . . . οὐχ ἀπάσῃ ἐνθὺς τῇ δυνάμει καίτοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων προκαλουμένων σφᾶς συνέμιξεν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἱππέας μετὰ τῶν συντεταγμένων σφισὶ πεζῶν μόνους ἐπέμπων ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοὺς ἐλίπει. καὶ τοίτων καταφρονήσας χώριόν τι ὑπὲρ τοῦ ταφρέϊματος σφῶν καταλαβεῖν ἐπεχείρησε. καὶ κάτεσχε μὲν αὐτό, ἀντικαταλαβόντων δὲ καὶ ἐκείνων ἕτερον³ etc.). This is obviously an inaccurate paraphrase of Caesar's narrative; for the challenges of the Roman infantry and the cavalry combats took place not before but after Ariovistus occupied the position in question:⁴ but even if Dion's account were correct, it would lend no support to M. Colomb's theory, that Ariovistus succeeded in forcing his way through the gorge of Présentevillers and accomplishing his flank march by dint of a single "lutte acharnée" in which he defeated Caesar's cavalry. The notion that Caesar would have attempted to stop his march with cavalry alone, while the legions looked idly on, is truly comical: Caesar at all events had no scruples about employing his infantry before the new moon. The whole episode of the march, as conceived by M. Colomb, is absolutely incredible. If Ariovistus had attempted it, he must inevitably have been driven back with heavy loss. Nothing would have been easier for Caesar than to seize the commanding position at Arcey, which Ariovistus is assumed to have occupied, when the head of Ariovistus's column began to debouch from the gorge of Présentevillers, even if he had not secured it before: nothing, I say, would have been easier, except to destroy the unwieldy column as it was slowly emerging from the gorge. M. Colomb asks us to believe that Caesar, who, a few days later, utterly defeated Ariovistus in a pitched battle, was so imbecile as

¹ *Rev. arch.*, xxxiii., 1893, p. 53.

³ *Hist. Rom.*, xxxviii., 48, § 2.

² Cf. *B. G.*, i. 50, § 4-5.

⁴ *B. G.*, i. 48-50.

to allow him to execute a movement which any intelligent centurion would have known how to frustrate.

M. Colomb points triumphantly, in support of his theory, to Caesar's statement of the distance which separated the battle-field from the Rhine: "*les Commentaires*," he asserts, "*disent que le champ de bataille se trouve à 50,000 pas du Rhin.*"¹ M. Colomb will pardon me for correcting him. *Milia passuum quinquaginta* (50,000 paces, or 50 Roman miles) does not occur in any MS. of the *Commentaries*: *milia passuum circiter quinque* ("about five miles") occurs in all. But on this question I must refer to my larger edition.

D

Dr. Heinrich Meusel, to whom I am indebted for an elaborate and most valuable review of *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*, tells me that I am mistaken in identifying Procillus, whom Caesar sent to confer with Ariovistus, with Troucillus, the interpreter through whom he communicated with Divitiacus. I was certainly wrong in calling the interpreter Procillus, in doing which I adopted the emendation of Manutius; for in the passage² in which he is mentioned the MS. readings are *Troucillum*, *Troucillum*, and *Troucillum*, and the accuracy of *Troucillum* is confirmed by inscriptions.³ The question, however, remains whether the man who was sent to Ariovistus was not *Troucillus*. In the two passages⁴ in which he is mentioned he is designated as Procillus in all the MSS., except Vind. L., which calls him *Troicillus*. Herr Dittenberger⁵ says that he was not *Troucillus*, arguing that the way in which Caesar first describes him⁶ shows that he had not been mentioned before; and also that Caesar calls him a young man (*adulescens*), whereas he evidently implies that *Troucillus* was well advanced in years.⁷ The reader will draw his own inferences from Caesar's language: I will only observe that the mere fact that *Troucillus* was called a *princeps* does not prove that he was old. Assuming that the interpreter and the *adulescens* were two different men, it is a remarkable coincidence that both were named Gaius Valerius; that both belonged to the *Provincia*; that Caesar had the utmost confidence in both; and that he described each of them as *familiarem suum*. In these circumstances I am inclined, though doubtfully, to conclude that *Troucillus* and *Procillus* were one and the same.

¹ *Rev. arch.*, xxxiii., 1898, p. 44. See also p. 61.

² *B. G.*, i. 19, § 3.

³ *Corpus Inscr. Lat.*, iii. 5037; v. 7269, 7287.

⁴ *B. G.*, i. 47, § 4; 53, § 5.

⁵ *C. Iulii Caesaris comm. de b. G.*, 15th ed., 1890, p. 391.

⁶ *Commodissimum visum est C. Valerium Procillum, C. Valeri Caburi filium, summa virtute et humanitate adulescentem, cuius pater a C. Valerio Flacco civitate donatus erat, et propter fidem et propter linguae Gallicae scientiam . . . ad eum mittere etc.* *B. G.*, i. 47, § 4.

⁷ *Divitiacum ad se vocari iubet et . . . per C. Valerium Troucillum, principem Galliae provinciae, familiarem suum, cui summam omnium rerum fidem habebat, cum eo colloquitur.* *Ib.*, 19, § 3.

E

The view which I have adopted in the narrative, that Caesar encamped in 57 B.C. nearly opposite Berry-au-Bac, on an eminence between the Aisne and the Miette, has recently been opposed by Herr Konrad Lehmann,¹ who frequently refers to my pages. Besides repeating arguments which I have already examined, he urges (1) that it is improbable that in Caesar's time a road could have crossed the marsh formed by the Miette; (2) that, assuming the accuracy of the late Emperor Napoleon's Plan,² this marsh was so extensive that Caesar would not have described it as "of no great size" (*non magna*); and (3) that if the marsh which he described had been traversed by a stream, he would have mentioned it. To this last objection I can only reply that Caesar did not mention the Essonne,—the stream that undoubtedly traversed the marsh which Labienus attempted to cross in 52 B.C.³ Herr Lehmann's other arguments do not appear to me to be cogent. In the note on "Caesar's operations on the Aisne" which is to be found in the larger edition of this book I have shown that the objections to every site that has been proposed, except that which General von Göler and Colonel Stoffel pointed out, are overwhelming; and the conditions which Herr Lehmann lays down as required by Caesar's narrative are not fulfilled at any point in the valley of the Aisne where it is possible to suppose that Caesar crossed.

F

In the larger edition of this book I argued that the Portus Itius was to be identified with the former harbour of Wissant. The note in which my arguments were embodied was unavoidably written while the book was being printed, and when I was becoming somewhat weary after more than ten years' incessant labour. Soon after the book appeared I suspected that I had made a mistake; and I have since written with fuller knowledge a dissertation, which will, I hope, be published in a work to be entitled *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar*.

G

According to M. Camille Jullian,⁴ who agrees with General von Göler,⁵ the abandoned hill (*collis nudatus*) which Caesar saw from the camp on the Roche Blanche was simply Gergovia itself, or rather that part of it which extended between the town on the plateau and the wall of loose stones, not, as I have stated in the text, "a hill forming

¹ *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* etc., 1901, pp. 506-9.

² *Hist. de Jules César*, Atlas, Pl. 8. ³ *B. G.*, vii. 57, § 4; 58, § 1.

⁴ *Vercingétoric*, 2nd ed., 1902, p. 373.

⁵ *Gallischer Krieg*, 2nd ed., 1880, pp. 277-9, 281.

part of the mass of Risolles." I am unable to agree with M. Jullian, first, because Caesar would have seen that the southern slope of Gergovia was abandoned before he ascended the Roche Blanche, and, secondly, because he says¹ that one of the results of the stratagem which he devised after he saw that the hill was abandoned was that "all the [Gallic] troops" were withdrawn from their former positions by Vercingetorix to assist in the work of fortifying [the approach to Risolles and the Col des Goules], which seems to show that the southern slope of Gergovia had not been abandoned before.

M. Jullian² holds that the first position of the 10th legion during the unsuccessful attack on Gergovia was at the northern extremity of the Roche Blanche, and that the valley (*satis magna vallis*) which separated the legion from the column of assault was the valley "où il se trouvait lui-même," that is to say, the valley between the Roche Blanche and the hill of Gergovia. He adds that "presque tous les écrivains placent à ce moment la X^e légion . . . sur le flanc de la montagne gergovienne, et pas loin du village"; and he refers to page 744 of my *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*. I venture to adhere provisionally to the opinion which I there expressed, for the following reason. Caesar says³ that when he saw that the assaulting column was in difficulties, he ordered Titus Sextius, whom he had left in command of the camp on the Roche Blanche, to take up a position with some cohorts of the 13th legion at the foot of Gergovia, and that he himself advanced a little from the position which he had taken up (*ad T. Sextium legatum, quem minoribus castris praesidio reliquerat, misit, ut cohortes ex castris celeriter educeret et sub infimo colle ab dextro latere hostium constitueret. . . . Ipse paulum ex eo loco cum legione progressus, ubi constiterat, eventum pugnae expectabat*). According to M. Jullian, Sextius was to take the place which Caesar had vacated. It appears to me, on the other hand, that the words *sub infimo colle* are contrasted with *eo loco ubi constiterat*.

¹ *B. G.*, vii. 44. § 6.

² *Vercingétoric*, pp. 214, 373-4, and 374, n. 3.

³ *B. G.*, vii. 49.

INDEX

- Acco, 100-101
 Adige, 19
 Adour, 67
 Aduatuna, Sabinus and Cotta quartered at (54 B.C.), 79; camp attacked by Ambiorix, 80; Sabinus's force virtually annihilated near, 83-5; Q. Cicero left in command at (53 B.C.), 95-6; attacked by Sugambri, 97-9
 Aduatuci, 53; their stronghold captured by Caesar, 57-9; persuaded by Ambiorix to join in attacking Q. Cicero, 85; defeated by Caesar, 89-90; remain in arms, 93
 Aedui, their alliance with Rome, 3; Vergobret of, forbidden to cross frontier, 12; hegemony of, 15; rivalry with Sequani, defeated by Ariovistus, 19; beg Caesar for aid against Helvetii, 29; their cavalry with Caesar beaten by Helvetii, 30; fail to supply Caesar with corn, 31; ask that Boii may be allowed to settle in their country, 36; Caesar negotiates on their behalf with Ariovistus, 38, 42; supply Caesar with corn during campaign against Ariovistus, 39; contingent of, under Divitiacus, ravage lands of Bellovaci, 49; Caesar treats with distinction, 52, 77, 79; friendly to Caesar, 62, 70, 78-9, 91, 161; intercede for Senones, 93; keep aloof at first from rebellion of Vercingetorix, send troops to assist Bituriges, 104; Caesar demands supplies from, 106, 110; ask Caesar to settle dispute between Cotus and Convictolitavis, 116; Caesar demands contingent from, 117; signs of their impending defection, 120-23; Caesar intercepts mutinous contingent, 121-2; contingent joins in attack on Gergovia, 126; Aedui definitely join rebellion of Vercingetorix, 127; contingent deserts Caesar, 128; Caesar crosses Loire in spite of, 128-9; Aedui claim direction of rebellion, but are snubbed, 132; levy of, sent by Vercingetorix against Allobroges, 133; army raised for relief of Alesia musters in their country, 141; probably treacherous to Vercingetorix, 144; return to allegiance to Caesar, 148; two legions winter in their country (52-51 B.C.), 148; a renegade Aeduan betrays Lucterius, 158
 Agedincum, six legions quartered at (53-52 B.C.), 100, 104; Caesar concentrates legions near (52 B.C.), 106; Caesar garrisons, when marching to relieve Gorgobina, 106; Labienus marches from, against Senones and Parisii, 129; returns to, and thence marches to rejoin Caesar, 131
 Agger, built in siege of chief stronghold of Aduatuci, 57-8; in siege of Avaricum, 109-10, 113; in siege of Uxellodunum, 156-7
 Aisne, Caesar's operations on (57 B.C.), 49-51, App. E; in 51 B.C., 151, 153
 Aix, 19
 Aix-la-Chapelle, 79
 Albi, 105
 Alène, 33
 Alesia, fortified and provisioned by Vercingetorix, 132; Vercingetorix marches from, to intercept Caesar, 134; Vercingetorix retreats to, 136; Vercingetorix blockaded in, by Caesar, 136-41; final struggle at, 142-5
 Allia, battle of the, 1
 Allier, 102; bridges over, destroyed by Vercingetorix, 117; Caesar crosses, 118; he marches down valley of, to intercept Aedui, 122; recrosses, 127; Aedui try to hem him in between, and Loire, 128
 Allobroges, aid Salves against Romans, 3; rebel, 20; directed by Caesar to feed remnant of Helvetii, 36; repel emissaries of Vercingetorix, 133
 Alps, 1-3; crossed by Caesar, 26, 28
 Alsace, 4, 20, 39, App. C
 Ambiani, submit to Caesar, 52
 Ambibareti. *See* Ambivareti

- Ambivareti, 148
 Amiens, 52. *See* Samarobriva
 Andecumborius, 48
 Andernach, 75
 Andes, 62
 Angers, 61
 Anjou, 62
 Anti-Roman party in Gaul, 15, 31, 36, 79, 120
 Apennines, 2
 Aquileia, 23
 Aquitani, 4-5, 8-9; campaign of Crassus against, 67-8; hired cavalry of, assist Vercingetorix, 116; ethnology, 4-5, 8-9. *See also* 162
 Archers, in Caesar's army, 23, 49, 51; at Aduatuca, 84; employed by Vercingetorix, 113, 116, 142; at Uxellodunum, 156
 Ardèche, 105
 Ardennes, 95-6, 99
 Ariovistus, invades Gaul on invitation of Sequani, defeats Aedui, annexes a third of Sequanian territory, defeats Aedui and Sequani and their respective allies, 19-20; receives a title from the Senate, 22; Celtae beg Caesar's aid against, 36-7; Caesar's attempts to negotiate with, 37-8; Caesar's campaign against, 39-45, and App. C
 Armançon, 134
 Armecy, 33
 Armour, of Caesar's legionaries, 24
 Army, Caesar's, 23-5, 160
 Arretium, 2
 Artillery, Caesar's, 24, 43; in siege of Aduatucan stronghold, 58; in siege of Avaricum, 110, 114; used by Fabius against Vercingetorix, 122; in operations at Alesia, 143
 Artois, 69
 Arverni, help Salyes against Rome, 3; their power broken, 4; their hegemony in Gaul, 14; leading men among, expel Vercingetorix from Gergovia, expelled in turn by him, 103; Caesar ravages their country, 105; submit after fall of Alesia, 148. *See* Gergovia, Vercingetorix
 Atrebrates, defeated by Caesar at Neuf-Mesnil, 53-5; join Belgic confederacy against Caesar (51 B.C.), 151. *See* Commius
 Aulus Hirtius, 150
 Auray, 65
 Aurunculeins. *See* Cotta
 "Auvergnat" type, 7
 Auxiliaries, in Caesar's army, 23; in battle with Helvetii, 33-4; in battle with Ariovistus, 45; relieve Bibrax, 49; in operations on Aisne, 51; i battle with Nervii, 54-5. *See* Aedui, Archers, Cavalry, Germans, Numidians, Slingers, Spanish
 Auzon, 118-19, 124
 Auzon (or Aizon), 33
 Avaricum, Caesar marches for, 108; Bituriges resolve to defend, against advice of Vercingetorix, 109; siege and capture of, 109-15; losses at, repaired by Vercingetorix, 116; occupied by Romans, 116
 Baculus. *See* Sextius
 Baggage, 25; disposal of Caesar's, in battle with Helvetii, 33-4; before battle with Nervii, 53; in cavalry combat before blockade of Alesia, 135
 Baggage-drivers, 25, 55, 124
 Balearic isles, 23
 Basilus. *See* Minucius
 Basques, 7
 Beaujolais, 30
 Beauvais, 49, 79
 Belfort, 41, App. C
 Belgae, value of Caesar's grouping of, 4-5, 8-9; ethnology of, 8; Caesar's first campaign against, 47-59; character of their resistance, 78, 161; legions quartered in their country (54-53 B.C.), 79; hold aloof at first from rebellion of Vercingetorix, 104; Caesar's final campaign against, 151-4. *See also* Aduatuci, Bellovaci, Eburones, Morini, Menapii, Nervii, Remi, etc.
 Bellovaci, Caesar sends Aeduan contingent to harry their country (57 B.C.), 49, 51; surrender Bratuspantium, 52; two legions quartered among (54 B.C.), 79; threaten Labienus (52 B.C.), 129; send a small contingent to join in relief of Vercingetorix, 140; Caesar's campaign against (51 B.C.), 151-4
 Berri, 104-5, 108. *See* Bituriges
 Berry-an-Bac, 49, App. E
 Besançon. *See* Vesontio
 Beuvray, Mont. *See* Bibracte
 Bibracte, 11, n. 1; Caesar marches towards, Helvetii try to cut him off from, 33; Helvetii defeated near, 33-6; Caesar's hostages sent to, by Eporedorix and Viridomarus, 128; general assembly at, elect Vercingetorix commander-in-chief, 132; Caesar winters at (52-51 B.C.), 148-9; Caesar marches from, against Bituriges, and returns, 150-51
 Bibrax, attacked by Belgae, relieved by Caesar, 49-50
 Bituriges, join rebellion of Vercingetorix,

- 104; Vercingetorix orders destruction of villages in their country, 108; they persuade him to spare Avaricum, 109; their rebellion in 51 B.C. crushed, 150-51. *See* Avaricum, Noviodunum
- Boii (of Cisalpine Gaul), 2
- Boii, join Helvetian emigration, 26; in battle near Bibracte, 35; survivors allowed by Caesar to settle in Aeduan territory, 36; their stronghold, Gorgobina, besieged by Vercingetorix, 106; Caesar marches to relieve, 106-8; send supplies to Caesar during siege of Avaricum, 110
- Bonn, 72
- Boulogne, 77, App. F
- Bratuspantium, 52
- Brenne, 136
- Brenner Pass, 19
- Breuil, 52. *See* Bratuspantium
- Briançon, 28, 29, n. 1
- Bridges, of Gauls, 11; bridge at Geneva destroyed by Caesar, 26; Caesar bridges Saône, 29; he crosses bridge over Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, 49, 51; builds a bridge over Rhine, 75; builds a second bridge, 95; bridges rivers in country of Menapii, 94; bridge over Loire at Cenabum, 107; bridges over Allier destroyed by Vercingetorix, 117; Caesar repairs one of them, 118; he crosses Allier by, 127; Labienus repairs bridge at Metiosedum, 129; bridges at Lutetia destroyed by Camulogenus, 130
- Brigantio. *See* Briançon
- Britain, trade of Veneti with, 62-3; Caesar said to be contemplating invasion of, 63; his objects in invading, 76
- Brittany, Crassus receives submission of tribes of, 61; tribes rebel, 62-7; they contemplate an attack on Roscius, 91; they rebel in 51 B.C., 154-5
- Brutus. *See* Decimus
- Brythonic, 8
- Bussy. *See* Montagne de Bussy
- Cabillonum. *See* Chalon
- Cadurci, 133, n. 1
- Caesar, Gaius Julius, busts of, xx-xxv; his grouping of Gallic peoples, 8-9; consul, appointed Governor of Gaul, 21-2; his person and character, 22-3; his army, 23-5; his intentions, 25; hastens to Geneva, 26; negotiates with Helvetii and prevents them from crossing Rhône, 26-7; goes back to Cisalpine Gaul and returns with reinforcements, 28-9; defeats Tigurini, 29; Helvetii attempt to negotiate with, but reject his terms, 29-30; campaigns against and defeats Helvetii, 30-36; his treatment of fugitive Helvetii, 36; congratulated by deputies from Celtic Gaul, who solicit his aid against Ariovistus, 36-7; attempts to negotiate with Ariovistus, 37-8; seizes Vesontio, 39; allays panic in his army at Vesontio, 39-41; campaign against Ariovistus, 41-6; resolves to conquer Gaul and returns to Italy, 46; results of his first campaign, 47; returns to Gaul and receives submission of Remi, 48-9; campaign of 57 B.C. against Belgae, 49-59; sends Galba into the Valais, 59; rejoicings at Rome over his victories, 61; goes on political tour to Illyricum, 62; prepares for campaign against Veneti, 63; conference at Luca, 63-4; campaign against Veneti, 64-6; campaign against Morini, 68-9; returns from Cisalpine to Transalpine Gaul, to deal with Usipetes and Tencteri, 71; campaign against Usipetes and Tencteri, 71-4; bridges Rhine, punishes Sugambri and returns to Gaul, 74-5; invasions of Britain, correspondence with Cicero, 76; has Dumnorix put to death, 76-7; quarters legions for winter of 54-53 B.C., 78-9; promotes adherents to power, sends Plancus to avenge assassination of Tasgetius, 79-80; humbles Indutimarus, 80; Ambiorix professes gratitude towards, 81; praises bravery of troops at Aduatuca, 84; relieves Q. Cicero, 88-91; spends winter of 54-53 B.C. in Gaul, 91; warns malcontents, 91-2; eulogises generalship of Labienus, 92; borrows a legion from Pompey and raises two others, 93; punishes Nervii and forces Senones and Carnutes to submit, 93-4; crushes Menapii, 94; crosses Rhine again, but returns unsuccessful to Gaul, 94-5; campaign against Eburones, 95-7; invites neighbouring tribes to harry them, 97; gently rebukes Q. Cicero for rashness at Aduatuca, ravages lands of Eburones, 99; distributes legions for winter of 53-52 B.C., 100; executes Acco, 100; Gallic chiefs conspire against, 101-2; returns from Italy to Gaul, 104; rescues Province, out-manceuvres Vercingetorix and rejoins legions, 104-6; marches to relieve Gorgobina, captures Vellaunodunum, Cenabum and Noviodunum, 106-8; besieges and captures Avaricum, 109-15; secures election of

- Convictolitavis as Vergobret, 116-17, 123 note; sends Labienus against Parisii and Senones and marches against Gergovia, 117; first operations at Gergovia, 118-19; intercepts Aeduan contingent, 121-2; attempts in vain to take Gergovia by *coup-de-main*, 123-7; marches to rejoin Labienus, 127-8; Labienus hears rumours that he has been forced to retreat to Province, 130; rejoined by Labienus, 131; enlists German cavalry, 134; marches to succour Province, defeats Vercingetorix in cavalry combat and forces him to retreat to Alesia, 134-6; operations at Alesia, 136-45; receives surrender of Vercingetorix, 146; effects of victory at Alesia, 150; disperses Bituriges and Carnutes (51 B.C.), 150-51; campaign against Bellovaci, 151-4; ravages lands of Eburones, 154; executes Gutuatrus, 156; captures Uxellodunum and punishes garrison, 156-8; conciliates conquered Gauls, 158; why he succeeded, 159-61
- Caleti, 151
- Calones* (drivers and officers' servants), 25, 55, 83, 97-8, 124
- Calvados, 64
- Cambrai, 53
- Camp, Caesar's on the Aisne, 49; Sabinus's in country of Unelli, 66-7; winter camps of 54-53 B.C., 79; Caesar's at Gergovia, 119-24; at Alesia, 137-8
- Camulogenus, commands Parisii and Senones in campaign against Labienus, 129-31; killed in action, 131
- Caninius, defends camp on Mont Réa, 143; forces Dumnacus to raise siege of Lemonum, drives Drappes and Lucterius into Uxellodunum, 154; blockades Uxellodunum, 154-5
- Canstadt race, 5
- Carcaso, 67
- Carnutes, 79; rebel against Caesar (53 B.C.), 93-4; Caesar investigates origin of rebellion, 100; Carnutes strike first blow in rebellion of 52 B.C., 101-2; Caesar captures their chief town, Cenabum, 107-8; attack Bituriges (51 B.C.), punished by Caesar, 151
- Carthage, 3
- Cassius, L., 29
- Casticus, 20
- Catiline, 19
- Cato, 74
- Caturiges, 28
- Catuvelcus, joins Ambiorix in attacking Aduatuca, 80; commits suicide, 96
- Cavalry, Caesar's, 23; in campaign against Helvetii, 30, 32-3, 35; against Ariovistus, 41, 44-5; in operations on Aisne, 50-52; in battle with Nervii, 54-6; against Usipetes and Tencteri, 72-4; at Aduatuca, 81, 97-8; in expedition for relief of Q. Cicero, 89-90; in operations against Indutiomarus, 92-3; under Basilus, 95-6; against Eburones, 99; ravage country of Arverni, 105; in combat at Noviodunum, 108; at Gergovia, 118-19, 121-3; ford Loire, 128; in battle of Lutetia, 131; Caesar enlists German, 134; in combat before blockade of Alesia, 135-6; at Alesia, 137-8, 142; disperse Carnutes, 151; in campaign against Bellovaci (51 B.C.), 152-3. *See also* Aedui, German, Spanish, Sugambri, Tencteri, Treveri, Usipetes
- Celtae, Caesar's grouping of, 4-5, 8-9; culture of, 10-11; enfeebled by contact with Roman civilisation, 11; deputies from central tribes congratulate Caesar on victory over Helvetii, 36; certain chiefs of, egg on Belgae to rebel, 47; mostly support Vercingetorix, 103-4; ineffectual nature of their resistance to Caesar, 162
- Celtillus, 103
- Celts, 1; invade Gaul, 7-8; their language, 8; their character, 13, 46; their religion, 18. *See also* Celtae, Gauls
- Cenabum, massacre of Romans at, 102; captured by Caesar, 107; legionaries resolved to avenge massacre at, 111; temporarily garrisoned by two legions (51 B.C.), 151-2; Caesar marches from, against Uxellodunum, 155-6
- Cenomani, 2
- Centurions, 24; panic among, at Vesontio, 40; of the first rank, 82; in battle with Nervii, 55-6; self-sacrifice of, near Aduatuca, 99. *See* Petronius, Quintus Lucanius, Sextius Baculus
- Cevennes, 4; crossed by Caesar (52 B.C.), 105-6
- Chablais, 59
- Chalon, 148
- Character, of Gauls, 10, 13, 63, 67, 71, 78
- Charente, 28
- Chartres, 17
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius, inclined to oppose Caesar (56 B.C.), 63-4; his correspondence with Caesar, 76; his opinion of Caesar, 163, n. 2
- Cicero, Quintus, takes service under Caesar as a *legatus*, 76; commands a legion in country of Nervii, 79;

- defends his camp against Ambiorix, 85-8; Gauls abandon siege of his camp, 89; joined by Caesar, 90; his legion quartered near Samarobriua, 91; left in command at Aduatuca, 95-6; attacked by Sugambri, 97-9
- Cimbri, 18-19, 40, 57, 141
- Cingetorix, supports Caesar, 80; declared a public enemy by Indutiomarus, 92; appointed chief magistrate of Treveri on death of Indutiomarus, 94
- Ciron, 67
- Clanship, in Gaul, 12, n. 1, 13, n. 2
- Clientes* (clients), 12, 15
- Clodius, 101
- Clothing, of Caesar's legionaries, 24
- Coblenz, Caesar marches towards, 71; Caesar bridges Rhine between, and Andernach, 75
- Cohort, made tactical unit of Roman infantry, 23
- Coinage, Gallic, 11
- Commissariat, 160
- Commius, deputed by Caesar to watch Menapii, 94; Labienus tries to procure assassination of, appointed a general of army destined for relief of Vercingetorix, 140-41; his operations at Alesia, 142; joint leader of Bellovaci and allied rebels (51 B.C.), 151; obtains terms after guerilla warfare, 153
- Couconnetodumnus, 102
- Condusi, Usipetes and Tencteri enter their country, 71
- Considius. *See* Publius
- Constitution, of Gallic states, 12-15
- Convictolitavis, his election as Vergobret of Aedui confirmed by Caesar, 116-17; intrigues against Caesar, 120, 122; openly declares for Vercingetorix, 127
- Correus, heads a rebellion against Caesar (51 B.C.), 151; killed, 153
- Côtes-du-Nord, 63-4
- Cotta, L. Aurunculeius, 51, n. 2; placed in joint command at Aduatuca, 79; urges Sabinus to hold Aduatuca against Ambiorix, 81-3; his splendid conduct in action, 83-5; killed, 85
- Cotus, 116
- Councils, Gallic, 12, 131, 140; councils of Gallic deputies summoned by Caesar, 36, 71, 80, 93; councils of war, 82, 108
- Crassus (the triumvir), 64
- Crassus, Publius, strikes decisive blow in battle with Ariovistus, 45; receives submission of maritime tribes, 61; engages with Veneti and other tribes for supply of corn, 62; they demand that he should restore hostages, 63; marches for Aquitania, 64; his campaign in Aquitania, 67-8; in command of a legion near Samarobriua, 79; placed in charge of Samarobriua, 88
- Cremona, 2
- Crete, 23
- Critognatus, 141
- Cro-Magnon race, 6
- Culture, of prehistoric races, 9; of Gauls, 10-11
- Curiosolites, 63-4
- Debtors, in Gaul, 12-13
- Decetia, 116
- Decimus Brutus, commands in sea-fight against Veneti, 65-6; left in command by Caesar in country of Arverni (52 B.C.), 106
- Divico, 29
- Divitiacus, begs Senate for help against Ariovistus, 19; restored to power by Caesar, 31; begs Caesar not to punish Dumnorix, 32; guides Caesar from Vesontio to plain of Alsace, 41; leads Aeduan levies against Bellovaci, 49
- Dolmens, 6, 9
- Dora Riparia, 23
- Dordogne, 5, 154
- Doubs, 39, App. C
- Dranse, 59-60
- Drappes, 153-4
- Druids, 16-18, 117
- Dumnacus, 154-5
- Dumnorix, forms compact with Celtillus and Orgetorix, 20; ready to help Helvetii, 21; induces Sequani to let Helvetii pass through their country, 28; commands Aeduan cavalry with Caesar's army, 30; intrigues against Caesar, 31-2; intrigues again (54 B.C.), 76-7; killed, 77
- Durance, 7, 28
- Durocortorum, 100
- Ebrodunum. *See* Embrun
- Eburones, 71; Sabinus and Cotta encamp in their country, 79; attack Aduatuca, 80; destroy force of Sabinus and Cotta, 83-5; besiege Q. Cicero's camp, 85-8; remain in arms (53 B.C.), 93; their country harried by Caesar, 95-7, 99, 154. *See* Aduatuca, Ambiorix, Catuvoleus, Sugambri.
- Eburovices, 151
- Embrun, 28
- Emmerich, 70
- Engineers, 24, 66. *See Fabri*
- Eporedorix reports treachery of Litavicus to Caesar, 121; seizes Noviodunum,

- 127 ; one of four generals in command of army destined for relief of Alesia, 141
Equites, 13, n. 2
 Essonne, 129
 Esuvii, join Veneti in resisting Caesar, 63 ; Roscius's legion quartered among, 79
 Etruria, 1-2
Evocati, 134
 Evreux, 71, 129
- Fabius, commands a legion in winter-quarters in country of Morini (54 B.C.), 79 ; joins in relief of Q. Cicero, 88-9 ; sent back to his camp, 91 ; left in temporary command at Gergovia, 121-2 ; defeats Dumnacus, 154 ; at Uxellodunum, 155-6
 Fabius (a centurion). *See* Lucius
Fabri, 24
 Fecht, 41
 Finistère, 62. *See* Osismi
 Flavigny. *See* Montagne de Flavigny
 Forez, 30
 Formans, 29
 Fortune, Caesar's belief in, 22, and App. B
- Gabali, induced to join rebellion of Vercingetorix, 105 ; hounded on by Vercingetorix to invade Province, 133
 Galba, Servius, his campaign in the Valais, 59-61
 Galba (king of the Suessiones), 48 n., 49, 51
 Gallia Cisalpina, 1-2, 22, 28, 46, 48, 70, 104
 Gallia Comata, 22
 Gap, 29
 Garonne, boundary (roughly speaking) between Celtæ and Aquitani, 4 ; tribes between, and Seine join Vercingetorix, 103
 Gaul, invaded by Celts, 1, 7 ; Gauls in Italy, 1-3 ; Romans establish footing in Transalpine Gaul, 3-4 ; the country and its inhabitants, 4-5 ; ethnology of, 5-10 ; character, civilisation, political and social organisation and religion of Gauls, 10-18 ; invasion of, by Teutoni and Cimbri, 18-19 ; by Ariovistus, 19-20 ; plan of Orgetorix for conquest of, 20-21 ; Caesar appointed Governor of, 21-2 ; Caesar resolved to prevent Germans from conquering, 25 ; conquest of, by Caesar, 26-164 ; Caesar's remarks on character of Gauls, 10, 78, 159 ; monarchy in, 12. *See* Celts, Gallia Cisalpina, Gallia Comata, Province
 Genabum. *See* Cenabum
- Geneva, 26
 Gergovia, 102-3 ; Vercingetorix banished from, returns to, 103 ; Caesar marches against, 117 ; Vercingetorix occupies, 118 ; first operations at, 119-20 ; Caesar temporarily quits, to intercept Aeduan contingent, 121-2 ; Caesar attempts to take, by *coup-de-main*, 123-6 ; he abandons, in order to rejoin Labienus, 127. *See* App. G
 German cavalry, 44 ; employed by Caesar, 107, 134, 136-7, 142
 Germans, threaten Gaul, 18-19 ; Caesar resolved to prevent, from conquering Gaul, 25 ; Labienus sent to prevent, from crossing Rhine (56 B.C.), 64 ; Caesar's invasions of Germany, 74-5, 94-5 ; Germans said to be meditating attack on Romans (54 B.C.), 81 ; some tribes refuse, others promise to aid Indutiomarus, 92-3 ; Caesar prevents, from aiding Ambiorix, 94. *See* Ariovistus, Cimbri, Suevi, Sugambri, Teutoni, Usipetes
 Goidelic, 8, and App. A
 Gorgobina, besieged by Vercingetorix, 106 ; he raises siege, 108
 Graioceli, 28
 Great St. Bernard, 59
 Greece, 3
 Gutuatrus, leads attack on Cenabum, 102 ; executed, 156
- Hannibal, 2
 Harudes, 37
 Hegemony, of Arverni, 3, 15 ; of Aedui and Sequani, 15
 Helvetii, plan invasion of Transalpine Gaul, 20-21 ; prepare to march through Roman province, 26 ; negotiate with Caesar, prevented by him from crossing Rhône, 26-7 ; allowed by Sequani to march through Pas de l'Écluse, 28-9 ; Aedui solicit Caesar's aid against, 28-9 ; Caesar's campaign against, 29-35 ; Caesar's treatment of fugitives after battle near Bibracte, 36
 Helvii, Caesar's levies concentrate in country of (52 B.C.), 105 ; attacked by order of Vercingetorix and defeated, 133-4
 Hesbaye, 57, 85
 Hirtius. *See* Aulus
 Homme Mort, 6
 Human sacrifice, 17
- Iberian inscriptions, 7
 Iberians, 7-8
 Icius, 48-9
 Ill, 45

- Illyricum, 22, 62-4, 76
 Indutiomarus, reluctantly submits to Caesar, 80; instigates Ambiorix to attack Aduatua, 80; his intended attack on Labienus prevented by Caesar's victory over Nervii and Eburones, 91; his plan of campaign, defeated by Labienus and slain, 92-3
 Insubres, 2
 Isère, 3, 29
 Italy, Celtic invasion of, 1-2; threatened by Cimbri and Teutoni, 18-19; by Germans, 21, 25; endangered by presence of Ariovistus in Gaul, 37; enthusiasm in, at Caesar's Gallic victories, 61; Caesar's custom of wintering in, 46, 70, 91, 101
 Itius, Portus, 77, App. F
 Javelin. *See Pila*
 Julius Caesar. *See Caesar*
 Jura, 20, 28
 Kings, in Gaul, 12. *See Ambiorix, Catuvolcus, Commius, Galba, Monarchy, Tasgetius, Teutomatus, Vercingetorix*
 Knights, Gallic, 13. *See Equites*
 Labienus, ordered by Caesar to guard lines on Rhône, 28; rejoins Caesar near confluence of Saône and Rhône, 29; co-operates with Caesar in attempt to surprise Helvetii, 32-3; left in command of Roman army for winter of 58-57 B.C., 46; informs Caesar of conspiracy of Belgæ, 47; pursues Belgæ down valley of Aisne, 51; in battle with Nervii, 56; in command of a legion during winter of 54-53 B.C., 79; informed of disaster at Aduatua, 85; unable to join Caesar in relieving Q. Cicero, 88-9; informed of relief of Cicero, 91; defeats and slays Indutiomarus, 92-3; reinforced by Caesar, defeats Treveri, 94; charged by Caesar with duty of suppressing rebellion in valley of Seine, 117; Caesar anxious for his safety, 123, 128; his campaign against Camulogenus, 129-31; rejoins Caesar, 134; attempts to assassinate Commius, 141; strikes decisive blow at Alesia, 145; his great services, 161
 La Fère, 49
 La Madelaine, 5
 Langres, 36, 104
 Latium, 1
 Latobrigi, 26
 Legati, 23, 45, 54, 76; services of, during conquest of Gaul, 160. *See*
 Caninius, Cicero, Cotta, Crassus, Decimus Brutus, Fabius, Galba, Labienus, Lucius Caesar, Plancus, Reginus, Roscius, Sextius, Titurius Sabinus, Trebonius
 Legionaries, 23-4; panic among, at Vesontio, 39-41; short stature of, 58; conduct at Avaricum, 110-11; nationality, 160, n. 1
 Legions, Caesar's, 23-4; raised by Caesar during Gallic war, 28, 48, 93; 7th, 55-6; 8th, 55; 9th, 55; 10th, 41, 55-6, 124-6; 13th, 124
 Lemonum, 154
 Les Eyzies, 5
 Les Laumes, 146
 Leuci, send supplies to Caesar, 43, n. 2
 Lexovii, 64
 Ligurians, 6-7
 Limagne, 102, 118
 Lingones, Caesar overtakes Helvetii in their country, 36; supply Caesar with corn for campaign against Ariovistus, 39, 43, n. 2; two legions winter among (53-52 B.C.), 99, 104; Caesar rejoins the legions, 106; adhere to Caesar during rebellion of Vercingetorix, 132; Caesar rests his army in their country, 134
 Liscus, 31
 Litavicus, tampers with Aeduan contingent on march to join Caesar at Gergovia, 120-22; recruits for Vercingetorix, 127
 Loire, legions cantoned along valley of (57 B.C.), 61; Caesar orders ships to be built in estuary, 63; Brutus's fleet assembles in estuary, 65; legions quartered between, and Seine (56 B.C.), 69; boundary between Aedui and Bituriges, 104; Caesar crosses, at Cenabum, 107-8; Caesar crosses, in spite of Aedui, 128; campaign of Fabius in lower valley, 155
 Luca, 64
 Lucanius. *See Quintus*
 Lucius Caesar, 133
 Lucius Fabius, 125
 Lucterius, threatens to invade Province, 104-5; defends Uxellodunum, 154-5; goes out to fetch supplies, escapes slaughter, 155; delivered up to Caesar, 157-8
 Lutetia, Labienus marches for, 129; burned by order of Camulogenus, 130; battle near, 131
 Luxury, 12
 Mâcon, 30, 148
 Mandubii, 132; expelled from Alesia, their fate, 141

- Maniple, 23
 March, Caesar's forced, during operations at Gergovia, 121-2; to cross Loire, 128. *See* App. C
 Marcus Petronius, 126
 Maritime Alps, 3
 Marius, defeats the Teutoni, 19; his military reforms, 23
 Marne, 4, 48, 129
 Marseilles, 3
 Martigny, 59. *See* Octodurus
 Massilia, 3-4
 Matisco. *See* Mâcon
 Mediolanum, 2
 "Mediterranean race," 6-7
 Menapii, 68; their country invaded by Usipetes and Tencteri, 70; rebel after disaster at Aduatuca, 93; their lands harried (55 B.C.), 94; Caesar deters, from helping Ambiorix, 94
 Metiosedum, 129, 131
 Mettius, 43
 Meuse, skulls of Neanderthal type found in basin of, 5; winds round Mont Falhize, 57; Caesar crosses (55 B.C.), 71; Aduatuca situated east of, 79
 Miette, 49-50, App. E
 Milan, 2
 Milo, 101
 Miners, of Aquitania, etc., 11
 Mines, of Romans and Gauls in siege of Avaricum, 113
 Minucius Basilus, sent with cavalry to pursue Ambiorix, 95; nearly catches him, 96
 Monarchy, in Gaul, 12, 14-15
 Mont Auxois. *See* Alesia
 Mont Falhize, 57
 Mont Ganelon, 153
 Mont Genève, 28
 Mont Parnasse, 131
 Mont Pevenel, 136, 139
 Mont Réa, 136, 143-4
 Mont St-Marc, 151
 Mont St-Pierre, 152
 Montagne de Bussy, 136, 139
 Montagne de Flavigny, 137, 139, 144-5
 Montagne de la Serre, 119, 124
 Montargis, 107. *See* Vellaunodunum
 Montbéliard, 41, App. C
 Morbihan, 62, 64
 Morini, Caesar's campaign against (56 B.C.), 68-9; Fabius's legion quartered among (54 B.C.), 79; Fabius sent back to, after relief of Cicero, 91
 Moselle, Usipetes and Tencteri defeated near confluence of, with Rhine, 74
 Mussy-la-Fosse, 142
 Namnetes, 59
 Namur, 79
 Nantes, 64. *See* Namnetes
 Nantuates, 59
 Narbo, 4; threatened by Lucterius, rescued by Caesar, 105
 Narbonne. *See* Narbo
 Neanderthal race, 5
 Neolithic man, in Gaul, 6
 Nervii, 52-3; defeated by Caesar (57 B.C.), 53-6; survivors exaggerate their losses, 57; Caesar treats survivors with clemency, 57; Q. Cicero winters in country of, 79; besiege Q. Cicero's camp, 85-8; defeated by Caesar, 89-90; remain in arms, their lands ravaged by Caesar, 93
 Neuf-Mesnil, 53, 56
 Nevers, 117. *See* Noviodunum (Aeduarum)
 Nièvre, 106
 Nîmes, 105
 Nitiobriges, induced to join rebellion of Vercingetorix, 105, 116
 Nobles (nobles), in Gaul, 12, 14-15
 Normandy, Crassus receives submission of tribes of, 61; tribes rebel, 62-3, 66-7; they contemplate an attack on Roscius, 91
 Notre Dame, Lutetia built upon its site, 130
 Noviodunum (Aeduarum), used by Caesar as a magazine, 117; seized by Eporedorix and Viridomarus, 127
 Noviodunum (Biturigum), surrenders to Caesar (52 B.C.), 107
 Noviodunum (Suessionum), 52
 Numidians, 23, 51
 Octodurus, 59-60
 Oise, 49, 52, 153
 Opme, 119, 124
 Orbis, 84 and n. 1
 Orcet, 119
 Orgetorix, 20-21
 Orléans, 61. *See* Cenabum
 Orne, 63, 79
 Ourthe, 71, 79
 Oze, 136-8, 143
 Ozerain, 136-8, 144-5
 Pagi, 12
 Palæolithic man, in Gaul, 5
 Parisii, campaign of Labienus against, 129-31
 Pas de l'Écluse, 27-8
 Petronius. *See* Marcus
 Pevenel, Mont, 136, 139
 Pictones, lend ships to Caesar, 65
 Pilum, 24, 34, 45, 55
 Piso, 73

- Placentia, 2
 Plancus, quartered near Samarobriua (54 B.C.), 79; sent to overawe Carnutes, 79-80
 Po, 1-2
 Pompey, negotiates with Caesar at Luca, 63-4; lends Caesar a legion, 93; restores order at Rome after murder of Clodius, 104
 Pontarlier, 28
Praefecti fabrum, 24
 Prehistoric races, of Gaul, 4-5, 8-9
 Procillus, App. D
 Province, formation of Roman, in Transalpine Gaul, 4; victory of Cimbri and Teutoni in, 18-19; Caesar appointed Governor of, 24; exposed to danger from Germans, 25; Helvetii desire to march through, 26; Caesar refuses to allow Helvetii to enter, 27; exposed to danger from Helvetii, 28; Caesar raises cavalry in, 30; Ariovistus complains that Caesar has crossed frontier of, 42; Caesar levies oarsmen from (56 B.C.), 63; threatened by Lucernus, rescued by Caesar, 104-5; Aedui intend to prevent Caesar from retreating to, 123; Caesar said to be retreating to, 130; threatened by Vercingetorix, 133-4; roads leading to, from Further Gaul, blocked, 134; Caesar marches to succour, 134; Caesar posts troops to guard (52-51 B.C.), 149
 Publius Cusidius, 32-3
 Punic war, second, 2
 "Putrid Plain," 19
 Puy de Dôme, 102
 Puy Giroux, 119
 Puy d'Issolu, 154
 Pyrenees, 68
 Quiberon Bay, 65
 Quintus Lucanius, 84
 Rabutin, 137, 138
 Rations, 24
 Raurici, 26
 Ravenna, 64
 Réa. *See* Mont Réa
 Rebilus. *See* Caninius
 Red-hot (or white-hot), balls, 87
 Reginus, defends camp on Mont Réa, 143
 Reims, 49, 100. *See* Durocortorum
 Religion of Gauls, 9, 16-18
 Remi, voluntarily submit to Caesar and help him, 48-9; their territory threatened by other Belgic tribes, 51; loyal to Caesar, 62, 120, 134; he treats them with distinction, 79; congratulate Labienus on relief of Cicero's camp, 91; Indutiomarus threatens, 92; intercede for Carnutes, 93; two legions detailed to protect them (52-51 B.C.), 148; Suesiones placed in dependence on, 151
 Rhine, 4-5; crossed by Celts, 7; Germans fight their way to right bank of, 18-19; Ariovistus and beaten host flee to, 45; some Transrhene tribes offer submission to Caesar (57 B.C.), 59; Labienus charged to prevent Germans from crossing, 64; Usipetes and Tencteri cross, 70; Usipetes and Tencteri driven to confluence of, with Moselle, 74; Caesar crosses in 55 and 53 B.C., 74-5, 95; Sugambri cross, 97; German cavalry cross, to reinforce Caesar, 134. *See* Triboci
 Rhône, Arverni and allies defeated at confluence of, with Isère (121 B.C.), 3; Romans masters of lower valley, 3-4; Romans defeated on banks of, by Cimbri and Teutoni, 19; Helvetian marauders on right bank (60 B.C.), 20; Helvetii prevented by Caesar from crossing, 26-7; Labienus holds Caesar's lines on, 28; Caesar crosses, near Lyons, 29; Allobroges defend fords of, against Vercingetorix's levies, 133
 Risolles, 118, 123, 125
 Roanne, 30
 Roche Blanche, 118; seized by Caesar, 119; camp on, held during Caesar's absence from Gergovia, 121; held by Sextius, 125
 Rome, captured by Gauls, 1; Romans repel Gallic incursions and conquer Cisalpine Gaul, 1-3; establish themselves in Transalpine Gaul and form Province, 3-4; Roman army defeated by Tigurini, 20; Roman interests menaced by intended Helvetian emigration, 20-22, 23; and by pressure of Germans upon Gaul, 25, 37; Caesar leaves Rome (58 B.C.), 26; Dumnorix heads anti-Roman faction, 31; Ariovistus complains of Roman interference and bad faith, 33, 42; Roman soldiers liable to panic, 39; rejoicings at Rome over Caesar's victories (57 B.C.), 61; Gauls familiar with idea of Roman dominion, 62, 162; Caesar obliged to think of Roman politics during conquest of Gaul, 63, 93; Roman supremacy galling to Gallic patriots, 78, 91, 101; riots in Rome (52 B.C.), 101; Pompey restores order in, 104; Caesar desires to Romanise Gauls, 158
 Roscius, 79

- Ruteni, induced to join rebellion of Vercingetorix, 104-5; hounded on by Vercingetorix to invade Province, 133; a legion quartered in their country, 148
- Sabinus. *See* Titurius
- Saint-Gildas, 65
- Saint-Jean-de-Lozne, 134
- Saint-Maurice, 59
- Saint-Parize-le-Châtel, 36, 106
- Salyes, 3
- Samarobriua, 52; Trebonius's legion quartered at (54 B.C.), 79; Caesar fixes his headquarters there (54 B.C.), 79; Vertico carries a despatch to, 88; Caesar leaves Crassus in charge of, 88; three legions quartered near, 91; Caesar holds Gallic council at (54 B.C.), 93
- Sambre, 52; battle on, 53-6
- Samnite war, third, 1-2
- Santonnes, lend ships to Caesar, 65
- Saône, crossed by Helvetii and by Caesar, 29; Caesar marches up valley of, in pursuit of Helvetii, 30-31; Caesar marches up valley (52 B.C.), 106; Caesar intends to cross, in order to succour Province, 134
- Sappers' huts, 52, 87, 109, 113, 143
- Sathonay, 29
- Scheldt, 52; Nervian non-combatants take refuge near estuary, 57; Caesar marches towards lower valley, Eburones take refuge in marshes formed by estuary, 96
- Seduni, 59
- Seine, 4; legions winter between, and Loire (56-55 B.C.), 69; campaign of Labienus in valley of, 117, 129-31. *See* Lexovii, Meldi
- Senate, Roman, support Massiliots against Ligurians, 3; will not definitely assist Aedui against Ariovistus, 19; try to guard by diplomacy against threatened Helvetian invasion, 21; grant title to Ariovistus, 22; order a thanksgiving service in honour of Caesar's victories, 61; induced to vote pay for legions raised by Caesar on his own responsibility, 64; Caesar's treatment of Usipetes and Tencteri condemned in, 74
- Senates, of Gallic tribes, 12; senate of the Nervii, 57; senates of Ebuovices and Lexovii massacred, 66-7
- Senones (of Cisalpine Gaul), 2
- Senones, rebel against Caesar (54 B.C.), 91-2; inquiry into their conduct, 100; Caesar captures their stronghold, Vellaunodunum, 107; Labienus's campaign against, 129-31
- Sequani, 15; hire aid of Ariovistus against Aedui, subdued in turn by Ariovistus, 19-20; allow Helvetii to pass through their country, 28; ask Caesar's aid against Ariovistus, 37; Caesar occupies their stronghold, Vesontio, 39; send supplies to Caesar 43, n. 2; Caesar quarters troops in their country (58-57 B.C.), 46, n. 2; he intends to march through their country, to succour Province, 134; he quarters troops in their country (52-51 B.C.), 148. *See* App. A
- Serbannes, 121
- Sertorius, 68
- Sextius, his operations during attack on Gergovia, 125-6
- Sextius Bauculus, in battle with the Nervii, 55-6; at Octodurus, 60; saves Cicero's camp at Aduatuca, 98
- Slavery, in Gaul, 13
- Slingers, in Caesar's army, 23, 49, 51, 142; at Aduatuca, 84
- Soissons, 52. *See* Noviodunum (Suessionum)
- Somme, 68
- Sos, 67
- Sotiates, 67
- Spain, reinforcements from, join Aquitanians (56 B.C.), 68
- Spanish cavalry, employed by Caesar, 23, 81
- Strasbourg, 38
- Suessiones, Remi anxious to shake off their yoke, 48; join Belgic confederacy against Caesar, 48-9; surrender to Caesar, 52; threatened by Bellovaci, 151
- Suevi, threaten to reinforce Ariovistus, 38; return home, 46; harry Usipetes and Tencteri, 70; their superiority acknowledged by Usipetes and Tencteri, 71; Ubii solicit Caesar's aid against, 74; ready to fight Caesar, 75; send reinforcements to aid Treveri against Labienus, 95; Caesar too wary to attack, 95
- Sugambri, refuse to surrender cavalry of Usipetes and Tencteri to Caesar, 74; Caesar punishes, 75; harry land of Eburones, 97; attack Cicero's camp at Aduatuca, 97-9
- Switzerland, 4, 20. *See* Helvetii, Nantuates, Seduni, Veragri
- Tamahu, 6, n. 1
- Tarn, 4; Lucterius threatens to cross, 105
- Tasgetius, 79
- Telamon, battle of, 2

- Tencteri, cross the Rhine, 70; Caesar's campaign against, 71-4; effect of his massacre of, in deterring Germans from crossing Rhine, 92
- Tenth legion. *See* Legions
- Tertiary man, alleged traces of, in Gaul, 5
- Tentomatus, joins Vercingetorix, 116; surprised in attack on Gergovia, 124
- Teutoni, 18-19, 40, 48, 57
- Thuringia, 95
- Tigurini, defeat a Roman army (107 B.C.), 20; defeated by Caesar, 29
- Tille, 134
- Titurius Sabinus, holds bridge over Aisne at Berry-au-Bac, 49, 51; sent to disperse northern allies of Veneti, 64; defeats them, 66-7; placed in joint command at Aduatua, 79; attacked by Ambiorix, 80; overrules his colleague and abandons camp, 81-3; conduct in subsequent disaster, 83-5; killed, 85
- Tolosa, 67
- Tonnerre, 36
- Toulon-sur-Arroux, 33
- Tourmente, 154, 156
- Toutates, 18
- Towers (movable), in siege of Aduatucan stronghold, 58; used by Gauls in siege of Q. Cicero's camp, 87; stationary tower built on Caesar's second bridge over Rhine, 95; movable towers on *agger* at Avaricum, 109-10, 113-14; towers erected by Gauls at Avaricum, 112; Caesar's towers at Alesia, 139, 143, 145; tower at Uxellodunum, 156
- Traders, 25, 39, 97
- Transalpine Gaul. *See* Gaul
- Transmigration of souls, 17
- Trebatius, 76
- Trebonius, quartered at Samarobriua (54 B.C.), 79; Caesar marches with his legion to relieve Q. Cicero, 89; campaigns in south-western part of country of Eburones, 96; disarms Vellaunodunum, 107
- Treveri, auxiliary cavalry of, desert Caesar in battle with Nervii, 55; Labienus winters near western frontier of (54-53 B.C.), 79; disaffection of Treveri (54 B.C.), 80; Labienus hard pressed by, 89; rebellion of (54-53 B.C.), 91-5; forced by attacks of Germans to hold aloof from rebellion of Vercingetorix, 131
- Trèves, 64; two legions quartered near (53-52 B.C.), 104. *See* Treveri
- Tribes, Gallic, mutual relations of, 13-15, 78, 162
- Tribunes, military, 23, 39-40, 56, 60, 85
- Troucillus, 32, 43, App. D
- Troyes, 134
- Tulingi, 26; in battle near Bibracte, 35
- Tumuli*, 8
- Ubii, Caesar invites Usipetes and Tencteri to settle in their country, 72; beg Caesar to cross Rhine, 74; Caesar enters their country, 75; give him information about movements of Suevi, 95
- Unelli, 64
- Usipetes, cross the Rhine, 70; Caesar's campaign against, 71-4
- Uxellodunum, blockade and capture of, 154-7
- Vadimo, Boii defeated near lake of, 2
- Veliocasses, 151
- Vellaunodunum, captured by Caesar (52 B.C.), 107
- Venelli. *See* Unelli
- Veneti, their rebellion, 62-5; Caesar's campaign against, 65-6
- Veragri, 59. *See* Martigny
- Vercassivellaunus, 141; attacks Roman camp on Mont Réa, 143-5; captured, 145
- Vercellae, 19
- Vercingetorix, rebels against Caesar, chosen king and commander-in-chief, raises an army, 103; sends Luciterius to deal with Ruteni, enters country of Bituriges, who join him, 104; forced by Caesar's strategy to return to country of Arverni, 105; besieges Gorgobina, 106; raises siege and attempts to recover Noviodunum, 108; persuades Bituriges and other tribes to burn towns and granaries, 108; obliged to consent to defence of Avaricum, 108-9; encamps near Avaricum and harasses Caesar, 109-10; moves nearer Avaricum, 111; refutes charge of treachery, 111-12; advises garrison to evacuate Avaricum, 114; consoles troops for loss of Avaricum, 115; raises fresh levies, 116; destroys bridges over Allier, 117; plants himself on hill of Gergovia, 118; diligent in command, 119; bribes Convictolitavis to join rebellion, 120; fortifies western approach to Gergovia, 123; defeats Caesar at Gergovia, 124-6; fails to harass Caesar's retreat from Gergovia, 127; joined by Aedui, 127; resists their claim to direct campaign, re-elected commander-in-chief at Bibracte, 132; his plan of campaign, fortifies and provisions Alesia, attempts to gain

- Roman Province, 132-3 ; attacks Caesar with his cavalry near Dijon, 135-6 ; retreats beaten to Alesia, 136 ; failure of his first sortie, 137 ; sends out cavalry to fetch succour, 138 ; economises stores, 138 ; army organised for his relief, 140 ; his final stand, 142-5 ; surrender, imprisonment, and execution, 146 ; place in history, 146-8 ; other chiefs jealous of him, 162
- Vergobrets, 12. *See* Convictolitavis, Cotus, Dumnorix, Liscus
- Vertico, 88
- Vesontio, occupied by Caesar, 39 ; panic in Caesar's army at, 39-40 ; garrisoned by Caesar, 41 ; legions probably quartered there (58-57 B.C.), 46. *See also* 48
- Vienna (Vienne), 106
- Vieux-Laon, 49. *See* Bibrax
- Vilaine, 65
- Viridomarus, 121 ; seizes Noviodunum, 127 ; one of four generals in command of army destined for relief of Alesia, 141
- Viridovix, 66-7
- Viromandui, 53, 55
- Volunteers, 134
- Volusenus, at Octodurus, 60 ; attempts to assassinate Commius, 141
- Vosges, 41, 43
- Walls, Gallic, 112
- Yonne, 129, 134

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